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This dissertation develops an interpretation ofMartin Heidegger's philosophical
project in On the Way to Language and some of his earlier works that pave the way for
this text and offers criticism of Heidegger' s project in light of this interpretation. On the
Way to Language stands apart from most twentieth century philosophy in arguing that,
although human beings are within language in one sense, our relationship to language is
nevertheless an estranged one. Heidegger often describes this condition as "lacking the
word for the word." Because we are constantly speaking, we rarely if ever stop to wonder
about the nature of language itself. Heidegger calls this our "entanglement" within
language, a concept rooted in Being and Time's exposition ofthe human being's
thrownness. Read in terms of language, thrownness describes how we inherit concepts
and find ourselves entangled in words prior to our reflection upon them.
--- ----------------
v
Heidegger presents what motivates us to bring the word to word in two ways.
First, this need is rooted in the human being's fundamental structure ofthrownness.
Second, the need makes itself manifest through translation. My reading expands upon
these two explanations ofhow we come to experience this entanglement, arguing that
everyday communication regularly offers such experiences and demands that we modify,
therefore temporarily distancing ourselves from, given language inheritances. The
dissertation employs three other theorists, Roman Jakobson, Judith Butler, and Julia
Kristeva, to flesh out how this need naturally arises in ordinary language development.
Though he underestimates the extent to which everyday communicative situations
require ongoing transformations of ordinary language, Heidegger nevertheless considers
social encounters to be an important vehicle for language transformation. In this way, the
goal of bringing our thrownness into language to word is not to disentangle ourselves
from social relations, as some commentators have suggested. The last chapter shows how
Paul Celan's poetics, in its inheritance of Heidegger's project, expands upon the role of
social relations in language entanglement.
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1CHAPTER I
FINDING OURSELVES IN LANGUAGE:
HEIDEGGER AND THE LINGUISTIC TURN~
When one speaks of the philosophy of language, Heidegger is probably not the
first figure that comes to mind. In fact, one cannot locate any definition of language in
Heidegger's work, let alone a sustained description ofthe qualities, modes, and rules
which would distinguish it from other phenomena. What's more, the prospect of bringing
Heidegger's engagement with Sprache (language) into conversation with language
theorists from other traditions seems like an awkward effort motivated by no more than a
coincidence of words. Is it not foolish to insist on a dialogue between figures on the basis
of the fact that they use the same word? Why not admit that, for example, Saussure and
Heidegger are addressing two entirely different matters and limit Heidegger's
comparators to other explicitly ontological thinkers like Aristotle or Hegel?
Indeed, Heidegger sought to speak about language in a way that systematically
departed from the philosophical history of the word. Though this effort can be tracked
throughout the series of lectures and essays that comprise On the Way to Language, an
instructive example can be found in the "Dialogue on Language" (1953-4). In this
exchange, Heidegger discusses with Professor Tezuka whether there is a word in
Japanese for language. The richness of the dialogue hinges on the thoughtful way in
which Tezuka responds to the question. After much consideration, Tezuka appears to tlnd
his answer in what we are inclined to perceive as a sensuous image: Koto ba.! He offers
it, however, not as an image but, he says, as a hint. The enthusiasm Heidegger displays in
response to Tezuka's answer is revealing for lmderstanding where his interest in language
1 It is paliicularly difficult to give a summary explanation of this phrase. Tezuka fIrst notes that ba means
leaves, especially blossom leaves. Having already described Iki as the "pure delight of beckoning stillness,"
Tezuka explains that Koto names that which gives such delight in an event. It is the happening of the
graciousness which brings forth and allows flourishing. Koto ba names the petals that stem from Koto.
2does and does not lie. "That is a wondrous word," Heidegger rejoins, "and therefore
inexhaustible to our thinking. It names something other than our names, understood
metaphysically, present to us: language, glossa, lingua, langue. For long now, I have
been loath to use the word 'language' when thinking on its nature.,,2 Here we see
Heidegger's weariness of speaking about Sprache and his enthusiasm, instead, for what is
hinted at in this word.
It is through an attempt to loosen words from their sedimentation, understood
above as that which "names, understood metaphysically, present to us," that Heidegger
seeks to distinguish his approach to Sprache from others who aim to orient themselves by
way of the ready-to-hand, unquestionable presence of words. Rather than edifYing the
concept of language that is available to us, On the Way to Language tracks the
withdrawal of language from the word "language," a withdrawal which, as I shall later
address, Heidegger considers the very essence of language. As such, these meditations
are not easily incorporated by a philosophical approach whereby, on the basis of a
common term, one assumes the continuity of a subject martel' across a wide range of
authors. For this, critics from Adorno to Camap charge Heidegger's texts with a level of
encryption which makes it, at times, nearly impossible to evaluate their claims through
comparisons with other authors who treat "the same" theoretical subject matter.3 Part of
the worry, as I see it, is that in loosening the word from its historical sedimentation, and
following it toward the region of its withdrawal, Heidegger unsettles the grounds for
communication, which, in some part, lies in this historical sedimentation. Further, if
language's withdrawal means that it fundamentally eludes our ability to know it, then
Heidegger's approach to language seems to result in a skeptical position: a comportment
2 Martin Heidegger, "A Dialogue on Language," in On the JiVay to Language, trans. Peter Hertz (San
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1971),47.
3 I am drawing a comparison between Adomo and Camap's criticisms ofHeidegger only on this point. It is
worth noting that in The Jargon ofAuthenticity, Adomo actually faults Heidegger on the same grOlUlds as
he charges positivism. "Neither of them bother," he observes, "about the dialectical moment in which
language, as if it were something else, wins itself away from its magical origins, language being entangled
in a progressive demythologization. That paIiicular neglect authorizes the social using of linguistic
anachronism. The jargon simply ellllobles the antiquity oflanguage, which positivists just as simply long to
eradicate - along with all expression in language." - Theodor Adomo, The Jargon ofAuthenticity, trans.
Knut Tamowski and Frederic Will (Evanston: Northwestem University Press, 1973),42-43.
to knowledge which is perpetually haunted by the separation of A6yo~ and being, and
which, thus, continually rediscovers the impossibility of knowing and speaking.
In this chapter, I hope to show how Heidegger'sattention to the need for an
approach to language amounts to something more significant than a disregard for clarity
and something other than the melancholic alienation of the philosopher from his
language. For, as the first two sections of this chapter show, in tracking with Heidegger
the withdrawal of language from the word "language" as it has come to operate
metaphysically, we may discover the way in which our familiar relationship to words is
the site of unacknowledged and unresolved contradictions. In the fIrst section, I describe
these contradictions in our familiar relationship to language as thought's entanglement
with language, one that involves our inheritance of a historical tradition but is not
reducible to it. This entanglement spurs us to transform our relationship to language,
which involves rethinking the immediacy of our relation to it. It is this attempt to find
ourselves in language again through such reconstruction that I call the turn to language.
The second section of this chapter addresses one important aspect of how we
might find ourselves estranged from language, namely, as the experience of what
Heidegger calls "un-readiness-to-hand" (die Unzuhandenheit). Here I argue that the
experience of language that Heidegger describes in "The Nature of Language," which
seemingly emphasizes passivity and casts language as a kind of sovereign signifier that
one cannot question, should instead be read as prompting us to rethink our innnediate
relation to language.
In the third section, I look at one attempt to characterize the site of language's
claim. The focus here is on Wittgenstein's Tractatus in its attempt to establish a
relationship between word and being that illegitimates philosophical questioning of
language, including but not limited to skepticism. By exploring the irony of
Wittgenstein's own discourse, I show how, as Heidegger says, language proves to be
more than the conceptual framework of our thinking. There is something inexhaustible, I
will argue, in the difference opened up in our questioning of language, which proves
4difficult to incorporate into any metaphysical conception of language insofar it attempts
to ground and limit language to what is ready-to-hand.
Language consistently proves to be more than what we've taken it for. In the last
section, I develop this point further by looking at poetic experience and, in pm1icular, at
Heidegger's reading of a poem by Stefan George. The poet's turn to language is not
unlike Wittgenstein's in that language appears in unforeseen ways, for example, as
silence. Only this time, this possibility is not illegitimated but, on the contrary, emerges
as the voice ofthe poem - the event of its unique speaking - precisely that which the poet
in his turn to language hopes to effect or encounter.
Thinking and Speaking Through Entanglement
Our familiarity with speaking, for the most part, keeps us from reflecting much on
language. As conceptuality, language is the general form in which things give themselves
to be thought, and insofar as we are regularly thinking, this general fom1 seems both
fmniliar and obvious. We take it as constantly present and understand our thinking - for
some, even our primary experience - as linguistic. Linguistic concepts are the way in
which we immediately organize our experience. I look out ofthe window and I see
"house," "truck, "gray," "mud," "rain." Such concepts aren't limited to the grammatical
form of the noun. As I continue to gaze, I reflect momentm'ily on the scene's effect: "I am
calm." Language organizes and synthesizes my experience. Such conceptualization
happens so quickly - perhaps even immediately - that it is difficult to fathom that these
concepts tl1emselves are the result of mediation, construction, or work.
Though sometimes im10cuous, such realizations can result in a disturbance of the
way in which language functions "behind the scenes" of reflection by alienating language
in its immediacy 11:om the work of which it results and which it continues to enact. For
the most pm1, we fail to synthesize or to negotiate this alienation of our primary
experience. For example, if what we take fi'om the fact that what appears as our
immediate experience has actually been mediated via historical and cultural inheritances
5is that our primary experience is simply an illusion, this easily leads to a disposition
wherein the world organized by our concepts is a false world, or that our thinking merely
repeats a history and a culture without possibility of revision.
But philosophy, having frequently involved dispute over the true meaning of
terms, seems in part predicated upon the possibility that these inheritances which shape
our reflection require rethinking and that, in doing so, we may revise these errors and
understand the truth of the words we use. When Socrates asks about the meaning of
justice in The Republic or the meaning of love in The Syrnposium, he aims to critically
examine the way that these words are frequently used. Such meditations make us
question the working knowledge that we have of our language, not simply in order to
undemline this working knowledge but - through Dnopia (impasse) perhaps - to effect
some change in the way that we think about the words we use.
These efforts are difficult, because it is not as though one can simply abandon
usage in order to get to the truth of, say, justice or love. Our thinking is always already
immersed in and making use of language when we find ourselves in need of a new
approach. At the same time, however, breakdowns do occur in various forms that require
us, midway through the course of our speaking lives, to question just how this
conceptualization occurs. Upon leaming the cultural history of a word, for example, I
may find myself reoriented in the way that I hear it. Knowing its origins are tied to the
lynching of Blacks in America, I may not hear the word "picnic" as innocently as I did as
a young girl. These cultural histories stand to be forgotten when we experience language
as ahistorical and, by virtue of this, innocent. Conversely, the lack of historical awareness
with which many speak may be upsetting if I admire the history attached to a word. For
instance, I may have to remind myself of the intellectual labor and the nuanced thought
that went into shaping the concept of democracy in America when, given the way it is
used for the most part in our political discourse, I may be inclined to regard the word
"democracy" as meaningless.
Such historical awareness is an important way in which we can relate to our
language as something which requires and has always rested upon mediation. But one
6could also see the experience of writing as providing a similar insight. In sitting down to
write, I experience my relationship to language as requiring effort. I must make choices
anlOng different ways offOlIDulating what I want to say. Not only this, but having made a
decision, I may look back at it and realize that that a fOlIDulation I chose failed in the end
to say what I had hoped, and then I must revise it. This is a reciprocal process; my
thoughts and intentions don't directly express themselves into language, perfectly
worded, because it in the struggle to express our ideas that we are able to detemline what
thoughts are worthwhile and, thus, what intentions we have. As a foml of inquiry, the
process of writing invites us to question the initial relationship between our thoughts to
our words. Language ceases to operate merely as the immediate framework in which my
thoughts come to me. Instead, it appears as the destination my thoughts strive to reach.
What these examples show is that a complete phenomenological description of
language would have to address both ways that language operates in our lives: (l) as the
immediate, given framework of our thinking, and (2) as that destination toward which
thinking finds itself oriented for various reasons. Notice that in the latter case the
phenomenological description would itself encounter language as a practical question,
and, in this, it would cease to be purely description.
Throughout On the Way to Language, Heidegger emphasizes the need for, as the
title suggests, a way to language. For, as the experiences above make evident, as much as
it seems a constant presence in our existence, we must work on our relationship to it.
"The way to language is impossible," Heidegger claims, "if indeed we are already at that
point to which the way is to take us. But are we at that point? Are we so fully within
language such that we experience its nature, that we think speech as speech by grasping
its idiom in listening to it?,,4 A way to language would not be needed if language did not
seem to call us away from the way it operates as ilmate or transcendental structure and as
the inscription of culture upon the individual.
But as I have suggested, we experience this claim upon our being in manifold
ways. Moreover, apmi from this or that experience we may have, there are a number of
4 Martin Heidegger, "The Way to Language" in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz (New York:
Harper Collins, 1971), 112.
7weaknesses with these paradigms simply as theoretical descriptions of the phenomenon.
For instance, in conceiving oflanguage as an innate or transcendental structure or a
cultural inscription, one leaves out any first-person account of the way that language
becomes (and in some cases fails to become) significant for individuals. For to be
claimed by language and to be embedded in a signifying system are two different things.
Recall my description of conceptual language as the immediate form in which things give
themselves to be thought. We could rephrase this point by saying that language is the
form in which determinate, significant experiences give themselves. Now, asking how the
significance of language emerges seems nonsensical if one takes language to be the
source of all significance. For whatever then moves at the margins oflanguage enters
immediately into the realm of the indetenninate and meaningless.5
To note, there seems to be a significant contradiction in the way that we conceive
of language. For example. despite its a priori significance, words are still mere words,
that is, epiphenomenal. A word is at once the most determinant form that thought can
take and a mere shadow compared to what is beyond them. Real and unreal, sign and
signified, the status of the word- and, for that matter, our relation to it - is anything but
coherent.
One can see this in philosophy's ongoing struggle with rhetoric. When Gorgias
claims to teach the ali of logos, Socrates questions whether such an ali can really exist-
distinct fi'om the study of, say, medicine or political science. To know how to speak well
on a subject would seem to require that one has some genuine knowledge of that subject.
Without this, the art of rhetoric appears to be little more than smoke and mirrors,
sophistry in its propensity for deception. At the same time, any philosopher knows the
value of studying f0l111al argumentation. Replaying a move that Aristotle makes in his
Rhetoric, we trust that, by nature, arguments will tend toward truth and goodness rather
5 See, for example, Rudolf Camap' s "On the Character of Philosophical Problems" in The Linguistic Turn
edited by Richard ROlty (Evanston: University of Chicago, 1967). Here Camap tmderstands himself to be
giving a "positive" accOlmt of the character of philosophical propositions, in place ofWittgenstein's at the
end of the Tractatus. As I shall try to argue for the impOltance ofthis negative account for the place of
silence in the linguistic turn, I find it interesting that Camap's project, while understanding itself as a
continuation ofWittgenstein's work, seems on this point to leave behind this aspect of his project.
8than deception and ill wil1.6 In this, we maintain a place for self-evidence and intuition,
which CalUlot be derived from reason, even as we emphasize the need to submit all of our
assumptions and values to rigorous critique.
Philosophy's relationship to language today is an especially conflicted one. On
the one hand, we can be historically hyperconscious, by which I mean that we have a
strong sense that the way we think is determined by a history that we cannot escape.
Coupled with whatever lingering distrust of rhetoric there may be (perhaps dwindling in
response to the anti-intellectualism of the day), this suggests that we harbor some degree
of reluctance about how language affects our thinking. On the other hand, numerous
efforts have been made to rethink the concept of language that we have inherited.
ReculTently, philosophy seems to rearticulate the way that language structures our lives.
And yet, these assumptions are so deeply entrenched in our thinking that they've
appeared even in my own attempt to describe the history of language as the history of its
concept. When I say that there has been a history of efforts to rethink the way that
language structures our lives, I am presuming that these etlorts have all aimed to describe
the way that language functions as a medium. In this and other ways, it seems inevitable
that when we ask for the essence of language, we inevitably seek the concept. In other
words, we seek the concept oflanguage stripped of the historical baggage of the concept.
There seems to be no way of untangling language from the history of the concept.
As much as we Call see this history as contingent, we cannot leap out of it in order to get
a more objective idea of language.
It is from this situation of entanglement that Heidegger speaks in "The Nature of
Lallguage." In the first lecture, for example, he writes:
We speak and speak about language. What we speak of, language, is
always ahead of us. Our speaking merely follows lallguage constalltly.
Thus we are continually lagging behind what we first ought to have
overtaken and taken up in order to speak about it. Accordingly, when we
6 See Aristotle's Rhetoric, Book I, Chapter 1, Line 1355a 21: "Rhetoric is useful, because things that are
true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites ...." and 1355a37: "No;
things that are true and things that are better are, by their natme, practically always easier to prove and
easier to believe in." These remarks are taken by many commentators as a response to the Platonic
suspicion of rhetoric.
9speak of language we remain entangled in a speaking that is persistently
inadequate. 7
Language is historical. And this means that our thinking does not originate ex nihilo, not
only because we inherit celiain concepts from the past but because the very concept of
the concept is one such inheritance. Our thinking and our language are largely the
sedimentation of the past. In allowing this inheritance to come to light and in bringing out
the historical entanglement of any philosophical questioning of language, Heidegger's
own line of questioning opens up a space in which to rethink our relationship to what
seems impenetrably obvious. This space, however, is not the uncontaminated space
which results tJ:om what Sartre called accessory reflection. It is not that of a mind
considered in isolation from these assumptions. Rather, our entanglement with the
metaphysical language of the concept reveals the intractable inheritance of a historical
tradition.
As Heidegger says in "The Way to Language": "There is no such tlling as natural
language, a language that would be the language of a human nature occurring of itselt~
without a destiny. All language is historical, even where man does not lmow history in
the modem European sense."s
One can see that the conception of language as a historical inheritance could
easily lead us back to an attitude wherein language no longer seems question-worthy.
In truth, the image of sedimentation used earlier does not go far enough to describe the
relationship of history and thought, since in questioning our comportment to the constant
presence of language, our comportment to history is transfonned as well. In experiencing
our own thinking as the scene of historical inheritance, history becomes more than a
block of events that are fixed in the present as "the past."
This is why, in "The Nature of Language," Heidegger writes, "... (W)here we
already are, we are in such a way that at the same time we are not there, because we
7 Mmiin Heidegger, "The Nature of Language," in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Heliz (San
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1971), 75.
8 Martin Heidegger, "The Way to Language" in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Heliz (New York:
Harper Collins, 1971), 133.
10
ourselves have not yet properly reached what concems our being, not even approached
it.,,9 What concems our being (was unser Wesen belangt) requires some approach
(erlangen). Whether we are talking about history or language, our deepest inheritances
remain only alienated parts of our lives unless we find a way of experiencing them in
such a way that we are called to think about how their presence is convened in our lives.
Such an experience is precisely what Heidegger understands his lectures to work toward.
Undergoing the Event ofLanguage
According to Heidegger, exploring the Wesen oflanguage calls for us to have an
experience with language. The character of this experience requires explanation for a few
reasons. First, it is not obvious how an experience which (a) is not something universal to
all people and (b) is potentially anecdotal can be the most important thing for an effort to
arrive at the Wesen oflanguage. Secondly, I have emphasized the way that Heidegger's
approach makes us question language's immediacy, but experience seems to be relatively
pre-reflective - not in the sense that it isn't mediated by concepts in the way that I've
described - but in the way that is revealed when we, for example, talk about doing
something with a purpose vs. doing something just for the experience. We tend to talk
about experience as something that befalls us vs. something that our thoughts strive to
reach. Indeed, Heidegger at times speaks this way as well.
For example, Heidegger begins the first lecture of "The Nature of Language" with
a description of the nature of this experience. Here he contends that:
To undergo an experience with something - be it a thing, a person, or a
god - means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us,
overwhelms us and transf0I111S us. When we talk of 'undergoing' an
experience, we mean specifically that the experience is not of our own
making; to undergo here means that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it
strikes us and submit to it. It is this something that comes about, comes to
pass, happens.
9 Martin Heidegger, "The Nature of Language," 93.
11
To undergo an experience with language, then, means to let
ourselves be properly concerned by the claim of language by entering into
and submitting to it. 10
Mit etwas, .'lei es ein Ding, ein JvJensch, ein Gatt, eine Elfahrung machen
heifJt, dafJ es uns widelfahrt; daj3 es uns trijft, uber uns kommt, uns
umvvirft und verwandelt. Die Rede vom »machen« meint in diesel'
Wendung gerade nicht, dafJ wir die Erfahrung durch uns bewerkstelligen;
machen heifJt hier: durchmachen, erleiden, das uns Treffende vernehmend
empfangen, annehmen. insofern yvir uns ihm fugen. Es macht sich etwas,
es schickt sich, es fugt sich.
i\1it del' Sprache eine Erfahrung machen he(fit dann: uns vom
Anspruch del' Sfjrache eigens angehen lassen, indem wir auf ihn eingehen,
uns ihm fi~gen. 1
To experience language means to experience it as an event that we somehow undergo and
that is "not of our own making." As I've said, what is especially important about this
passage for my purpose is that it seems to contradict my earlier account of what often
causes us to question language: an experience of language as mediated and requiring
mediation. The insight, as I have described it, is precisely that language is of our own
making, both in that it is historical and in that one must make a way to it. Is this evidence
of yet another paradox in our conception of language?
Heidegger oilers some clarity on this when in "The Question Conceming
Technology," written four years earlier, he explains how modem teclmology positions
nature as a standing reserve (Bestand), which he describes as the way that "(e)verywhere
everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so
that it may be on call for a further ordering."l2 Nature becomes not only synonymous
with what is a priori and ilmate but what has no meaning in itself other than what we
make of it. Likewise, we understand words to be arbitrary containers for the meaning we
10 Ibid., 57.
II Mmiin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Band 12: Unterwegs zur Sprache (Frankfllli am Main: Vittorio
Klostel111mm, 1985), 159.
12 Mmiin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Teclmology" in Basic Writings, ed. David Krell (San
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993),322.
12
inseli into them. Like nature, we are oblivious to language as long as it fUnctions. The
relationship here, in fact, goes beyond analogy, since any technological enframing of
nature requires a technical language. 13
But as Heidegger describes in Being and Time, the breakdown of the tool can be
an extraordinarily discIosive occurrence, the kind of transformational event that might
lead us to experience it as more than whatever we utilize it for. In such an instance, the
nature of the tool reveals itself as conspicuous, as un-readiness-to-hand
(Unzuhandenheit). "Anything which is un-ready-to-hand in this way is disturbing to us,"
Heidegger remarks, "and enables us to see the obstinacy ofthat with which we must
concern ourselves in the first instance before we do anything else.,,14
The analysis is infonnative for understanding the relationship between our
familiar dealings with language and the possibility of experiencing it differently.
Whenever the invisible framework becomes suddenly conspicuous, we can experience
our comportment to language anew. Language the tool suddenly appears as striking and
transfonnational. But this doesn't mean that our everyday comportment to language is
simply overcome. Rather, this breakdown "enables us to see the obstinacy of that with
which we must concern ourselves in the first instance." The breakdown of a tool can be
revolutionary, but not in such a way that we become utterly free of the tool. Revolution
here is not so much a progress to something different but a return to the same in a new
way, as suggested in the Latin root, valvere, meaning to turn or return.
The analysis ofun-readiness-to-hand, then, suggests that an experience of
language as strange and overwhelming, while disrupting our everyday comportment to
language in a way, does not necessarily amount to an incapacitation of speech. While an
13 In What is Called Thinking, Heidegger writes: "But language is not a tool. Language is not this and that,
is not also something else besides itself. Language is language.... The boundlessness with which such
sentences can be abused corresponds to the infinity into which they direct the task ofthinking." - Martin
Heidegger, What is Called Thinking, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Gleml Gray (New York: Harper and Row,
1968), 153. Heidegger's defense of tautology can be understood as a rejection of the kind ofpredicative
logic whereby a tenn has content only through its predication. "Language is language" directs us back to
the being of the word which is presupposed by such predicative activity. In logic, we begin when some
telTIIS are "given."
14 Martin Heidegger" Being and Time, trans. Jolm Macquirrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco:
Harper Collins, 1962), §16, 103.
13
experience oflanguage as an estranging, sovereign force in one's life can certainly result
in such incapacitation at times, it can also prompt us to reorient ourselves to "the
obstinacy of that with which we must concem ourselves in the first instance:' "To let
ourselves be properly concemed by the claim of language" would require that we tum
ourselves to the event of language, retuming to the site of its claim.
One can see the revolution of modem literature as exemplary of this kind of tum
in the way it both preserves and radically transforms the history from which it departs.
But perhaps this tum characterizes any and all attempts to write. Is it not the weight of
what is present and ready-to-hand that spurs one to free language onto new
possibilities?15 If we take Heidegger's word that all language is historical and that there is
no such thing as a natural language in the sense of a language wholly present to hand,
then even realism should be viewed as a struggle to free speech from its sedimentation.
But if we can see this struggle with entanglement present in literature in this way, this
suggests that we needn't understand the experience we have been describing as limited to
that of a single individual. Indeed, at the very end of "The Way to Language," Heidegger
quotes Wilhelm von Humboldt, whose "deep dark insights into the nature oflanguage,"
according to Heidegger, "we must never cease to admire": "A people could," Humboldt
says, "by imler illumination and favorable circumstances, impart so different a fonTI to
the language handed down to them that it would thereby tum into a wholly other, wholly
new language.,,16
On my reading, this "wholly other, wholly new language" is not something that
we encounter as separate from the struggle to disentangle language, opening up new
possibilities for it. It is precisely in speaking from out oftheir entanglement in what is
15 Roland BaIthes addresses the relationship between literature, revolution, and history in Writing Degree
Zero, where he says: "It is not granted to the writer to choose his mode of writing from a kind of non-
temporal store of literaI)' fon11s ... There is a Histol)' of Writing. But this HistOl)' is dual: at the very
moment when general histOl)' proposes - or imposes - new problematics of the litermy language, vvriting
still remains full of the recollection of previous usage, for language is never innocent: words have a second-
order memOl)' which mysteriously persists in the midst of new meanings. Writing is precisely this
compromise between freedom and remembrance ...." - RolaIld Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, traIlS.
Atmete Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968), 16.
16 Martin Heidegger, "The Way to Language," 136.
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"handed down," that the freedom of language emerges. And insofar as such freedom -
here in the fon11 of literary revolution - means that one finds oneself momentarily freed
from arbitrariness and released upon the possibility of speaking otherwise, this site of
struggle is essential to the nature of language.
The experience is a shared one, because the attempt to re-encounter one's
relationship to language demands that we explore new ways of speaking. One can find
this effort underway throughout Heidegger's writing and speaking career, in that he
continually sought ways to draw our attention to language as it came to pass, not merely
as a set of instrumental signs, but as an event of thinking itself. Note that this does not
mean that we stop using words, only that our use changes.17 What speech does changes. I
will retUlTI again to address poetic transfOlmation of language at the end of the chapter.
For now, I want to make a new approach to understanding the situation of entanglement,
this time through the example of philosophical inquiry.
To Say Nothing Except What Can Be Said
So tar, we have looked at a few important examples of experiences in which our
working knowledge of language becomes disrupted. These problems arise, 110t only
during philosophical inquiries into the nature of things, but on a day-to-day basis for all
human beings trying to orient themselves in the world. The disruption has the character
of both a theoretical and a practical problem: we may speak of contradictions in our
conception of and our attitudes toward language. From these examples, we can also see
that disruptions of language in its immediacy needn't lead simply to an incapacitation of
speaking; instead, they offer opportunities for the sort oftransfol1nation and enrichment
that language often needs. The breakdown of language may push us toward a more
authentic way of inheriting what, in the first instant, we find olU'selves always already
17 As Heidegger writes in "The Origin ofthe· Work of Alt": "Of course the poet also uses the word not,
however, like ordinary speakers and writers who have to consume them, but rather in such a way that the
word only now truly becomes a word and remains a word (my emphasis)."
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immersed in. Rather than an obstacle to our anival at the truth of language, entanglement
seems to be the site of a difference that is essential to the nature of language.
In the end of the previous section, I suggested that we could see modern literature
as an example of how it is possible to speak from out of our entanglement in language,
and in so doing, to preserve the site of difference opened up in this situation. In this
section, I want to explore the efforts of philosophers to think from out of the same
entanglement. What I hope to demonstrate is: (a) how this entanglement motivates the
philosophical tum to language, and (b) how, insofar as this turn tries to establish language
as a ground for thinking, and thus to disentangle itself from skepticism and other
intelicities, it finds itself once again encountering contradiction. Though I will briefly
mention other thinkers, my analysis will ultimately focus on Wittgenstein, and more so
on his early project so as to: (1) in this section, compare how Wittgenstein and Heidegger
understand the importance of transgressing beyond the limit that language gives us, and
(2) in the last section, compare Wittgenstein's understanding of the kinship of word and
being to Heidegger's account of the experience of this kinship in Stefan George's poem
"Das Wort," showing how a transgression of the limits of language is at play in both
texts.
Only two years before Heidegger began his lectures on "The Nature of
Language," J.L. Austin was captivating his Harvard audience with his seminal work on
speech-act theory, "How to Do Things with Words." The result of Austin's efforts: a
sense that for a long time now, philosophy has conceived of language too narrowly by
treating all statements as constative (true or false) and a belief that by paying closer
attention to the perfonnative function of language, we could get a fuller picture of how
language works. 18 Indeed, there were many philosophers at this time for whom language
18 One of the important things to note about Austin's lectmes is that they demonstrate how the question, "Is
that tme?," is not an appropriate question to ask ofal! statements. In this way, the kind of knowledge that
language provides us is not the kind oflmowledge in every case that we can doubt. Wittgenstein's
treatment of skepticism - in the Tractatus and in the Philosophical Investigations - paves the way for
Austin's anslysis. In the Tractatus, for example, he ,vrites: "Scepticism is not inefutable, but obviously
nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked." - Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Tractatus Logico-PhilosophicllS, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuim1ess. (London: Routledge, 2001), §6.5,
81.
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had become positively captivating in that it retumed them again to the cite oflanguage's
claim upon their thinking.
Just as language presents a question for individuals who seek, as Heidegger puts
it, to "properly reach what concems (their) being," language presents a question,
theoretical and practical, for philosophy in its historical becoming. Nowhere is this more
evident perhaps than in what has been called the linguistic tum. For the purposes ofmy
argument, the linguistic tum describes a philosophical movement wherein the analysis of
discourse, especially the laws which govem it, is preeminent and wherein this activity is
understood as a radical departure from previous philosophical methods.
To what extent does the linguistic tum of the twentieth century have its roots in
earlier epochs, as in Greek philosophy? For many Greek thinkers, from Heraclitus to
Plato's Socrates to Aristotle, ,,,6yor; (language, speech) is fundamental to philosophical
investigations. I do not intend to give a scholarly historical account of that cOlmection
here. The answer I have to give has already been provided. First, insofar as I understand
any effort to re-orient oneself to language as an attempt to come to terms with
inheritance, including, for example, the concept of the concept, I believe that nearly any
twentieth century philosophical project on language struggles with its inheritance from
the past and especially from Greek thought. Second, Greek thinkers found themselves
concerned with their relationship to language, and this seems to suggest that their
language was perhaps no more unproblematically present at hand to them than modem
thinkers. They took language as a question: one which confronted them at least as much
practically as theoretically.
This is to say that the intense concem with language in the larger philosophical
world during Heidegger's time was not an isolated movement. And though the particular
features of the linguistic tum in the twentieth century may have celiain qualities which
exemplify modemity, it cannot be wholly limited to the modem age. The movement is a
continuation of an ongoing effort to position thinking vis-a.-vis the entanglement with
language in which it finds itself.
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Yet the historical self-understanding of the movement as a radical departure from
previous philosophical methods seems to be one of its defining characteristics. What is
peculiar, however, is that this new method, rather than discovering new possibilities,
requires that one encolmter language as an absolute, sovereign, and natural limit to
thought. For the linguistic turn is, as we shall see in Wittgenstein, an attempt to break
away from the philosophical history of metaphysics, from the attempt to address the
nature of concepts and things in themselves apaIt from the way that we speak about them.
Through the linguistic turn, philosophy becomes conscious of its activity as
limited in a new way: limited to responding to a discourse that it inherits, the dictates of
which, in the best case, it willfully submits. In the words of Richard ROliy, the linguistic
turn finds that "philosophical problems are problems which may be solved (or dissolved)
either by refOlTI1ing language, or by understanding more about the language we presently
use.,,19 Whether by articulating an ideal philosophical language or discovering the rules
that regulate our everyday spoken language, through this turn it was thought that
philosophy could avoid the pitfalls of metaphysical discourse. And so, philosophy was in
many ways heeding Heidegger's call to submit to the experience of language (uns ihm
jZ:igen).
In one sense, Heidegger's engagement with Sprache seems to exemplify this
philosophical movement: his thinking becomes increasingly Oliented toward language in
the later half of his life, and he insists that seeking the nature of language requires us to
explore nature on its own terms by bracketing paradigms borrowed from other kinds of
inquiry. There are important differences though. Despite this affinity, in the discussion
that follows Heidegger's initial remarks on experience (Erfahrung), Heidegger
distinguishes his goal from certain manifestations of the linguistic turn. He writes:
But this, to undergo ail experience with laIlguage, is something else again
than to gather information about language. Such information -linguists
and philologists of the most diverse languages, psychologists and analytic
philosophers (Sprachphilosophie) supply us, and constantly increase the
. supply, ad infinitum. Of late, the scientific and philosophical investigation
19 Richard ROliy, ed. The Linguisitic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method, (Evanston: University of
Chicago Press, 1967),3.
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of languages is aiming ever more resolutely at the production of what is
called 'metalanguage.' Analytical philosophy (wissenschaftliche
Philosophie), which is set on producing this super-language
(Ubersprache), is thus quite consistent when it considers itself
metalinguistics. That sounds like metaphysics - not only sounds like it, it
is metaphysics. Metalinguistics (die j\1etalinguistik) is the metaphysics of
the thoroughgoing teclmicalization of all languages into the sole operative
instrument of interplanetary information. Metalanguage and sputnik,
metalinguistics and rocketry are the Same.20
In its totalizing and globalizing effect, Heidegger contends, metalinguistics, the
construction of a philosophically perfect language, is no different than metaphysics. The
construction of a super-language, ever the symbol of man's hubris since at least the story
of Babel (Genesis 11:1-9), here constitutes a kind of technological megalomania,
transgressing any heretofore recognized bOlmdaries of human dwelling. But was not this
revolution in philosophy's activity, the linguistic turn, supposed to break away from
metaphysics once and for all? Indeed, the argwnent that analytical philosophy is
consistent with the metaphysical tradition, from which it aims to disassociate itself, can
be read as a challenge to a prevailing understanding of metaphysics at that time. This
understanding had been long in the making. Following Hume, Kant took metaphysical
inquiries to be those that extend beyond experience and transgress the reach of its
tribunal. Likewise, the philosophy of the linguistic turn draws a line across human
inquiry in order to set off questions that transcend the limits of knowledge. The
difference is that, in this twentieth century tradition, metaphysics is contrasted, not with
empirical knowledge, but with language. The dictates of language are its triblmal. In the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, for example, Wittgenstein describes the task of
philosophy as the effort:
to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural
science - i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy - and then,
whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to
20 Mattin Heidegger, "The Nature of Language," 58.
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demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in
his propositions (my emphasis).21
As Wittgenstein understands it, metaphysics is an illegitimate use of language, a form of
gibberish whose incoherency results from the fact that it has rushed past the restrictive
limits of thought. The activity of philosophy, once purged of its lofty ambitions, becomes
no more than "to say nothing except what can be said," (Nichts zu sagen, als was sich
sagen ltisst), understood here as the propositions of natural science (Naturwissenschajt).
as opposed to metaphysical speculation. But how does one come to know the limit at
which philosophy must stop asking questions? Wittgenstein's answer changes tluoughout
his career. In the Tractatus, the analysis of how meaning attaches to propositions
detemlines this point. As A.C. Grayling explains, the philosopher's task, as enacted by
Wittgenstein, is:
... to reveal the nature of language and its relation to the world, which in
effect amounts to explaining how meaning attaches to the propositions we
asseli.... And this, for Wittgenstein, is as we have seen the same as
identifying the limits of thought; since the limits of language and thought
are the same, an investigation of the former constitutes an investigation of
the latter.22
Thinking through the nature oflanguage in this case means carrying out an analysis of
how meaning attaches to propositions. 23 Moreover, it involves analyzing the conditions
in which propositions (and questions) are meaningless. As we have seen, Wittgenstein
identifies such utterances as metaphysical.
In the later years of his life, Wittgenstein seems to rethink the way language's
limiting of thought is established. In the Philosophical Investigations, there is a
21 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London:
Routledge, 2001), §6.53, 89.
22 A.C. Grayling, Wittgenstein, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 15.
23 At fIrst glance, Wittgenstein seems to view language as thoroughly descriptive, or, in Austin's words,
constative. Upon closer inspection, though, Wittgenstein's interest in the meaning of propositions is
actually an interest in how meaning comes into effect, how it is activated. Meaning, therefore, means more
than a property of a proposition. It is an OCCUITence, which, in fact, cOITelates with other occurrences. most
notably, successful communication, or in Austin's terms, successful speech-acts.
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significantly lesser portion of the text dedicated to explaining in a teclmical way how
meaning attaches to propositions and almost no mention of Naturwissenschcift. Instead,
Wittgenstein's approach to language is more phenomenological, as is evident from the
book's refrain: "Look and see." The difference between meaningful and meaningless
speech is something that we become familiar with through our everyday practical affairs,
only that we have a stubborn tendency to stray from this mode. Wittgenstein writes:
We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound, essential, in our
investigation, resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of
language. That is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition,
word, proof, truth, experience, and so on. This order is a super-order
between - so to speak - super-concepts. Whereas, of course, if the words
'language,' 'experience,' 'world,' have a use, it must be a humble a one as
that of the words 'table,' 'lamp,' 'door.'
Wir sind in del' Tauschung, das Besondere, Tiefe, das uns Wesentliche
unserer Untersuchung liege darin, daj3 sie das unvel'gleichliche Wesen del'
Sprache zu begre(fen trachtet. D. i., die Ol'dnung, die zwischen den
Begr(ffen des Satzes, FVortes, Schliej3ens, del' Wahl'heit, del' E'1ahl'ung,
u.s. w. besteht. Diese Ol'dnung ist eine Ober-Ordnung zwischen -
sozusagen - Obel'-Begr(ffen. Wahrend doch die Worte 'Sprache, '
'Erfahrung, , 'Welt,' wenn sie eine Verwendung haben, eine so niedrige
haben miissen, vvie die Worte 'Tisch,' 'Lampe, ' 'Tiir. ,24
Like Heidegger, Wittgenstein here in the Investigations charges philosophy - and, in
particular, philosophy as metalinguistics - with an attempt to construct a super-language.
Such a language is, on Wittgenstein's view, illegitimate insofar as it disrupts the
usefulness of language. The meaning of our words, according to Wittgenstein in the
Investigations (§43) lies in their use; moreover, our practical knowledge of this use is not
furthered by thinking about what is "peculiar, profound, (or) essential" about language.
Here the philosopher is made "hlill1ble" before the limits of his or her power. In this,
there is continuity between the early and the later phases ofWittgenstein's thought, in
that, in both texts, philosophy runs up against its limits, and the limit in each case is the
criteria for meaningful speech.
24 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 2001), §97, 38.
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When Heidegger says that the attempt to secure these criteria by way of
metalinguistics is an example of metaphysics, however, he does not mean metaphysics as
opposed to meaningful, useful speech or as opposed to the propositions of
Naturwissenschaft. In order to get a better sense of Heidegger's general discussion of
metaphysics, let us recall the description Heidegger gives in "What is Metaphysics?,"
where he addresses the nature of metaphysics through a single metaphysical question:
"What is nothingness (das Nichts)?" After describing what motivates many of us to ask
after such seemingly impossible questions, Heidegger concludes that, "Metaphysics is
inquiry beyond or over beings that aims to recover them as such and as a whole for our
grasp." He adds: "In the question conceming the nothing such an inquiry beyond or over
beings, beings as a whole, takes place. It proves thereby to be a metaphysical question.,,25
On this point, any positivist would agree. If "beings" indicates the mundane, empirical
realm of Sinn, of tables, lamps, doors, and so on, then metaphysics is the effort to
transcend just this.
In light of the description from "What is Metaphysics?," we can now better
understand Heidegger's association of metalinguistics and metaphysics. Metalinguistics
is inquiry beyond or over (meta) the study of particular languages which aims to recover
the diversity of these language difIerences as such and as a whole for our grasp.
Language differences are automatically recovered into an identity. In this way, all of the
world's spoken and written languages can be lmderstood according to a single grammar,
a single logic, and a single privileged system of signs. It was for this reason that Tezuka
stmggled to articulate his word for language, and, in light of this, the association of
metalinguistics and globalization does not seem so far-fetched. 26
Moreover, since linguistic conceptuality is the way that things give themselves to
be thought, in ordering words "as a whole for our grasp;" metaphysical inquiry shapes
25 Maliin Heidegger "What is Metaphysics?" in Patlunarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998),93-4.
26 See Heidegger's 1960 address entitled "Sprache und Heimat" (in Gesamtausgabe Band 13) for a more
sustained discussion of the dangers of creating a unified language. Here Heidegger addresses the profound
significance for om time of the disappearance of languages and the domination of certain languages over
others. He also argues in this address that language is irreducibly plmal and bound to multiple dialects.
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our experiences of things at the most fundamental level. It organizes the way things give
themselves to thinking, which in calling a framework I've already metaphysically framed
in a particular way. In this way, metaphysical inquiry into language is an attempt to
ground not only our speech but our thinking. It is an attempt to "recover" an originary
encounter with that into which, in the first instance, we find ourselves always already
thrown.
Toward the end of the first lecture, Heidegger calls the search for a ground
philosophy's radical stance:
Thinking is more thoughtful in proportion as it takes a more radical stance,
as it goes to the radix, the root of all that is. The quest of thinking always
remains the search for the first and ultimate grolmds. Why? Because this,
that something is and what it is, the persistent presence of being, has from
of old been detemlined to be the ground and foundation. As all nature has
the character of a ground, a search for it is the founding and grounding of
the ground or foundation. 27
The effort to think from out of the entanglement of thinking and language is, in its
metaphysical form, an attempt to recover language as a ground and a root: a ground for
knowledge, a root for thinking. In this, it discovers the being of thinking and speaking as
emanating from one and the same source.28 As Heidegger explains in the essay "On the
Essence of Truth," this concordance secures language in the sense of securing the
condition for propositional truth. And it is precisely this concordance that, for many,
structures the limits of philosophical inquiry. It is in reaching this Dpxil-limit, that
thinking discovers the parameters of its world and the way it belongs to this world. On
the other hand, the absence of this belonging - discordance - is what Wittgenstein
27 Mmtin Heidegger, "The Nature of Language," 71.
28 Here Heidegger speaks of the way that truth comes to be unquestionably a matter of adequatio intellectus
et rei. He describes the way that a theological order enables a modem framework oftmth within which the
"capacity of all objects to be plmmed by means of a worldly reason [Weltvernu'?ftJ which supplies the law
for itself and thus also claims that its procedme is inmlediately intelligible (what is considered 'logical').
That the essence of propositional tmth consists in the COITectness of statements needs no further special
proof." - Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Tmth" in Basic Writings, ed. David Krell (San Francisco:
Harper Collins, 1977), 121.
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articulates when in the Investigations, he remarks that the predicament of a philosophical
dilemma has the character of saying: "I have lost my way."
But beneath every account of the kinship of word and being lies the experience of
having lost this concordance. It is this experience of having lost one's way, after all, that
propels us to search for "first and ultimate grounds," in whatever way we want to
conceive this: nature, thinking, God, social life, or language. This is why, for Heidegger,
metaphysics does not lie on one side of the line; it is the drawing of the line.
The description of language philosophy as metaphysics is, therefore, not simply
pejorative. Indeed, immediately after this passage, Heidegger explains that such inquiry
has its place. "Such investigation has its own particular justification and retains its own
importance," Heidegger writes, "But scientific and philosophical infOlmation is one
thing; an experience we undergo with language is another. ,,29 While, on my reading, the
attempt to conceptualize language can be tmderstood as a way of responding to the claim
of language, relating to language as Heidegger's point suggests that there is something
about the experience of language that remains excessive to scientific knowledge. In the
experience of entanglement, language's immediacy appears as something which we must
continually re-approach. For om relationship to language is as much one of mediation as
it is ofillunediacy. Near and far, ideal and real, beyond and underfoot: these two aspects
of language seem to cradle thought rather than simply provide a firm ground for it.
But in discovering one's way and, as it were, recovering one's beginning, the
difference which allowed for us to make om way to language in the first place stands to
be forgotten. Lines are drawn between legitimate and illegitimate language. In
Wittgenstein's account, for example, after philosophical discomse leads thinking to run
aground and find its home in language, it is abandoned. In the words of the Tractatus:
"My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me
eventually recognizes them as nonsensical (unsinnig), when he has used them - as steps-
29 Martin Heidegger, "The Nature of Language," 59.
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to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throwaway the ladder after he has
climbed up it. ),,30
The search for a limit wherein philosophy would at last no longer transcend its
bounds remains ever at odds with itself because the discourse by which it arrives at its
ideal language is itself outside of the bounds of this ideal. This is the general irony of the
linguistic tum: the question of how to grolmd language could not emerge unless language
came to appear as wlsettled, as in need of some growlding; and yet language appears as a
growld, a limit, by which all philosophical questions will be, in the words ofRorty,
"solved or dissolved." In this, the parameters of the world established in the discovery of
the 0 PX11 -limit are always transcended by what does not appear to originate from that
ground. In this way, the establishment of the confluence of word and being reveals an
irreducible remainder for which it Call1iOt account. Hence, the linguistic turn never
manages to tear itself wholly away from the danger of illegitimate speech, of a language
that emanates not from radix of beings but from out of the stmggle to find it, out of the
condition which I have called, following Heidegger, our entanglement.
LaIlguage's emergence as what is excessive to this metaphysical grounding can be
seen through other examples as well. In the 1951-1952 lectures entitled "What is Called
Thinking?," Heidegger tells us that:
Language admits of two things: One, that it be reduced to a mere system
of signs, unifonnly available to everybody, and in this foml be enforced as
binding; and two, that language at one great moment says one unique
thing, for one time only, which remains inexhaustible, because it is always
originary, and thus beyond the reach of any kind ofleveling. 31
The remark is spulTed by Nietzsche's prophetic and ominous statement: "The wasteland
grows." Heidegger here describes that, in order to tmly hear these words, one must go
beyond interpretation, since, as he says in the passage above, there is something about
this statement that is "inexhaustible ... always originary, and thus beyond the reach of
any kind of leveling." But how should one understand this aspect of language that is
30 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, §6.54, 89.
31 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, 192.
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excessive to interpretation? Is it the fact that this statement could mean many different
things? Is its inexhaustibly simply a matter of indetenninacy?
A passage from Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology ofPerception gives a clue.
Here Merleau-Ponty writes:
It is said again and again that sounds and phonemes have no meaning in
themselves, and that all our consciousness can find in language is what it
has put there.... But this is just what the experience of language refutes.
It is true that communication presupposes a system of correspondences
such as a dictionary provides, but it goes beyond these, and what gives its
meaning to each word is the sentence. It is because it has been used in
various contexts that the word gradually accumulates a significance which
it is impossible to establish absolutely. A telling utterance or a good book
impose their meaning upon US. 32
In the "system of conespondences" that communication presupposes, language is
established as "uniformly available to everybody" and as "binding," in other words, as a
transcendental ground, the a priori condition of meaningful speech, or what I've called
the [JPx11-limit. On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty describes a language that seems to
arise precisely at the margins of communicability, where the event or occurrence of
language is foregrounded. Such writing cannot be "reduced to a mere system of signs,"
for it seems to rigorously pursue an exemption from just this system. What makes a
statement "beyond the reach of any leveling" is not an excess of objective or subjective
meaning; in other words, it is not that the words have such a surplus of objective meaning
that they exceed the subject's intentions, nor that the subject's intended meaning was too
much to contain somehow. The statement is "always original," because its claim upon us
seems to call for something beyond detennining its meaning through the author's
subjective intention or through a record of past usage. Its saying-power lies in its
movement towards the margins of communicability, in its treeing of language toward a
yet ungrounded possibility. I have spoken a lot about the writer's perspective; however,
the claim oflanguage belongs to the reader's experience as well. From the perspective of
the reader, what is inexhaustible is not an infinite series of meanings which could
32 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology o/Perception trans. Collin Smith, (London: Routledge, 2002),
452.
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possibly be given but the claim of language, the call (heissen) of language, the way
Nietzsche's words become originary precisely in our efforts to translate them and to
detelmine anew their meaning. 33
We see, then, two ways in which the delimiting project of metaphysics and
metalinguistics is unsettled by the existence of a kind of speaking which transgresses the
limits set down: (1) the way a philosophical relationship to language, which is excluded
from legitimation, nevertheless serves as the condition for the discovery of the criteria of
legitimacy, and (2) the way, despite a system of equivalences in place to COlmect new
utterances to a history of past usage, a kind of speaking is possible which twists itself free
from that interpretive framework. Language continually transcends the limits that we
establish for it. This is not to say that it such limits serve no purpose. For whatever limits
are put on thought by language do more than restrict speculations and cllliail wayward
speech; they open up the possibility for thinking to inhabit language in new ways.
Recall that I mentioned in the beginning that, for various reasons, incorporating
Heidegger's remarks on Sprache into the general field of the philosophy oflanguage
presented difficulty. Now we have a better understanding of why this is. Heidegger
questions to what extent the originary relationship with language that metaphysical
inquiry recovers is truly originary, ultimately suggesting that not only the most familiar
and immediate fonn in which we know language but also the basic way in which we
reorient ourselves to this form covers over the originary role it plays in our thinking. The
turn to language is not just a method whereby we set ourselves in the right place to gaze
upon language in its inm1ediate givenness; the turn to language belongs to the being of
1 . It''4anguage Itse .-
33 It is w011h noting that Heidegger uses the same word, "inexhaustible" (unerschOpjZich), to describe both
Tezuka's Koto ba and Nietzsche's declaration.
34 This idea recalls a section from "The Dialogue on Language" where Heidegger and Tezuka are
discussing the place ofhel1ueneutics in Heidegger's thought. When asked why the words "hermeneutics"
and "phenomenology" disappear from Heidegger's vocabulary early on, Heidegger explains that
"hel111enutics means not just the interpretations but, even before it, the bearing of the message and tidings,"
adding that it was this original sense of the word that prompted him to use it in Being and Time. The two go
on to discuss how language and hermeneutics are one and the same, since both bear up the relation ofthe
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The Absurdity ofRenunciation, The Silence ofLanguage
Though language is familiar, our relationship to language is not fully
encompassed by this familiarity. In the second installment of "The Nature of Language,"
Heidegger suggests that the Wesen of language is - not in its being present at hand - but
its withholding. "If language everywhere withholds its nature in this sense, then such
withholding is the very nature oflanguage.,,35 This is a difficult thought to wrap one's
head around, since it seems that this kind of withholding means that we lack knowledge
of the thing that withdraws. How then can a lack of knowledge also give us the nature of
something'? What is striking, however, is that this formulation is the reversal of what one
might expect of an expression of skepticism. For it is not that things in themselves
withdraw from our language, knowledge, and experience. It is language itself that
withdraws. What then does this withdrawal mean for the tum to language as I have
developed it?
In this holding back, language brings itself to language (bringt sich die Sprache
selbst zur Sprache). Heidegger writes:
But when does language speak itself as language? Curiously enough,
when we cmmot find the right word for something that concerns us, carries
us away, oppresses or encourages us. Then we leave unspoken what we
have in mind and, without rightly giving it thought, undergo moments in
which language itself has distantly and fleetingly touched us with its
essential being.36
Wo abel' kommt die Sprache seiber als Sprache zum Wort? Seltsamerweise
dort, wo wir fur ehl'as, vvas uns angeht, uns an sich reifJt, bedrangt oder
befeuert, das rechte Wort nichtjinden. Wir lassen dann, was ~wir meinen,
im Ungesprochenen und lnachen dabei, ohne es recht zu bedenken,
human to the two-fold, that is, ontological difference. The discussion reiterates the point that the way to
language is something more than a method taken by a subject in order to access an object of inquiry.
35 Mmtin Heidegger, "The Natme ofLmlguage," 81.
36 Ibid., 59.
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Augenblicke durch, in denen uns die Sprache seiber mit ihrem Wesen
fernher undjluchtig gestreift hat.37
In a way, the thought here resonates with the common presumption that I described
earlier, namely, that words are mere shadows of reality, since when words fail us, our
being is given to us immediately and, for that reason, intensely. But Heidegger describes
this experience, not as one oflanguage's ineffectiveness, but as one that brings us to the
essence oflanguage. On this point, Heidegger's thought is markedly different from that
of positivism. Whereas the claim oflanguage there appears as a silencing of thoughts that
exceed the boundaries of meaningful language, Heidegger presents the Wesen of
language as emerging in this silence.
An experience of language is an experience of this silence. The meaning of
silence here is not restricted to the cessation of all speech though. Dennis Schmidt
observes:
In the light of claims, such as one fInds in Heidegger, that language needs
to be heard precisely as that which emerges out of the unsayability of
silence, the need to 'speak' of silence becomes all the more pressing. And
yet no direct discourse on silence is possible, no word summons it as
word. It only appears obliquely. Only at the margins of the word do we
become sensible of it. 38
To say that silence's appearance is oblique is not, however, to say that it exists only in
opposition to speech, for wherever there is speech, there is also silence. The grant of
silence enables the occurrence of speech just as the grant of space enables time. This is
more than just an analogy. Synchrony is the condition for diachronic speech-acts.
Because these acts, whether spoken or written, are gestures in time, and, as Kant argued,
any intuition of time entails one of space, language always unfolds in a kind of space.
The white paper is the space upon which ink is organized (a space that is foregrounded by
Concrete poets). It recedes into the background in order to let the ink take on shape and
37 Mmiin Heidegger, Gesaumtausgabe, Band 12: Untenvegs zur Sprache, 136.
38 Dermis Sclunidt, Lyrical and Ethical Subjects (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 91.
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relation. Likewise, it is the silence between sounds which allows one to hear them each as
distinct from one another.
But space and silence are more than transcendental conditions of language.
Silence, as the limit of language, is that which language presses toward in its withdrawal,
a withdrawal that, as we have seen, Heidegger understands as the emergence of language
in its essence. Just as in the previous section we traced how language emerges beyond its
metaphysical limits, we may talk about silence (along with space, inarticulability, and
other limits) as an appearance of language that moves beyond its initial familiar fon11.
Note that this, the essence oflanguage, cannot ultimately be separated from the speech in
which we find ourselves entangled. As Heidegger says in What is Called Thinking?: "As
we are drawing toward what withdraws, we ourselves are pointing toward it ... (D)rawn
into what withdraws, drawing toward it and thus pointing into the withdrawal, man first is
man. His essential nature lies in being such a pointer.,,39 What this passage tells us is that
the withdrawal of language, for Heidegger, cannot be lmderstood as the cause - efficient
or final - of our speech. The withdrawal of language is not the Cpxi] of language. Nor
does the withdrawal of language mean that we lose the capacity to speak. In fact,
according to the passage above, the withdrawal appears only insofar as we bring it into
view by pointing to it, indicating it.
The possibility ofpointing toward this withdrawal is what Heidegger lmderstands
as the unique compOliment of Dichtung. Our entanglement within language, which - if
you will recall - is in part our entanglement in the history of language, pushes us to find a
way of coming into our own from out of this inheritance. Here there is the potential for a
signitlcant transfom1ation, since poets (Heidegger uses the word Dichter) retrieve an
original possibility vis-a~vis the comportment to language in which they find themselves.
Does the tum to language then amount to the conversion of philosophy into
poetry? Not quite. Poetic comportment, in ten11S of my argument, involves any sort of
tum to language whereby one aims to experience the claim of language in an original
way. Philosophy may also make such huns and have these experiences. For Heidegger
39 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, 9.
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too, Dichtung refers to more than poetry as a specific genre of writing (Poesie). Much
could be said on this. Wanting to remain close to the text I am concerned with primarily,
however, I will not venture into Heidegger's larger discussion of poetry. My focus
instead will be on the poem that Heidegger discusses the most in On the Way to
Language: Stefan George's "Das Wort" ("The Word").
Before turning to the poem in "The Nature of Language," Heidegger makes clear
that he does not wish to exhaust what is said in the poem by way of an interpretation that
would aim to lay bare the meaning of the poem without remainder. Thus, he contends,
"we must be careful not to force the vibration of the poetic saying into the rigid groove of
a univocal statement, and so destroy it.,,4o Vibration here marks the site of ditlerence. We
can understand this in at least two ways: first, as the polyvalence of any word in the
poem, given the multiple ways that we could interpret it; second, as the irreducible
doubling of the word as immediate, given sense and the hermetic signature of its event -
as givenness and withdrawal. Here is George's poem:
The Word
Wonder or dream from distant land
I carried to my country's strand
And waited till the twilight nom
Had found the name within her bourn-
Then I could grasp it close and strong
It blooms and shines now the front along ...
Once I returned from happy sail,
I had a prize so rich and frail,
She sought for long and tidings told:
"No like of these depths enfold."
And straight it vanished from my hand,
40 Martin Heidegger, "The Nature of Language," 65.
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The treasure never graced my land ...
So I renounced and sadly see:
Where word breaks otT no thing may be.
Das Wort
Wunder von ferne oder traum
Bracht ich an meines landes sawn
Und harrte his die graue nom
Den namen fand in ihrem bam -
Drau;[konnt ichs greifen dicht und stark
Nun bUiht und gltinzt es durch die mark . ..
Einst langt ich an nach gutterfahrt
Mit einem kleinod reich und zart
Sie suchte lang und gab mil' kund:
>So schla:ft hier nichts auftiefem grund<
Worm{!es meiner hand entrann
Und nie mein land den schatz ge}vann ...
So lern ich traurig den verzicht:
Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht.
In what way does language bring itself to language in this poem? Heidegger's initial
answer to this question is peculiar. He claims that it is the final line of the poem that
brings about this transformation and that this becomes apparent when we transform the
content of this line into a statement, which the poem apparently allows for (Der Inhalt
der Schlupzeile lapt sich in eine Aussage umformen). The meaning ofthe poem is finally
suggested by the last line: "The word alone gives being to the thing.,,41 Such an
interpretation might then conclude that the fruit of the poet's experience is that the world
is thoroughly mediated by language, by concepts. The point ofthe poem, then, seems to
41 Ibid., 62.
be that the poet experiences the fullest power of language and renounces the
entanglement of natural consciousness, where word and being seem separable.
But shortly after statiing off on this path of interpretation, Heidegger begins to
rethink the final line. He observes, first of all, that the line does not say "no thing is," but
"no thing may be" (kein Ding sei). In order to understand the sense ofthis phrase,
Heidegger turns back to the penultimate line, which speaks of a renunciation (So lernt ich
traurig den verzicht:) What is being renounced? It would seem to be, as Heidegger
suggests, his original relationship to language. The last line, thus, names what the poet
has learned, a sad insight that what had been present at hand is now lost (line 11).
But the character of this renunciation requires some deeper consideration, as it
arises out of an experience, and it is only in light of this patiicular path that the
remmciation is a sonowful one. The poet has gone on a voyage. Urged by a discordance
- the "prize so rich and frail" (reich und zart) - he has sought to "grasp" (gretfen)
something that, once held "close and strong" (dicht und stark), he longs to regain. "The
poet experiences his poetic calling," Heidegger writes, "as a call to the word as the
source, the bourn of Being.,,42 He visits a woman, sovereign and foreboding - perhaps a
goddess - who annOlUlces to him that what he seeks cannot be unfolded from its depths.
The prize of his journey: the sonowful realization that "where word breaks off no thing
may be (Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht)."
And yet the journey leading up to the announcement of this sovereign proposition
seems to suggest that the breakdown of the word plays an important role. To take the
statement in the last line as a theoretical claim and to turn it into a tmth proposition, we
might say: word and being are one. But throughout the poem, language has been at work
in a different way. It has given only traces of the journeyer's story, letting lines six and
twelve trail off into an ellipsis, into the empty space of the page. It leaves encryptions:
what is "it" in lines tive, six, and eleven? What exactly is the "prize" in line eight and the
"treasure" in line twelve?
42 Ibid., 66.
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Indeed, the whole poem seems to end with an ellipsis. Immediately after reading
the last line in George's poem, one allows the silence that follows it to linger, pregnant
with the intimation of a joumey still underway.43 Where there is no word, there is - what?
It is nothing (kein Ding), but not in the sense of negation, an act of the intellect. As
Heidegger argues in "What is Metaphysics?," there is a more original sense of nothing
(there, nicht and das Nichts), one more primordial than its sense as negation.44 As I
developed in the last section, we can see here how the tum to language comes upon what
is excessive to the metaphysical grounding of being and language.
Notice how similar this is to the self-professed absurdity ofWittgenstein's
philosophy, which is perhaps most palpable at the end of the Tractatus, when after a long
discussion of how speech is bound to address only what is clear and manifest,
Wittgenstein begins to talk about what he argues is transcendent of words (ethics, death,
God, the world). "The sense of the world," he writes, "must lie outside of the world ....
Hence also there can be no ethical propositions. It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed.
Ethics is transcendental." (§6.42 - 6.41) Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, daruber muss
man schweigen. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence, but ironically
silence has the last word.
This absurdity must complicate our initial impression of what is renounced.
Heidegger observes that the last line "names the realm into which the renunciation must
enter; it names the call to enter into that relation between thing and word which has now
been experienced." Heidegger here interprets the subjunctive of sein as an imperative, a
call which emerges after the undergoing of an experience. At the sanle time, Heidegger
suggests that this command is always indistinguishable from other ways of hearing the
subjunctive. In describing this polyphony, he writes: "Presumably one meaning and the
other of 'may be' vibrate and mingle in the poetic saying: a command as appeal, and
43 One might compare George's poem to Pam1enides' poem, where, while the goddess insists that only
what does not come to be or pass away truly is, the poem unfolds as an accolmt of education, which is in
every sense a process of transfonnation.
44 Heidegger, Martin, "What is Metaphysics?" in Basic Writings, ed. David Farell Krell, (San Francisco:
Harper Collins, 1972), 99.
34
submission to it. ,,45 Here Heidegger is elaborating on the remarks on experience with
which he began the first lecture and over which we troubled, where he spoke about
experience as a kind of submission and an undergoing. But now we see that it is at odds
with itself, this submission, in that neither the path before it nor the silence after it is ever
fully reconciled to the sovereign tmth that is compressed into the last line.
But the irony cuts both ways. For, in telling the story of this development, the
whole complicated structure, its tensions notwithstanding, is held together and affirmed.
As the poet tries to discover the nature of language, its language is pressed increasingly
toward silence; ironically, in such speaking it both runs aground and tinds its prize. This
then is the relative degree of freedom that is achieved in trying to speak in a way that is
"wholly other." In poetic experience, one takes upon oneself the precarious dwelling that
we have with language, this way of finding ourselves within language, as one's OWlllil0st
possibility.
As Dasein is the being that asks the question of Being, the poet's language asks
the question oflanguage. This perhaps sheds light on the meaning of the enigmatic
suggestion at the end of the last lecture in "The Nature of Language": "Mortals are they
who can experience death as death. Animals cannot do so. But animals cannot speak
either. The essential relation between death and language flashes before us, but remains
still unthought.,,46 Who speaks in the poem, after all? It is not the voice of this or that
biographical subject, but a voice that comes to be and that passes away in the time of the
poem, a voice born from nothing and which returns to nothing. The voice of my writing
is my own only in the way that my death is my own. Each is both my unique possibility
and the point at which my distinct identity disappears into anonymity.47
45 Martin Heidegger, "The Nature of Language, 65.
46 Ibid., 107. See also Giorgio Agamben's Language and Death: The Place ofNegativity (University of
MiImesota, 1991), which is a sustained meditation on this one passage.
47 I am drawing here from the theory of shifters iIltroduced by Beneviste, taken up by Jakobson, and
discussed frequently by Barthes and Kristeva. According to this theOly, the pronoun "I" plays a lUlique
grammatical role in that it is both the way I refer to myself individually and also the way that evelybody
refers to his or her self. It is, thus, as much an indicator of anonymity as it is to my identity. I will return to
this in Chapter Three.
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The voice of the poem is the language which remains after word breaks off, that is
after the breakdown of words in their familiarity draws us toward a "wholly other" way
of speaking. And yet in this new way of speaking, the traces of entanglement remain. As
Robert Bernasconi argues, the significance of the poet's activity for Heidegger is that, in
studying this possibility, Heidegger:
learns how the thinker, like the poet, can still speak and write after the
word breaks off. For though the poet is without the word he sought, he still
writes the poem that tells of this, and he does it by adopting the language
of remembrance and of renunciation: remembering his previous relation to
language and the quest based upon it, and renouncing it.48
But, again, the character of this remmciation is a complicated one. As I have tried to
argue, all such turns require that we are as attentive to what has come before us, to what
we inherit, as we are to what lies ahead. For, in many ways, it is my entanglement in
language that draws me to its inarticulable limits. It is at that limit where a good number
of writers, if not every writer, impassioned by their work want to speak. This, then, is one
way of thinking through what it means to say that language brings itself to language.
Through the discordance in which we find ourselves vis-a.-vis our language, we strive to
discover its limits. Language is brought back to itself, then, only when it has been
stretched to this limit, where word breaks off.
Let me retrace the path that I have taken in this chapter. In the beginning, I
described how language calls us away from its function as constant presence whenever
we experience the need to revise or ret1ect on our relationship to it. I presented how
philosophy in many ways has tried to disentangle itself from the twofold and potentially
contradictory relationship that thinking has with language by renouncing its powers of
reflection and revision. Through an analysis of the linguistic tum as read through
Wittgenstein, I argued that any attempt to renounce this dimension of om relationship to
language results in absmdity. This absurdity showed itself to be more than an error in
calculation: it allowed us to articulate the way that language withdraws from the
48 Robeli Bernasconi, The Question ofLanguage in Heidegger's Hist01Y ofBeing (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities International Press, 1985), 58.
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metaphysical origins to which we assign it. Whether we look at the text ofWittgenstein's
"Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, dariiber rnuss man schweigen" or the text of George's
"Kein ding sei wo das Wort gebricht," the dynamics of the texts themselves cannot be
wholly reconciled with the metaphysical propositions presented. For each bears witness,
if only as a vibration of an unreconcilable difference, to a being who has wondered about
the nature of language.
In the next chapter, I will retum in a new way to the concem that I presented early
on in this chapter. In calling into question the immediate givenness of words, one may
wonder about what happens to lmlguage's ability to function as a basis for social
communication. I have said a lot about historical entanglement in this chapter, suggesting
that the task of speaking from out of this condition pushes us to develop new ways of
speaking. But is there a social entanglement involved in the way that we find ourselves
sharing a language with others in our present lives? And if so, to what extent does this
social entanglement presuppose a kind of skepticism toward those relationships? These
are the questions that the next chapter will take up.
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CHAPTER II
SOCIAL BEING AND AUTHENTICITY:
INHERITING LANGUAGE WITH OTHERS
For the most part, language functions in our lives as inconspicuous equipment,
conveniently ready-to-hand for the various practical uses to which we put it. But its
practical utility in daily life in no way guarantees that we know language. In fact, for
Heidegger, it is precisely this familiarity that makes it also strange and unknown to us.
We have explored this theme so far in terms of Heidegger' s most sustained reflection on
Sprache, the set of texts entitled On the Way to Language and, in particular, the essay
"The Nature of Language." There we saw how Heidegger expresses the need for a
transformation in the relationship to language that we initially find ourselves in, and we
looked at how the tension between philosophy and poetry is in pmi due to philosophy's
disavowal of this need. But there is another dimension to the experience of ilnding
ourselves entangled in language that we have not yet explored, namely, its social
inflection. A list of questions come to mind: Does entanglement as I have discussed it
normally take on a particular social behavioral form, and if so, is this fOlID equivalent to
skepticism toward social f0l111S of knowing? Does the transfol111ation that Heidegger
deems necessary mean that one must stay perpetually at odds with the everyday discourse
that one inherits? And, even if the answer is no and we assert that the goal is a
reconciliation with the language we share with others, should we understmld this task to
be the work of an individual, or does it entail some collaborative etTort?
In order to answer these questions, which I would like to call the social problem
o,{language entanglement, I will trace the development of the problem through the course
ofHeidegger's engagement with the topic oflanguage. To begin with, in the ilrst two
sections of the chapter, I will look at how the problem appears in Being and Time (1927).
While there are many possible ways that one could address the relationship of
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entanglement and social life in Being and Time, my engagement will focus on the
concepts of de-distancing (das Entjernen), thrownness (die Geworfenheit), and
authenticity (die Eigentlichkeit), in order (1) to deepen our sense for the existential
characteristics of the being who has language - and, in particular, the peculiar temporal
quality of its facticity and (2) to thus open up the relationship between Dasein's thrown
possibility and its facti cal social life.
The third section looks to Heidegger's discussion of translation and interpretation
in his 1942 lectures on H61derlin, tracing the metamorphosis of Heidegger' s earlier vision
of Eigentlichkeit into a nanative about the dependence of what is "one's own" upon an
encounter with the foreign. My interest here is twofold. On the one hand, I think that
Heidegger opens up something about the way experiencing the need for translation or
interpretation can effectively return us to the site oflanguage's claim. On the other hand,
I will argue that Heidegger's own attempt to translate the early concerns about language
in Being and Time into the cultural historical concerns of the 1942 lectures is not entirely
successful, because it subsumes the problem of the individual's path toward language
into the problem faced by a cultural people (ein Volk).
The fourth and final section of the chapter gives a reconstructive account of where
Heidegger may have located the scene at which an encounter with others gives us back to
ourselves. Rather than envisioning this scene as an encolillter between early twentieth
century Germany and pre-Hellenistic Greece, I ofIeI' a phenomenological description of .
an experience that I call, playing with Heidegger's own language, Afitbejindlichkeit,
where we find ourselves ethically concerned about our conduct in language insofar as it
bears on the lives of other individuals. I describe how 1vlitbefindlichkeit belongs to our
daily lives, while it also illuminates the way that our daily praxis of language holds sway.
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De-di:;;tancing our Being-lvith-Others
In the last chapter, I had already suggested that we understand language as
included in that domain of things to which Being and Time refers to as "equipment" (das
Zeug). Thoroughly woven into our primary experience of the world and ourselves,
language functions, for the most part, as equipment. We do not first perceive something
and then put it into language. Things come forward as part of a world, as belonging to
what Heidegger calls in Being and Time a referential totality, as significant in terms of
the purposes I weave out of my historical and cultural situation. The referential totality of
such a situation is a system of signs. For example, I know the table before me as serving a
particular cultural function - dining. Furthermore, I know the table as a symbol for many
things in my culture - sustenance, sociality, family, perhaps hierarchy - associations
which have been communicated to me in idiomatic expressions, paintings, traditional
activities, etc. From the very beginning of my contact with it, I do not encounter the table
as neutral of purpose or meaning. I see it in tenllS of its use, the way it functions in my
life as I orient myself toward my goals ... sustenance, happiness, and so on. As a system
of such signs, discourse is equiprimordial with our understanding and the way we find
ourselves - what Heidegger calls Befindlichkeit. These signs allow us to organize our
experience: to track causal relations, to organize our desires and our perceptions, etc.
What's more, they serve as an impOliant basis for social communication by providing us
with shared worlds of meaning and a wealth of pre-reflective lillderstanding.
But by describing the place of discourse in the praxis of our lives, we have told
only half ofthe story. Like the road beneath one's feet, language is something we use
without paying it much mind. But as the last chapter argued, we are nevertheless the kind
of being for whom such equipment can and does become a question, indeed, a problem.
In the last chapter, I explored various ways that we can describe the disruption of
language's readiness-to-hand. I suggested that this disruption takes the form of both
theoretical contradictions in our way of understanding language and practical impasses.
In most cases, though, the two go together. For example, we commonly experience
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language to be at once the immediate fOlm of our thinking and a foml into which we
strive, in vain sometimes, to present our thoughts. At once the conceptual reality of a
thing and an arbitrary label attached to it. Such contradictions characterize the way,
phenomenologically speaking, we find ourselves within language - a condition that I
have called, following Heidegger's use of the term in On the Way to Language, our
entanglement.
On some occasions, the condition of entanglement entails that language suddenly
takes on the character of the present-at-hand; it confronts us as a suddenly unfamiliar
object in the world rather than behind-the-scenes equipment. An excellent example of
this is the aptly named "writer's block." Here the easy flow oflanguage stemming from
our familiarity with speaking (what Heidegger calls pre-tmderstanding and average
intelligibility) becomes obstructed, and we find ourselves frustrated, at a loss for words.
Language comes to stand before us conspicuously, and in its breaking down appears as
something other than the immediate, given framework of our thoughts.
This observation about the hwnan's relationship to language, I suggested, has
been largely ignored by twentieth century philosophy. Instead, the focus has been on the
opposite, that is, on the limits to philosophical questioning established by language, as in
Wittgenstein's philosophy. This is to say that the tradition has been much more interested
in how language functions nOlmatively than the ways we may experience dissonance
with this nOlmativity. But experiences of such dissonance with one's language do occur,
and they can be in themselves very meaningful. Take, for example, the way the term
"woman" has become problematic within the movements of second and third wave
feminism. Throughout history, the term has functioned to organize social relations and to
provide many individuals with an identity that they feel no mgent need to question. But
for some women, despite the tenn's ability to work in this way, the word "woman" has
lost any real explanatory power - both because it speaks of the contrary of man
(Beauvoir, for example) and because it labels drastically disparate experiences with the
same name (Denise Riley, for example). Such feminist explorations of language show us
the need for continually reflecting on the words we use, and by and large they do so by
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describing the inadequacy of nom1ative language to recognize some experiences which
nonetheless make themselves apparent. When we consider this example alongside the
statement by Wittgenstein that we analyzed last chapter, namely, that the limits of
language are the limits of thought, the problem seems clear. While philosophy of
language has often dismissed any attempt to radically transform language in its insistence
upon the pre-reflective, praxis-botmd role of discourse in human experience, it has in tum
neglected to account for the practical conditions from which an experience of words as
incongruous with praxis emerges. 1
Let me provide another example of how we might experience language as a
source of alienation. The situation I have in mind comes from a passage at the end of
Roland Barthes's Writing Degree Zero, where Barthes presents writing as symptomatic
of a "tragic disparity," one which seems to call into question the wTiter's sense of himself
as the agent of the writing. The passage reads:·
In front ofthe virgin sheet of paper, at the moment of choosing the words
which must frankly signify his place in History, and testify that he
assumes its data, [the writer] observes a tragic disparity between what he
does and what he sees. Before his eyes, the world of society now exists as
a veritable Nature, and this Nature speaks, elaborating living languages
from which the writer is excluded: on the contrary, History puts in his
hands a decorative and compromising instrument, a writing inherited from
a previous and different History, for which he is not responsible and yet
which is the only one he can use. Thus is bom a tragic element in writing,
since the conscious writer must henceforth fight against ancestral and all-
powerful signs which, from the depths of a past foreign to him, impose
Literature on him like some rituaL not like a reconciliation.2
The birth of writing's tragedy, as Barthes presents it, lies in the disparity between what he
describes as a living language of Nature that he has before his eyes - not in his hands or
1 Here one exception deserves mention. Stanley Cavell has developed a very compelling account of how
and why we stray from om everyday relationship to language. Cavell weaves together Wittgenstein,
Heidegger, Emerson, and Thoreau, among others, to describe how human existence is such that we find
omselves in need of making some tmn, some tranSfOlTIlation, in order to, as Wittgenstein says, "leave
everything as it is," or, for Heidegger, lassen sein. See Cavell's This Nell' Yet Unapproachable America
(Albuquerque: Living Batch Press, 1989),45.
2 Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, trans. Annete Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: Hill and Wang,
1968),86.
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at his lips - and an instrumental language (Werkzeug dienend) inherited from a foreign
past which allows him to write only ifhe undergoes a ritual whereby the compromise of
that other language is dubiously presented as genuine reconciliation with it. Thought in
this way, the struggle of the writer exemplifies the condition of entanglement.3 In
entanglement, we experience our language as uncamlY, simultaneously familiar and
strange. Fanliliar in that, as I've explained, linguistic concepts [ranle our thoughts and
perceptions pre-reflectively. Strange when, for instance, we perceive the intricate system
of signs within which we find ourselves enclosed as a shadow world, both totalizing and
lacking in reality. For the writer described above, the instrumental language does not just
appear as an alien imposition. It is an intricate pmi of his life. It is near to him in a way
that perhaps few things are. And it is on account of this intimacy maintained with
language that he struggles.
In such cases, one must choose how best to work with the language for which one
is not responsible but which nevertheless seems so formative for one's sense of who one
is that it camlot simply be discarded. We may develop a critical distance to these concepts
mld begin to use them differently - more reflectively, more purposively. We may choose
to let go of certain terms entirely. These m'e just a couple of the various strategies that
feminist authors have suggested, for example, for dealing with the inadequacies of the
word "woman." But regardless of whatever strategy one chooses, there is a conunon
situation which prompts the motivation for action in each case, namely, a sense of finding
one's entangled in the history oflanguage.
Now, for Barthes's writer and - I will argue - for Heidegger, nearly all of
language must be reckoned with in such a way. This is because language in general - not
just this or that word - comes to us as part of a cultural inheritance that, as much as we
are bound to it, will appear strange at times. Heidegger's explanation of this is to be
3 To avoid potential confusion, it might be helpful to indicate that I am not using this term in my project in
the same way as Heidegger uses the tenll vet:ftingt (translated by Macqllanie and Robinson as "entangled")
in Being and Time. The latter OCClli'S in section 38 of Being and Time, where Heidegger writes: "The
alienation of falling - at once tempting and tranquillizing - leads by its own movement, to Dasein's getting
entangled (verfangt) in itself." Though there is a large overlap in meaning, the pln'ase that Heidegger uses
in On the Way to Language is verstrickt sein, to be entangled or ensnared.
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found in what he calls in Being and Time Dasein's de-distancing (Entjernen). In de-
distancing, what is proximally ready·to-hand for Dasein, existentially speaking, regularly
appears as the most distant. Heidegger writes:
When for instance, a man wears a pair of spectacles which are so close to
him distantially that they are 'sitting on his nose,' they are environ-
mentally more remote from him than the picture on the opposite wall ...
Equipment for seeing - and likewise for hearing, such as a telephone
receiver - has what we have designated as the inconspicuous-ness of the
proximally ready-to-hand.4
Again, I am suggesting that we classify language in its ready-to-hand character as an
instance of such "equipment" (Zeug). Making this cOlmection, we can attribute the
uncaIminess of language to the fact that we are always already disclosing the world
through the language-instruments that we find ready-to-hand, while, at the same time,
continually finding ourselves at a distance from these instmments. From this one can see
the scope ofthe claim Heidegger wants to make. It is not that there are certain words
which prompt us to take our distance from them because they fail us in some particular
way. Every aspect of language which we use pre-reflectively and which therefore
inconspicuously shapes our lives will occasionally appear to us, according to Heidegger,
as strangely distant. 5 This basic existential fact of our being canies with it the seed of a
more bewildering thought: in going about our everyday affairs, we are strangers to
ourselves, for those structures which sustain our familiar engagements with the world are
too close. Their readiness-to-hand makes them strange.
4 Heidegger, Maltin, translated by Macqual1'ie and Robinson, Being and Time (San Francisco: Harper
Collins, 1962), §23, 141.
5 I realize that a lot may hang on this difference, namely, whether we understand our estrangement from
language to be generally limited to a word here and there (as in my example of the term "WOmall") or
whether there is something about language as such that we become estranged from (as in the exmnple of
the writer). Both scenal'ios seem possible, as I hope my examples make evident. While I concede that trivial
slips alld the like may not mean much to om general relationship to language, I am inclined to interpret
occasions where a word occupying all important role in organizing om experience begins to fail us as
disclosing to us the larger issue, that is, of the instability oflanguage as such. I am inclined toward this
reading, because it allows us to account for how the failure of a single word or an isolated experience of
lallguage inauthenticity can produce much greater, more generalized feelings of alienation.
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Notice how different this is from the claim that the limits of what is to-hand
(zuhanden) detemline the limits of what I can think. In de-distancing, thinking hovers
above what is near, paradoxically maintaining an intimacy and a separation from the
immediate dimension of our being. With tIlls description, we can appreciate how close
something like the mood of de-distancing is to the philosophical Stimmung of re±1ection
or meditation. In de-distancing, we experience ourselves both absorbed in the world and
separated from it.
But here is where the question of social relations emerges. For if we accept
Heidegger's account of En(fernen as a good phenomenological description of the way we
are sometimes estranged by what is most near, what role are we allocating for those
social relations which are also fundamentally characterized by neamess? In other words,
how should we understand the role of a community in the life of a being whose most
proximal ties are simultaneously "environmentally remote"? This is the first question I
would like to address on the road to a full analysis of the social problem of entanglement.
Let me elaborate on the concem by addressing it from two angles. First, the
concem has an epistemological dimension. We are asking if Heidegger's account of the
way we become separated from the immediate relations in which we are otherwise
absorbed entails skepticism towards the knowledge we inherit through our social
imbeddedness. There are, after all, good reasons for wanting to cling to the world of pre-
detennined meanings that I find myself in. For the most part, when I speak, for example,
I can presume the available fonns of communicative praxis do their job - my point is
understood and I understand what others tell me. To doubt this beyond a certain extent
would be to fall prey to a kind of skepticism that betrays the pre-reflective intelligibility
of speech-acts, to experience discourse as an arbitrary set of conventions and labels that
one leams after one has already encountered things in the world, rather than as a
fomlative part of one's self.6 Second, the concem has an ethical or political dimension. If
6 U may be interesting to pursue such a question in tenns of the so-called problem of other minds as it is
taken up by Descartes, J.L. AuStirl, and others; however, as I will address irl the fourth section of this
chapter, I think that Heidegger's account of how others come to appear alongside one's own entanglement
is a unique approach - best studied apmt from the telTain of this problem- since it does not seek only to
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one believes, on ethical or political grounds, that the most powerful claims upon us come
from our unmediated relations with those people who share our world, an account which
illustrates our freedom to mediate these relations may seem undesirably individualistic.
Thus, the question is: Do the people, history, and culture that I am bound to
through my language require such de-distancing, and if so, to what end? A sense of self
transcendent of these social relations? A language all my own? In the context of the
feminist example, the issue could be posed like this: Is there a tension between the
interest in recognizing the claim of social relations upon us (an interest generally
characteristic of feminism) and the idea that one should twist free of any language that
does not mesh with one's individual experience or speak at the limits oflanguage, which
is to say, at the frontier beyond the discursive world that one shares with others?
My response to this concem in the next section is twofold. I will look at the
intentional structure of de-distancing, that is, how the experience of self-alienation can
actually be a vehicle for self-disclosure. But, reading de-distancing alongside Heidegger's
concept of tln'ownness, I will argue that the self that is disclosed by such experiences is
not a self untethered to its relations in the world through its capacity for reflection,
because the way it is disclosed is contingent upon finding oneself immersed in a world, in
practices and relations that remain a limit for our self-knowledge.
Thrownness and Facticity
Heidegger tells us at the beginning of "The Way to Language" that despite the
fact that we are "within language and with language before all else," language remains
strange. Retuming to this claim that appeared in the first chapter, we can now understand
the issue in tenus of de-distancing. Language remains strange in that our reliance on a
discourse that can continually outrun the intended uses to which we put it marks us as
other to ourselves. Discourse is, in this sense, the site of Bmthes's "ancestral, all-
evidently establish the fact of our being in common with others, but to explore the intricate ways that we
come upon and respond to this fact.
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powerful signs." Even when it seems like a second skin, it can also be a source of
alienation.
But there is an important temporal aspect to this strangeness as well. It appears in
the two examples that I offered in the previous section. For both the feminist problematic
of the term "woman" and the writer's struggle with inherited literary forms, the discovery
oflanguage's limitation comes late. It appears after one has already been using language.
This means that any deliberation on how one might authentically inhabit these
inheritances comes only after already inhabiting it i.nauthentically.
I use the terms "authentic" and "inauthentic" here, because their appearance in
Bei.ng and Time occurs within an exploration ofDasein's imbeddedness in the everyday
language that brings things near to Dasein. Our falle11l1ess into what Heidegger describes
as our primary inauthenticity becomes a problem when we intimate the limitations of this
language. This inadequacy may entail, as I have emphasized, the inability to speak for
oneself in the system of representation available, or, as Heidegger stresses, the leveling
down by which the meaning of whatever is spoken is understood in advance, fit into a
ready-made frame of "average intelligibility." And what is wrong with that? - one might
ask. Isn't it the proper function of communicative language to unify the way we
experience things and thereby to ofter a shared system of meaning to a large number of
people? Yes, but it is also the case that language's ability to enable communication can
be impeded when one feels its operation to be purely mechanical, stuck in a single
function without the possibility of transformation.
Consider the following example. Most philosophers I know have had the
experience of watching as a word that they once found very powerful and disclosive
slowly becomes jargon (or maybe even comes to be revealed as already having been
jargon). We notice the word increasingly replacing an argument in papers that we read or
hear read. And rather than simply functioning to indicate a phenomenon that one would
like to address, the word seems imbued with other powers - the power to include some
people into and exclude others from the conversation, the power to invoke all at once the
presence of the philosopher from whom the word is borrowed and to invoke his or her
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authority by specifically not engaging their arguments beyond reference to a single word.
And this can happen not only with the use of terms but with a rhetorical style as well. A
style that I once experienced as mind-blowing in all of the subtleties ofre±1ection it
suggested might over time come to seem like a crutch for feeble thought. This
disappointing experience is certainly not restricted to philosophers. A concept or foml of
expression that once resonated with me may quickly turn hollow after hearing it used in
commercials and advertisements. Its function then changes. It has become transfomled
into a commodity, no longer attached to the site that gave it meaning. No longer saying
what it once did.
I offer this example as another way of appreciating how the inauthenticity of
one's relationship to language can come into relief, that is to say, how the facticity of our
"having language" can actually entail, rather than a seamless absorption into our
everydayness, the emergence of a critical distance from it. The example is similar to the
description of the writer struggling with his inheritance of literary history in that in both
cases one becomes alienated from language and language ceases to be meaningful for
that person when it ceases to bring new ideas or styles of thinking into being. Not that
this issue of jargon is exactly the way that Heidegger addresses the issue. He could have
been perhaps more precautionary about the dangers of jargon; though nobody in the end
controls the fate of his or her text in the hands of posterity. Neve11heless, throughout his
career, from Being and Time to On the Way to Language, Heidegger tracks how it is
possible for us to experience something as intimate as language as inauthentic.
This question is difficult, because it's not as though we are ever in a situation
where we are not influenced by the discourse which has shaped our world. TIns issue
came up already in the first chapter in the discussion of the breakdown of language as
tool. There we asked whether, in the event of this breakdown, we cease using language as
a ready-to-hand instrument of communication and strive toward a more retlective
relationship to it. In this case, then, we would transform language from pre-reflective
structure into an object of reflection and thereby, it is thought, come to really knaw it.
The answer given in that discussion was that the breakdown of the ready-to-hand Zeug
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does not eject us from this kind of comportment entirely. Instead, it retums us to the
event of language in a new way: rather than appearing as immediate and constant, it takes
on the character of a problem.
What does this mean for the question of whether perceiving language
inauthenticity requires us to occupy a reflective space uncontaminated by social, cultural,
and historical influences? I would like to address this over the course of the next few
pages by considering to what extent our relation to language remains pre-reflective even
as it comes to appear as a problem.
When language comes to appear as a problem, we can say that it is no longer
wholly pre-reflective, since some part comes to appear conspicuously. At the same time,
it is clear that such a breakdown by no means transfOlms the instrument into something
entirely conspicuous, fully known to us. Why? Not because we CaIillot develop a
scientific lmderstanding of how pre-reflective behaviors work. It is entirely possible to
present this kind of data by taking recourse to concepts like instinct or social
conditioning, for example. But such a means of gaining knowledge of the ready-to-hand
remains limited, because it always comes after the fact. In other words, what is disclosed
by such knowledge remains, in effect, always prior to that knowledge; in this way, time
maI'ks such knowledge as other to itself. In this way, the social biologist, the feminist, the
writer, and the jargon-critical philosopher are all in the same boat: their reflections on the
pre-reflective force of language in our lives cam10t possibly accomplish a full reversal of
the fact that they each come upon.
But this is not to say that nothing is accomplished in bringing language into the
light of reflection. It just means that the consequence is not a complete disentaI1glement
from the situation being diagnosed. What then is accomplished? What I would like to
suggest is that the breakdown of language allows us to encounter ourselves as, proximally
aI1d for the most PaIt, immersed in a pre-ret1ective praxis. In this way, the ready-to-haI1d
remains a kind of limit to our self-transparency, but a peculiar one. Because finding
myself shaped by social, cultural, aI1d historical contexts is still a way of finding myself,
that is, it is still a form of self-revelation. To put this differently, the limit of my self-
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transparency shows up only after this boundary has been transgressed, after it has already
taken the shape of a question for a subject, albeit a subj ect-in-process.
Attending to the different ways of hearing the expression "finding oneself at the
limit" broadens and transfonns the way we relate to the facticity of the limit. Let me
explain my meaning by considering the difficulties that arise when we try to pin down the
factical point at which language begins, thus drawing a limit between the pre-linguistic
and the linguistic phases of development. Often times, the onset of language is
understood to occur at a particular moment in the course of human development. For
example, some claim that we organize our experiences linguistically from bilih. Others
posit this moment of inscription as coinciding with a particular empirical event, for
example, in many of Lacan's descriptions of the instantiation of the Name-of-the-Father,
where the entrance into language coincides with the separation from the mother and the
experience of castration anxiety.7 Other theorists suggest that we already begin to learn
language when we hear our mother speaking to us in the womb. But regardless of when
we establish the fact of our linguistic inheritance, it always remains the case that we must
continue to learn our language until we become fully mature speakers and writers, if such
a landmark can ever really be reached. Sure, one might say, but the earliest learning of
language establishes a deep-seated structure that remains filmly in place, no matter the
trajectory that follows. Still, even if the basics of a language that we learn as young
children provide a root from which language naturally grows as we develop, it is quite
possible for one to view this structure, no matter how deeply implanted in our thoughts,
as artificial (in the sense of a convention which we inherit after the basic emergence of a
self) and to imagine the self as containing depths that exceed the reach of such a
structure. (This is what Lacanian psychoanalysis identifies as the imaginary and object-
relations psychoanalysts identify as the preoedipal, categories I will return to in the next
7 Lacan himself appears to be of two minds on this matter. At times he stresses that one's entrance into the
symbolic order occms in conjunction with particular patemal utterances -- a real, physical event in the
course of childhood development. At other times, he describes this as an ongoing process, never fully
completed (since, he stresses that there is always some psychical remainder left out of the organizational
whole constructed by the Name-of-the-Father.) See, for one, Ecrits (W.W. Norton and Company, 2006),
688.
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chapter.) In other words, there is something tricky about pinpointing how and when this
inheritance occurs. 8 Putting this in terms of the temporality of our facticity that I have
been developing, we can say that the fact of our linguistic inheritance is never just behind
us. First of all, because we have never fully graduated from this acquisition. But,
secondly and most importantly for our purposes, because whenever we tum to this origin
in order to assert that language has definitively been acquired, we are already in a
situation where this origination has occurred to us as a problem, and this suggests that
some degree of dissonance has already occurred. We may have had experiences, for
example, which, because we were unable to express them within the nonnative language
available, revealed the limitation of language, even after we had long since supposedly
graduated from the pre-linguistic phase. For this reason, the origin of language,
developmentally speaking, is never simply behind us. While we may continually
experience something like the inscription of language behind us, the temporality of how
we come upon this fact is much more complicated.
But one must still deal with the fact that our experience is always already
discursive. This is why I have suggested that we need to understand the facticity of the
limit at hand (the inheritance or acquisition of social, cultural, and historical fonns of
discourse) in a different light, one which maintains our relationship to language as both
pre-reflective and reflective.
In order to better understand this, I will tum now to Heidegger's discussion of
Dasein's thrownness (Gewmfenheit) in Being and Time. This will offer us another way of
thinking through the relationship in question, that is, between the pre-reflective practical
usage oflanguage and this other possibility. By deepening our understanding of these
two, we can then better address the relationship between the nomlative language of
everyday communication and those moments in which one finds oneself at a distance
8 This difficulty is echoed by the fact that linguistics often considers the question of the origin oflanguage
to be out of bounds for the field. I take this to mean, for one, that such origins are beyond the limits of what
can be established by empirical observation. The question then arises: if we wish to talk about these origins,
how else can we proceed ifnot by empirical investigation? This seems to me to motivate exploration of the
existential-phenomenological approach to the question.
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from such language, which will help us to think through the problem of social
entanglement at issue in this chapter.
In section 29 of Being and Time, Heidegger introduces the telm "throWlmess"
(GewOlienheit) in order to distinguish Dasein's character of facticity from "the factum
brutum of something present-at-hand. ,,9 For Heidegger, we miss the important aspect of
the factical dimension of our being if we overlook the way that we come upon it. And the
most primordial fmm of this disclosure is not a kind of cognitive processing, according to
Heidegger - it is mood. The reason for this is because, as Heidegger says, "the 'that-it-is
of facticity never becomes something that we can come across by beholding it. ,,10 It is
revealed to us, instead, as we tum away from it, that is, in our attempt to evade it.
Heidegger continues: "In a state-of-mind (Bejindlichkeit) Dasein is always brought before
itself, and has always found itse1f~ not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving
itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has." Moods disclose for Dasein
its throWllliess, that is, the way that it is delivered over to its "there." And the way one
finds oneself in this way differs from how one finds oneself as, say, the product of
historical or biological forces. Heidegger explains:
Even if Dasein is "assured" in its belief about its "whither," or if, in
rational enlightenment, it supposes itself to know about its "whence," all
this counts for nothing as against the phenomenal facts of the case: for the
mood brings Dasein before the "that-it-is" of its "there," which, as such,
stares it inthe face with the inexorability of an enigma. I I . .
Why, according to Heidegger, does Dasein encounter the facticity of its being-there as ffi1
enigma? Because it has fled from this, its basic existential character as Da-sein, and
fallen into the They (das ~Man). Heidegger calls this condition of perpetual falling into the
They "inauthenticity." If we recall the passage from Writing Degree Zero, we can see this
9 Mmtin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Jolm Macquil1'ie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper
Collins, 1962), §29, 174.
10 Ibid., §29, 174.
11 Ibid., §29, 175.
52
falling into inauthenticity as part of the way that the writer finds himself To this writer,
according to Barthes's account, "History puts in his hands a decorative and
compromising instrument, a writing inherited from a previous and different History, for
which he is not responsible and yet which is the only one he can use." What is important
here is that the writer does not locate, through - say - a process of transcendental
reflection, a self that exists apart from history and a set of projects. The self of the writer
is entangled within these factical conditions, as what Heidegger would call "fallen" into a
set of conditions that he did not choose and so which remain for him alien - and, indeed,
alienating.
But despite the negative and nonnative connotations of the word, Heidegger
explains at some length that he does not intend the tenn "inauthenticity" as a moral
condemnation of any SOli. Inauthenticity is a basic existential condition of Dasein's
being. And this is what is most important for our purposes. Dasein does not find itself in
any other way. Rather, we find ourselves always already having taken flight - this is how
the "that-it-is" of Dasein' s "there" is disclosed to us. And it is "disclosed" (brought from
obscurity into the light) because it always involves a movement of revelation from what
is strange to - not what is wholly unfamiliar - but what is uncanny. 12
Because of this, Dasein is perpetually thrown - continuously finding itself, and
therefore, continuously having lost itself. As Heidegger makes the point in section 38 of
Being and Time, "Thrownness is neither a 'fact that is finished' nor a fact that is settled.
Dasein's facticity is such that as long as it is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw,
sucked into the turbulence of the they's inauthenticity.,,13 To imagine that thrownness is
merely an event of the past, that at some point prior to reflective awareness, thinking was
12 Heidegger at one point uses the imagery of darkness and light to describe the way one is thrown upon
one's being-there. While this could suggest that Heidegger intends a very traditional, perhaps Manichean
analogy between authenticity/inauthenticity and light/darkness, one should keep in mind the way that
Heidegger complicates the symbolism oflight and dark in his discussion of concealment and
lUlconcealment (particularly poignant in The Origin ofthe rVork ofArt). Like Schelling, Heidegger points
out, for light to ilhuninate, there must be darkness. I fInd this helpful in thinking about the relationship
between authenticity and inauthenticity, because it makes clear that authenticity is not simply the lack of
inauthenticity.
13 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, §38, 223.
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set up within language would not in itself, after all, lead one to the "tragic disparity" that
Barthes presented as motivating the writer. For the human subject's failure to coincide
with itself is itself something that we come upon as our factical condition. In this way,
our facticity is something that only ever shows up "after the fact," after we've
transgressed the limit, since being-ahead-of-ourselves is part of our facticity. Put another
way, the condition of being perpetually thrown, as Heidegger describes it, suggests that
primary experience (which we can call immediacy, pre-reflective experience, or our
"being there") is never simply a brute fact; rather, it is always a repetition in which we
find ourselves.
It is this feature that allows Heidegger to distinguish early on in Being and Time
between the Cartesian subject and Dasein. Dasein is not a subject isolated from its
worldly involvements - thoughts, perceptions, activities, human relationships, etc. In
section 13, Heidegger writes: "When Dasein directs itself toward something and grasps it,
it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally
encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always' outside' alongside
entities which it encounters ....,,14 Here Heidegger echoes the founding
phenomenological insights of his teacher, Edmund Husserl. And like Maurice Merleau-
Ponty will later develop extensively in The Phenomenology ofPerception, Heidegger is
critiquing the tendency in Descartes, for example, to separate the subject of thinking D:om
its object. In Heidegger's case, I believe we can understand this in two ways. As stated
above, we can point out that there is no subj ect who remains if we bracket all of its
involvements, that, as Merleau-Ponty says, there is no perceiver without the perceived. At
the same time, Heidegger does not seem as much to want to invalidate reflection entirely
but, rather, to show how reflection is also mooded. Finding language as the limit of one's
own self-transparency is still a fonn of Befindlichkeit, still a way of being thrown onto
our being-as-possibility. The reason we cannot reflect back onto the event oflanguage's
inscription and detennine once and for all the "whence and whither" of the nature of our
14 Ibid" §13,89.
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language is not, in the end, because this inscription occurred at a time before the advent
of consciousness. Rather, language is only ahead of us, because Dasein is ahead of itself.
What we have addressed in this section continues an important thread from the
last chapter concerning limits. There we explored the contradiction in the argument that,
in challenging that form of discourse into which we find ourselves problematically
entangled, we are transgressing beyond certain regulative boundaries of what we can
make sense of, since - as Wittgenstein set out to prove - the limits of language are also
the limits of thought. This contradiction consisted in the way that the critique of
metaphysical language relied on that very language, an absurd precondition which
suggests that the relationship between thinking and language is more complex than
Wittgenstein makes it out to be. In this chapter, we have looked at how experiences of
separation from normative language differ from reflection as it is often understood, in
that the subject of these experiences is not an autonomous power separate from the
contexts which precipitated the entanglement in the first place. And so, we have come
back around in a sense to the tradition of ordinary language philosophy which highlights
the bond of any speaker to his or her social context. But we have inflected this bond with
the Heideggerean tropes of de-distancing and thrownness, teasing out the important
difference between having one's language shaped by a social context andfinding oneself
and one's language claimed in this way. The latter case carries with it an important
dimension of self-discovery, where, rather than experiencing the weight of normative
social ties as a diminishment of one's being, one experiences one's rootedness in these
relations as an expansion of one's being.
Let us go back to Bmihes's description of the writer. On the one hand, we could
read this lmnent as indicative of an inverse correlation between overcoming one's
alienation from language and sharing a language with others. Then, we would conclude
that the writer will continue to suffer from a sense of inauthenticity as long as his
language does not originate solely from him alone. On the other hand, maybe his
articulation of this "tragic disparity" is only possible given language's presupposition of
others, of potential addressees who might hear him. If this is the case, then we could
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suppose that the experience of alienation was a moment of self-discovery for him. 111at it
was an experience of self-othering in two senses. First, he experienced the influence of
the history of literature on his writing as a burden and as a loss of his sense of self. And
maybe he just stopped there. But it seems more likely, given that Barthes describes him
as having a strong desire to write, that the new foreiglmess of his native language inspired
him. That his sense of intimacy with his language was actually intensified through
experiencing it as distant, not a ready-to-hand tool that one can pick up and use for one's
purposes without thinking about it, but an uncalmy presence in his existence, both
familiar and foreign. lS
It is this sOli of encounter with one's language that Heidegger takes up in his
discussion of trallslation and interpretation in his 1942 lectures on Holderlin. There he
describes the need to experience one's own language as foreign. In the next section, I will
present the basic argument that Heidegger gives for this claim in the lectures, relating it
back to the problem of social entanglement throughout.
Translating What l'i One's Own
According to what I have developed in the previous sections of this chapter, then,
entanglement Calmot be thought of simply as an incidental conundrum that we have
gotten ourselves into over the course of human history. For despite what sounds like a
quintessentially modern "anxiety of influence," such entanglement is not exclusively a
modern problem. To say so would be to suggest that, at some point in history, human life
was void of the character of thrown possibility, that at some point we did not find
ourselves already underway. As Heidegger says in "The Way to Language": "There is no
such thing as natural language, a language that would be the lallguage of a human nature
15 This is where readers of Freud may see a connection with his description oflanguage as organized like
the unconscious. For Freud, like Heidegger, language is uncanny in that its force in our lives far exceeds
the intentional (conscious) purposes for which we use it. The estrangement that I have described through
Heidegger is similar in this respect to Freud's dream-analyses where he describes dreams as the language
of the unconscious.
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at hand in itself and without its own destiny. Every language is historical.,,16 We looked
at this claim previously in the context of the first chapter. But after further clarifying the
character ofDasein's thrown projection, it now becomes clearer how linguistic
inheritance must be tmderstood in temlS of this thrownness and not as a "factum brutum"
of the human species.
Nowhere does Heidegger demonstrate this point more than in translation - both in
his remarks on Ubersetzung and his practice of translating. Perhaps his most notoriously
radical remarks on the topic of translation are to be found in the 1942 Freiburg lectures
on Holderlin's poem "The Ister." Here Heidegger argues that Holderlin's poetry emerges
out of an intimate dialogue that he has undergone with ancient Greek culture. This point
seems, in itse1f~ beyond dispute, given how often Holderlin's poems reference figures and
places from the ancient Greek world. What is less clear is just what motivates the
dialogue. Perhaps Holderlin attempt to describe the world of the Greeks by imagining
himself a part of it. Or, maybe his poems attempt to bear witness to the influence Greek
culture has had on 18th Century Genllany. Or is it, rather, an indication of a caesura
between the two cultures - a source dried up?
Heidegger argues that Holderlin turns to the Greeks because his poetic activity is
concemed with the essence of history as the task of becoming at home through venturing
into the foreign; and, according to Heidegger, it was the Greek world which "poetized the
essence of human beings with respect to their becoming homely.,,1? The discussion
foreshadows the later remark from "The Way to Language" regarding language's
historicality in that it suggests that one's historical being is tied to one's relationship to
language. Moreover, it echoes the thought that we ended with in the previous section,
where we considered how it could be precisely the foreigImess of one's own language
that excites the strongest cOlmection to it. In the lectures on "The Ister," Heidegger
presents a two-fold claim about the relationship of one's native language to foreign
16 Martin Heidegger, "The Way to Language" in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz (San
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1971), 133.
17 Martin Heidegger, Holderlin's H,vmn: The ]ster, trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis, (Bloomington,
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1996), 65.
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language (I leave the term "foreign language" ambiguous at the moment. I will pick back
up on this soon.)
First, translation requires inteq)retation. So, for example, when Heidegger offers a
translation of the choral ode from Sophocles' Antigone, he insists that we cannot simply
go to the lexicon for the definition of to deinon and feel as though we've genuinely heard
what is being said in the poem. This is because, when one grabs the closest equivalent in
one's own language for a foreign word, one renders the event of that word immediately
intelligible, and in so doing, fails to let the text speak on its own terms.
In this way, understanding involves going one step beyond the understanding as it
is presented in Being and Time. There Heidegger explains that Dasein always has a "co-
understanding beforehand of what is said-in-the-talk,,,18 that is, it is impossible to simply
hear utterances (even, Heidegger says, in a foreign language) without understanding
something, for example, that someone is speaking to one in a foreign language. We have
always already interpreted what we encounter in the world. This is a significant part of
what it means to be fallen into the public discourse of the They. At the same time,
Heidegger argues that something is missing in our preliminary understanding of
discourse: "... (B)ecause this discoursing has lost its primary relationship-of-Being
towards the entity talked about, or else has never achieved such a relationship, it does not
communicate in such a way as to let this entity be appropriated in a primordial manner. ..
.,,19 To "appropriate in a primoridal manner" here means to open a space in which a text
can come to appear as its own event, not restricted to the domain of what has always
already been understood. Heidegger's concern over idle talk in Being and Time,
understood as the leveling of everything one hears into what one has always already
understood, thus appears in his later thought as a claim about the necessity of translation
and interpretation. Heidegger's example in Being and Time makes the cOlmection even
more explicit. There he says: "The average understanding of the reader will never be able
18 Mmiin Heidegger, Being and Time, §34, 207.
19 Ibid., §35, 212.
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to decide what has been drawn from primordial sources with a struggle and how much is
gossip."
In the context of translation, this might speak to the common habit of projecting
certain preslilllptions about an author's relationship to their language in one's translations
of a text. This is not to say that it is ever possible to read without importing presumptions.
At the same time, we still recognize a virtue in the kind of reading which allows a text to
speak for itself. This means, for one, being able to distinguish between what a text says
and what we figure the author intends to say. No person, no matter the historical
circumstance, has complete control over what he or she will have said in writing. The text
that he or she produces will have a life of its own, one not reducible to the author's
intentions, or for that matter, other parts of his or her psychology. Every author works
within a language that remains always shared and always, in some pmt, strange. Bmthes's
writer became anxious in the face of what he perceived as his obligation to testify to his
place in history, as though he did not find himself thrown into this context, burdened with
a need to find out what it means that he arrived in this way, at this time, to the question of
his being. His text will require, not that we dismiss the historical context altogether, but
that we hear the voice of the writer entangled in its history, problematizing its history.
For this reason, Heidegger's trmlslations of Sophocles do not aim to bring to light
the author's intended meaning. Nor is it right to say that his readings try to reveal the
unconscious of the author or the unconscious of the text. For the meaning that he wishes
to disclose is not something present-at-hand. Rather, what is intended is a dialogue
whereby one allows the voice of a work its own historical becoming.2o This is how
Heidegger explains HOlderlin's choice ofthe Gennan tenn, das Unheimliche (the
20 My claim here positions me in opposition to Luce Irigaray's reading ofHeidegger's work on language, in
that I1'igaray argues that dialogue between subjects is missing in Heidegger's work, Because she
lUlderstands Heidegger's concept of appropriation as opposed to the spirit of "letting be," she sees
Heidegger's emphasis on appropriation in his dialogue with the poets as monological. In fact, lrigaray's
and Heidegger's explorations oflanguage share many featmes, most notably their mutual interest in
lUlemthing the primordial claim oflanguage that is prior to language's calculative or technological
[lU1ction. Moreover, the site of the primordial claim coincides with what each takes to be the region of
ethical claims. But lrigm'ay insists more explicitly that the presence of another subject is a condition for
entering this region; whereas, as the project of my own essay makes clear, one has to reconstruct to some
extent the presence of other subjects in Heidegger's account.
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uncanny) for the Greek, TO &lv6v in the poet's translation of Sophocles' choral ode.
Holderlin's project, according to Heidegger, must be understood as an attempt to find
home - or what is his own - through venturing into the strange.
This brings us to the second way that experiences of translation can affect our
relationship to language. In translating the work of another, Heidegger argues, one finds
oneself in one's "own" language in a new way, namely, as similarly in need of
translation. Heidegger writes:
Every translation is interpretation. And all interpreting is a translating. To
the extent that we have the need to interpret works of poetry and of
thought in our own language, it is clear that each historical language is in
and of itself in need oftranslation, and not merely in relation to foreign
languages. This indicates in tum that a historical people is not of its own
accord, that is, not without its own intervention, at home in its own
language. It may therefore be that we speak "German," yet talk entirely
"American. ,,21
Heidegger's argument is not that one must translate one's own language in order to
understand what people's words refer to. For, according to Heidegger's discussion of
interpretation in Being and Time, this is already a feature of everyday understanding. No
special eiIort is required. Instead of this kind of understanding, Heidegger is concemed
with the prospects oftmly inhabiting language, such that one can call it one's "own." For
though my language is a deeply-seated inheritance at the foundation of how I encounter
beings in the world, this disclosure remains also an alien force if the necessary
"intervention" is lacking.
Heidegger's own relationship to language in his work can be understood as such
an intervention. As Jan AIel' has argued, one can track an increasing commitment to the
use of everyday telminology throughout Heidegger' s career.22 His analyses aim more to
21 Martin Heidegger, HolderUn's Hymn: The Ister, 65.
22 See Jan AleI', "Heidegger's Conception of Language." According to AleI', "the combination ofa
scientific philosophy and a philosophy that remains close to life is what is so striking in (Heidegger's) use
of words." - Jan AleI', "Heidegger's Conception ofLanguage" in On Heidegger and Language, ed. Joseph
J. Kockelmans (Northwestern University Press, 1972), 39. What exactly counts as "close to life" is not
something that I think can be determined in any general way by any definite criteria. Heidegger draws from
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change the way we hear our words than to change which words we say. This
commitment, however, remains an intervention of SOlis, Heidegger messes with words in
order to draw our attention to them. Take, for example, the hyphenation of the word Da-
sein. This word was not paliicular to the German philosophical world at the time,
Moreover, Heidegger found resonances in the etymology of the word that provided him
with grounds for a new interpretation of what the word says - existence as being-there.
Or consider the word Befindlichkeit, one ofHeidegger's neologisms, In this case,
Heidegger takes a common expression, "befinden sich," which one normally uses to ask
another person how he or she is doing (Wie befinden sich Sie ?), and he considers it in
noun 1'01111. With this fonn, it is easier to think about what essentially occurs with this act
of finding oneself in a particular state-of-mind. In such ways, Heidegger enacts in his
own use of the German tongue what he describes as the need to interpret one's own
language.
Having explored Heidegger's two claims, (l) that interpretation is necessary for
translating the language of another and (2) that translation is necessary for interpreting
one's own language, let us see how the points relate to our earlier response to the social
problem of entanglement coming out of Being and Time, There we saw how finding
myself at a distance from the language I inherit tl'om my social and historical context can
actually facilitate a new disclosure of my intimate attachment to this context. In such
cases, it is the tillcanniness ofthe language that lies so near to us, its problematic
character, that draws me in closer and compels me to attend to it. As I see it, the
experiences identified in the two claims listed above can accomplish something similar.
For example, the effort to let a text speak for itself and not to rely entirely on ready-to-
hand word equivalents in interpreting it is an exercise that can cause me to question the
forces ofno1111ativity in my own language, My experience of these forces will cause me
to use language ditTerently, because I will recognize that a given thought or concept in
the text I am working with (let's say, for example, ethos in Aristotle's Ethics) does not
translate easily into the instrumental language that I have at hand, I then might have to
discourses that are near to him, including many words related to a relatively rural environment, which may
be perceived as "provincial" and therefore distant to many readers.
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explore the language available to me in ways I hadn't before to try to articulate this
foreign thought. And in exploring my own language in this new way, it may become that
uncanny companion that I spoke of previously - both familiar and unknown to me. I may
be able to find a way to say something like ethos in my modem English, but it will likely
require that I find associations, current usages, and maybe even etymologies previously
invisible to me. So, I might have to play and de-normalize my own language in order to,
say, create the conditions for a philosophical dialogue between Aristotle and
contemporary American philosophy.
But I don't think that one needs to be translating Aristotle to have the kind of
experience Heidegger is pointing to in his discussion of translation. Interpretation is, after
all, not an activity that we reserve wholly for those times when we travel across oceans or
read a Platonic dialogue. We take on an interpretive attitude whenever we find ourselves
concerned about reading or listening properly. To what extent such a comportment can be
observed in everydayness seems difficult to determine, but I will venture to say that it
does not lie entirely beyond the bounds of the everyday. We may not encounter the
absolutely foreign Other in the everyday context of interpretation, but most of us have
experienced the need to question our understanding ofsomeone's words. One might ask,
however: Is this concern for understanding the same as the orientation toward
appropriation previously outlined? Yes and no. Yes, in that an interpretive attitude is one
wherein one tries to make oneself an instnllnent of disclosure, one which facilitates
another being's ability to express itself, and in this way, which "lets beings be." No, in
that, without any further effort to conserve this interpretive mood, such instances will be
fleeting, momentary experiences whose lessons do not remain with us.
Therefore, I suggest that Heidegger's description of translation should be
understood as an intensification of the need for an interpretive comportment which we
may, in fact, experience in an "everyday" way, but only in passing. The point echoes
section 34 in Being and Time when Heidegger says that "the possibility of interpretation"
is "the possibility of appropriating what is understood.,,23 One relies on interpretation all
23 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, §34, 203.
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of the time to build for oneself one's own understanding ofthings, but we often forget
how much the most basic understanding rests upon the need for interpretation, and that
all interpretation involves to some degree a willingness to become estranged from the
familiar.
Consider, then, the following passage from the lectures on "The Ister," where
Heidegger writes:
Translation [Ubersetzen] is not so much a 'trans-Iating [Uber-setzen] and
passing over into a foreign language with the help of one's own. Rather,
translating is more an awakening, clarification, and unfolding of one's
own language with the help of an encounter with the foreign language.
Reckoned teclmically, translation means substituting one's own language
for the foreign language, or vice versa. Thought in terms of historical
reflection, translation is an encounter with a foreign language
(Fremd.sprache) for the sake of appropriating one's own language.24
The passage makes the point that one cmmot reflect or work on one's own Im1guage apart
from encounters with others. But I am suggesting translation can put this into effect, not
by insel1ing a need for interpretation that was entirely absent before, but by deepening the
interpretive mood which occasionally characterizes even everyday communication, and
that the activity of translation as Heidegger describes it is but one way that such an effect
could occur.
Moreover, the activity of translation that Heidegger describes could be more or
less effective for different individuals, depending on what precisely they find "foreign"
given their specific situation. After all, the "foreignness" of language as I have discussed
it is not limited to or even primarily to be found in a foreign language (eine
Fremdsprache) or a foreign culture. This raises the following imp011ant question: Is the
effort that I have described here as an individual's encounter with his or her own
language the same thing as how Heidegger describes the eff011 of a historical people (ein
Volk) to come into its own language? The difference, I believe, requires some comment.
Because we are attempting to borrow ideas from a text entangled in a history of its own,
it would behoove us to address how these ideas relate to the rhetoric of nationalism
24 Martin Heidegger, HolderUn's Hymn: The Ister, 65-66.
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apparent in this passage from Heidegger's lectures on "The Ister." To neglect this aspect
of the passage would, after all, mean ignoring part of the history that makes up the
complex gesture of this utterance and ignoring the limitations of a discourse that
continues to shape philosophical discussions of translation. Throughout the lectures,
readers will find that Heidegger's presentation of the need for homecoming is inflected
with a concem for the national identity and integrity of the German people - concems
which the Gemlany of 1942 rendered urgent. And while the problem of a national
identity had been abuzz in Germany since the time of the French Revolution and had
been taken up regularly as a banner under which the people hoped to achieve democracy
and constitutional rights, the coneem for Gennan integrity - understood as requiring the
exclusion of some other people - is tillambiguously a hallmark of the ideological climate
of the Third Reich.
The question impressed upon us who wish to take up Heidegger's argtilllent in the
lectures on "The Ister" is whether we can distinguish how we have tried to understand the
emphasis on coming into one's own trom an imperialist desire for national grandeur and
etlmic purity. My answer is yes, and in fact, I would argue that the two are even
incompatible with each other, because the end desired in the fanner is not the enrichment
of oneself over and against other beings that one encounters in one's world.
Taking our cue from Heidegger's discussion of de-distancing and thrownness in
Being and Time, we have seen in the previous two sections how the truth of Dasein' s
being cmmot be grasped as a substantial self, constantly present as set over and against
the world. As Otto P6ggeler argues, Heidegger's ongoing interest from Being and Time
through the end is to bring us toward the experience of Being's claim upon us, which in
Being and Time Heidegger describes in tenus of solicitude and concem, and which in On
the Way to Language appears as the Saying ofBeing which we have always already
heard.25 Dasein is the mode of being attending to what solicits it. In this way, the
25 According to Otto Poggeler, the world in which Dasein finds itself, for example, is "a world in which
something encounters us to which we conespond more properly through request, wish, and command than
through mere assertions." - Otto Poggeler,"Heidegger's Topology of Being" in On Heidegger and
Language, ed. Joseph 1. Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, ]972), 111.
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ontological project has an important ethical dimension, since it leads us to the insight that
our very being lies in a concemful opelmess, a primordial letting-be (lassen sein).
This is not in any way, however, to deny the "self' in Heidegger's project. This
should be apparent hom my earlier emphasis on the self-disclosure that occurs in finding
oneself estranged from language. Rather, the way that Heidegger brings us to an
understanding of the self is as something neither distinct nor as indistinguishable from
others. This statement would be a logical contradiction if the two tenns here were fixed
referents, present-at-hand in the world. But, again, the self is not this kind of referent for
Heidegger. While being-in-the-world is an essential component of Dasein's being, Dasein
is, strictly speaking, that which discloses the world and the beings in it, including itself.
On my reading, the best way to understand the meaning of the self in Heidegger's
thinking is in terms of the responsibility that one inherits in receiving the claim which
ushers forth from being-in-the-world. In this, I find myself rejecting Kwame Anthony
Appiah's interpretation of the self in Heidegger.26 For Appiah, Heidegger falls into one
side of a popular dichotomy with which philosophers have tried to peg the self as either
entirely pre-determined or entirely undetermined. In the first case, which Appiah labels
the "essentialist" view, a successful search for oneself would conclude when one
lU1covers a nature that was present, though hidden, all along. In the second case, the
"existentialist" picture, there are no limits restricting who one may become - the self is a
blank slate. Appiah mentions Heidegger as an example of the "essentialist" view -
curious, since Heidegger is most often associated with the existentialist tradition. While
Appiah is right to note the way that Heidegger's philosophy differs from the existentialist
picture as he presents it, I think one misunderstands how the question of the self appears
in Heidegger's project if one sees Heidegger's work as simply promoting its opposite.
While the path toward authenticity requires a retum to the primal scene of our existence,
what is significant is not that we find a being whose nature is all laid out for it m1d is thus
devoid of possibility. This was my em'lier point about the peculim' facticity of any origin
for Dasein.
26 Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics ofIdentity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), 2005.
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In Heidegger's own words, the task of authenticity involves "not a matter of
tracking down and inspecting a point called the' self,' but rather one of seizing upon the
full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world throughout all the constitutive items which are
essential to it, and doing so with understanding.,,27 We saw this to be the case in de-
distancing and thrownness in Being and Time, where these experiences can disclose and
intensify one's social and historical connections, for example, to inherited discourse.
Thus, what counts as one's own is neither entirely predetennined nor entirely
undetennined. And the same goes for one's own language. The language one inherits
comes with a particular history, a history which puts forward a particular set of claims.
To this extent, there is always something oflanguage that is "given" rather than forged.
We always find omselves within a particular discourse or set of discourses rather than
others. But what is radically up for question is the way we relate to this inheritance, this
scene of origin.
Framing this point in a different way, it does not necessarily follow from the fact
that our language remains bound up with om social life that what is given pre-reflectively
to individuals who speak GemIan, for example, is the same for all. This seems like a
hasty assumption on a variety of fronts. For one, it seems to take tor granted that there is
a one-to-one correspondence between a nation and a language; whereas, the reality is that
no such correspondence exists. A nation needn't expect or require that its citizens all
share the same language; and it certainly seems naIve to suggest that all people who share
a particular native language automatically have enough in common such that they should
foml a single nation together. Language does not single-handedly define a nation.
Second, different languages - traditionally defined - are not necessarily different
worldviews, particularly insofar as they become responsive to the same worldly
influences. In our globalized world today, one would be hard-pressed to insist on any
fundamental difference between modem Gennan versus modem American English. In
both cases, language is tailored more and more to technological environments, with the
predictable effect of homogenizing vocabulary across the board. This brings me to the
27 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, §37, 187.
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third point: it seems that what is given to individuals depends on exactly how each person
finds himself or herself claimed by language. Something like the inundation of a
language with teclmical vocabulary and innovations in communication technology
produce affects which can be seen quickly - in the case of text messaging, most people
see significant affects within the course of a single generation. But technology is not the
only form in which we see this contingency. People growing up in first-generation
immigrant families often have a different relationship to the language than others, even if
they share a native language in common. This contingency follows from the nature of our
existential facticity as we considered it in the previous section. Even people who share
"the same" pre-reflective social or linguistic practices may have drastically different
ways of relating to these inheritances, different ways of responding to being thrown upon
them as their own.
If it is true that language is ahead of itself in whatever particular ways Dasein is
ahead of itself, each way always taking a particular historical shape, then there is no
guarantee that the "foreign" which one must venture into must be understood in terms of
a foreign culture. For this reason, I find Heidegger's reliance on the categories of ancient
Greek and modern German identity cumbersome at times. For as Heidegger himself
points out, one needn't journey beyond the boundaries of "one's own" culture to
experience an alien language.
Another clarification seems prudent. The event of appropriation that I seek to
understand must be distinguished from a particular political goal at issue in Heidegger's
1942 lectures, namely, the strengthening of a national identity, however this is construed.
The movement toward appropriation that I have sought to articulate in this project is not
motivated by a desire to secure a foundation for political identity or political action,
particularly not by way of locating a pre-reflective lifeworld shared by people who share
a common language. My line of argument would suggest, on the contrary, that this
attempt to establish once and for all the relationship between the human being and its
language appears ahnost systematically blind to the complexities of (a) how Dasein finds
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itself entangled in language, and (b) the transfoTI11ations it must undergo in order to
reconcile itself to this language.
Before moving onto the final section of this chapter, let me review the ground
covered so far. In the previous sections, I argued that de-distancing language, understood
as an instance of entanglement, needn't entail a slighting of our social relations because
of the ecstatic character of this form of disclosure, a character that de-distancing shares
with the structures ofthrowlmess and mood. What finds itself problematically tangled up
and estranged in the experience of de-distancing or entanglement is not an ego separated
from its world but being-in-the-world itself. This addressed the WOlTY that allocating a
place for alienation in the human's relationship to language might not take seriously the
claim of our social relations upon us. In this section, I have considered Heidegger's
argument that encountering the language of others can help us to emich our own by
allowing us to see our own language as strange. In this, I have chosen not to follow
Heidegger in all senses in which he invests the distinction between one's own language
and a foreign language, because, as I have tried to show throughout, an encounter with a
foreign language is not something we need to seek out - it is part of the way even the
language closest and most native to us comes to appear. Putting the conclusion of these
last tlu'ee sections together, we can say that we have not alTived at our own language
properly until we come to hear it as a repetition whose source can never be a brute fact
before us, present-at-hand, and which is only insofar as we intervene by offering
thoughtful interpretation emiched by social interactions.
In what follows, I will tease out the way that intervening in one's own condition
must nevertheless rely upon that which others provide for us. In the first case, we CalU10t
make sense of much, including our own condition, without relying upon the paths of
interpretation made available by culture and history. I will approach tllis point by
showing how it beal's on the general method ofHeidegger's approach to language. For
fundaIllental to this approach is the way Heidegger's attempt to speak to the Wesen of
language - that is, language as language - is entangled in the way the concept of
language has historically been interpreted. Rather than suggesting that such entanglement
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invalidates the inquiry - on the presumption that it makes the inquiry bias and thus non-
objective, my argument is that following the paths of interpretation gifted to us by others
gives one's approach an attunement to the way the language of others discloses for us the
truth of our own condition. What I find interesting on this point is that, even for
Heidegger, who tends - as we saw - to identify the individual with his or her historical
culture. it is often the entangled language of a particular voice (e.g., Nietzsche, Novalis,
or Rilke) that claims Heidegger most powerfully. Arguably, the voices that claim
Heidegger most are those that appear to push the limit of what can be said in their
respective cultural and historical situations. They appear, in other words, as individual
voices. This, then, is the second way that the upcoming section will address our
dependence on others for working through our own entanglement with language; for it is
not only what is gifted by an entire culture or history that I find myself claimed by - it is
also the language that comes to me from particular individuals.
Tracks ofInteJpretation, Voices Underway
In order to address how Heidegger's work on language responds to the social
problem of entanglement, one must look to how this work attempts to bring to light the
bond between our language and our being-with-others, not only to what it asselis. In
various ways, philosophers have attempted to speak of sociality as an essential element of
human experience. Just how this essence becomes manifest, however, differs
significantly from tradition to tradition. b1 Anglo-American philosophy of language, for
example, lL. Austin presents linguistic utterances as intricately bound up with social
practices, such that one can evaluate the felicity of perfoffi1atives by looking to their
practical effects and vice versa.28 In Austin's approach, the essence of our social bond
28 One example that Austin gives is that of naming a ship. He points out that if someone who is not
designated to name a pmticular ship walks up and smashes the bottle hung at the stem, proclaims 'I name
this ship the Mr. Stalin" and then kicks away the chocks, "we can all agree: (1) that the ship was not
thereby named; (2) that it is an infemal shame." He goes on to say that the action taken ofnaming the
vessel is "void or without effect." Here the felicity of the speech-act depends on whether the social systems
in place permit the speech-act to be meaningful, or more precisely, to work. But one could also see how
this can work the other way around. The power invested by a society onto a speech-act may then be capable
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becomes manifest through a concern for felicity. But Austin's innovation is not only the
presentation of a new propositional truth to be inselied into the pre-existing theoretical
apparatus; it is a modification in the way of revealing - a switch away from concern over
propositional truth to the disclosure of a world of social regulations (as opposed to logical
axioms).
There is an interesting affinity between the projects of Heidegger and J.L. Austin.
In The Essence ofTruth, Heidegger argues that propositional truth depends on a more
primordiallmity, what in Being and Time he'd presented as the being-there ofDasein,
which is the condition for the disclosure of being. In Being and Time, he writes: "But if
the world can, in a way, be lit up, it must assuredly be disclosed. And it had already been
disclosed beforehand whenever what is ready-to-hand-within-the-worlcl is accessible for
circlUllspective concern.,,29 Heidegger's Dasein analysis, like Austin's speech-act theory,
looks at how disclosure occurs beyond the bounds of propositional truth. Neither simply
discredits the validity of such inquiry; however, both can be said to attempt a
phenomenological reconstruction of the ready-to-hand environment and the world
disclosed therein where discourse is a basic element.
We have already explored certain aspects of how Heidegger suggests that the
sociality of the human being becomes disclosed. In looking to how we find ourselves
continually thrown into language, Heidegger suggests that the disclosure of oneself and
the disclosure of world come hand in hand. In finding ourselves thrown, we discover
inheritances which become our OH'l1. Finding oneself in language is one such way of
being thrown. And while one might understand this to mean that we do not know our
relationship to the world or to others until we first find ourselves, or that finding oneself
is the condition for finding others, according to my argument, Heidegger's point is that
these two disclosures happen together at once. This is readily apparent in Heidegger's
ofgranting some recognition that would otherwise be withheld. An entertaining example of this would be
the comedic resolution that OCClli'S at the end of the film Miracle on 34th street, where, through some chance
series of events, the judicial corut deems that the defendant is Santa Claus, despite widespread skepticism
among the local population, thus effecting a precedent in the judicial system, where fictitious characters can
be recognized as real before the law.
29 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, §16, 106.
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treatment of translation, where he argues that it is only in the encounter with another-
whom he conceives through the concept of the "foreign" - that one can be brought to
genuinely search for and, hence, discover what is one's own.
Conversely, in every fact that Dasein unveils about the world it finds itself within,
there is some self-disclosure. Thus, when we consider the fact of our having language,
the nature of this facticity is changed. We might ask ourselves: How do I relate to this
fact? How do I preserve it, or do I not? But oftentimes we ourselves do not pursue this
line of reflection. Consider how the sciences have influenced the way we hear the famous
dictum characterizing the human being as zoon echon logon, the animal that has
language. We take the phrase to be asse11ing the fact as something objective and
universal, and furthermore neglect to flesh out phenomenologically what it means to have
(language, science, etc.). In allowing our reflections on human life to take this course, we
have come to view the hlilllan's relationship to language in the all-purpose biological
terms of "instinct." We then hear the phrase zoon echon logon as describing an innate
quality of the human animal - a brute fact of its being. But, as we saw earlier, for Dasein,
it is precisely the inunediacy of language that can actually lead us to challenge the
whence and whither ofthe discourse into which we are thrown. To have language means
to experience its claim as still underway.
But how does this observation stand when we consider that Heidegger's
arglilllents often proceed deductively toward an indication of language conceived of as
prior to any experience? Throughout On the Way to Language, for example, Heidegger
speaks of a primordial listening to language itself that is the condition for our belonging
to language. In the essay "Language," for example, Heidegger famously argues that
"Mortals speak insofar as they listen:' and listen not to what this or that person wants to
say with language but to language itself. 30 Heidegger goes to such lengths to disabuse his
audience of the impression that language is something that each individual person or
culture controls that he attributes to language an essence which seems in many ways to
pre-exist the hmnan's consciousness of it. The speaking oflanguage itself is something
30 Martin Heidegger, "Language" in Poetly, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York:
Harper Collins, 2001), 206.
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categorically different from human speaking, and that must also mean fi'om human
interpretation. It grounds our saying-power and our ability to interpret - it does not result
from these things.
On the one hand, this is nothing new. The experience of an originary belonging to
language which remains, because of its being primary, always excessive to our reflection
has already been a part of the way we've depicted entanglement. But whereas I have
described this consistently in tenns of social inheritances, Heidegger often describes what
we are entangled in as language itself, understood as something prior to any given
historical or cultural institution. "In order to be who we are, we hmnan beings remain
committed to and within the being of language, and can never step out of it and look at it
from somewhere else." Heidegger writes in "The Way to Language." He continues:
"Thus we always see the nature oflanguage only to the extent to which language itself
has us in view, has appropriated itself to US.,,31 What this tells us is that language is
something so formative and basic to our experience that we can never get a full view of it
as an object of experience. In this way, it has a quasi-transcendental character. But there
seems to be a tension between this transcendental motif in Heidegger's thinking and the
claim that we are brought to authentically inhabit our own language through encountering
the language of others. In the latter case, social engagement is requisite for properly
belonging to one's language; whereas, in the fOffiler case, our belonging is established as
a fact of our being regardless of what experiences we have or how we undergo them. The
question is then: Given that Heidegger's account describes the primordial appearance of
language as distinct from the way language comes to appear through hlilllan speech, to
what extent can we say that this account describes how others are bound up with the way
we find ourselves in language?
Heidegger does seem to want to distinguish the tigure of primordial language
from a transcendental condition in two ways. (l) First, because Heidegger - especially in
his later work - so often describes absence as an intensive fonn of presence, that which is
beyond what we can directly experience paradoxically takes on a vivid experiential fonn.
31 Martin Heidegger, "The Way to Language," 134.
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As Heidegger says in What is Called Thinking?: "The event of withdrawal could be what
is most present in all our present, and so intinitely exceed the actuality of everything
actual." Thus, Heidegger considers it possible to experience the primordial claim of
language, even in its transcendental fOlID. (2) Second, the primordial source disclosed is
not construed as something constantly present, as is the case, according to Heidegger,
with an a priori condition. Our belonging to language can be jeopardized - it is not a sure
thing. So, though Heidegger's line of thinking often leads us to the disclosure of what
looks like transcendental conditions, the nature of his project can nevertheless be
differentiated from that of philosophical deduction on at least these two points.
Nevertheless, Heidegger draws a distinction (albeit a complicated one) between
language in itself and (a) language according to how human beings have historically
taken it up and conceptualized it and (b) according to how humans use it. These two
clearly hang together, since conceptualization is a form of use. Moreover, on both
accounts, we can say that the distinction being made is between language in itself and
language as it is given to us through our relations with others.
Heidegger seems, in part, aware of this tension. And the complexity of how the
distinction is maintained may be viewed as symptomatic of the fact that Heidegger had
not explicitly tonnulated a social problem of entanglement in his work. We have to
reconstruct the problem through the various aspects of his work that seem to pertain to it.
Thus, it is to be expected that there are some unresolved tensions in the path Heidegger
lays. Consider, for example, "The Way to Language." The goal of the lecture is,
according to one pronouncement, a way of getting to language as language, rather than in
tem1S of something else.32 To this end, much of the first part of the lecture involves trying
to isolate what language is from other phenomena with which it is intertwined, which
Heidegger identifies as metaphysical categories that we tend to import in order to have a
grasp of the phenomenon of language. Heidegger steers the inquiry toward a point at
32 One finds a related fOl1nulation in What is Called Thinking?, originally published in 1954, where
Heidegger writes: "But language is not a tool. Language is not this and that. is not also something else
besides itself. Language is language.... The bOlmdlessness with which such sentences can be abused
corresponds to the infinity into which they direct the task of thinking." - Martin Heidegger, What is Called
Thinking?, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 153.
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which these various categories reach their limit, and this is where, according to
Heidegger, language shows up. Language as language appears at the point where all of
our approaches to it have been exhausted. And only then, through the presentation of this
limit, does Heidegger find it possible to address the place of appropriation (Ere ignis) , a
concept that I will take up here only insofar as its description involves a primordial
listening, an originary opelmess to the claim of language.
The complex relationship that Heidegger has to the above-mentioned distinctions
is evident when we consider that, while the lecture has the general shape of the argwllent
described above, Heidegger meanwhile also concludes that language is not something
that can be separated out as a discrete entity. He says that the goal of reaching language
as language must lead us to the web of relations within which the tmity of the
phenomenon lies. One aspect of this web that appears patiicularly impossible to separate
is the factor of human speaking, not least of all because philosophical inquiries like that
underway in "The Way to Language" rely ftmdamentally on human speaking. This
should sound familiar by now, as it corresponds to the way we have been talking about
entanglement. But what I am pointing out now is that this insight is in tension with a
parallel tendency to posit language as transcendental, as prior - in other words ~ to the
convening of the manifold relations which co-emerge as language.
Heidegger's interest in reserving a place for language prior to human speaking in
this lecture has in pati to do with his criticisms of the Idealist approach to language,
which he argues reaches its apogee with Wilhelm Humboldt. According to Heidegger's
reading, this approach takes language to be essentially a mode of human activity, that is,
a worldview (Weltanschauung) posited by a subject. In this, Heidegger argues, idealism
exemplifies a "change of the nature of truth" since the Greek meaning of a sign. Drawing
on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias, Heidegger argues that - for the Greeks - the sign is that
which shows what allows itself to be shown. According to the lecture, "The kinship of
Showing with what it shows - a kinship never developed purely in its own terms and
those of its origins - later becomes transfonlled into a conventional relation between a
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sign and its signification. ,,33 The word "conventional" is import,mt here. The Greek
conception that Heidegger presents suggests that signs facilitate the disclosure of a world
beyond them, not entirely tmlike the work of translation as it was described above. Here
human speech operates within a web of relation, entangled in the work of disclosing what
is. In the latter conception, however, the sign is not in kinship with anything other. The
world is simply a world of signs, where concepts are the most actual. The world appears,
from this vantagepoint, as something that is purely of our own device - an aggregate of
worldviews where the question of truth becomes meaningless.
But hidden within this inverted world, Heidegger claims, is evidence of this lost
kinship. For, according to Heidegger, "Even when Showing is accomplished by our
human saying, even then this showing, this pointer, is preceded by an indication that it
will let itself be shown. ,,34 The second lecture ends with the presentation of this evidence,
what are essentially ontological conditions for the possibility of the sign-signified
relationship. Here we may want to say that Heidegger has resolved the tension between
the transcendental condition of language and that which is experienced only through
social engagements, since we can reformulate the point this way: it is language in itself
that allows for there to be social institutions (historical, cultural) of language. And, in
tum, preserving what is opened up by these institutions goes to preserve language itself.
The institutions of language are then the traces of a more original ground, signs of a
structure that is not itself an object of experience.
But in the very next section, at the beginning of the third lecture, Heidegger
questions what has been reached via the route taken thus far in the inquiry. Has language
spoken as language, to recall the stated goal of the lecture? Not, he argues, if it has
become revealed strictly as a transcendental condition goveming our reflection through
the topic. For if the goal is to listen to language on its own tenns, it is not clear that the
inquiry at that point has accomplished this, since it has presented language in light of
reflection, which Heidegger has associated with Idealism. This approach presumably
33 Heidegger, Matiin, "The Way to Language" in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Heliz (San
Fratlcisco: Harper Collins, 1971), 115.
34 Ibid., 125.
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misses something of the nature oflanguage, because it cannot say much about this nature
insofar as it enables and is prior to the very subject of reflection itself. And so, Heidegger
attempts to miiculate what is beyond the horizon of reflection, or more precisely, what
appears within that horizon only as, again, a trace - but a trace in a different way. Here
his description proceeds in largely negative temls, except that he names it. In his own
words:
We can do no more than name it, because it will not be discussed, for it is
the region of all places, of all time-space-horizons. We shall name it with
an ancient word and say: The movingforce in Showing ofSaying is
Owning . ... What Appropriation (Ereignis) yields through Saying is
never the effect of a cause, nor the consequence of an antecedent. The
yielding owning, the Appropriation, confers more than any effectuation,
making, or founding. What is yielding is Appropriation itself - and
nothing else.35
Because we so rarely concem ourselves with the ontological character of language and
thus do not often consider its full depth, Heidegger urges us to recognize how little we
know of language when we perceive it as only the instrument of our subjectivity. But in
this description Heidegger goes so far in that direction that Ereignis appears as though it
had no direct link with what we bring into being through our speech. Language appears,
in other words, as almost entirely alien, not uncanny in the way that we earlier explored.
It is entirely strange except for a single linking thread running towards us that allows us
in the slightest way to take it up as our own: the ability to name it. "The peculiar property
of language, namely that language is concemed exclusively with itself - precisely that is
known to no one," Heidegger announces.36
One can see how commentators like Luce Irigaray get frustrated with Heidegger's
presentation of language. Heidegger sometimes speaks about primordial language, like in
the passage above, as so thoroughly separate from the economy of cause (and with that,
35 Ibid., 127.
36 MaIiin Heidegger, "The Way to LaIlguage," Ill. Heidegger is invoking Novalis's Monologue in this
passage. It is not easy to detel1uine where Heidegger's interest in Novalis in this lectme really lies, since
the 1959 lecture was part of a series where Martin Bubel' also spoke, aIld it seems to some extent an
imbedded criticism ofBuber's dialogical theory.
76
purpose or use), that it is hard to understand how this quasi-transcendental figure relates
to language as we know it through human interaction - where causes (and purposes and
uses) are always present.37 Irigaray raises this concern when she writes of Heidegger' s
project in On the Way to Language that:
(T)he philosopher's partner is speech itself - of which he says moreover
that it speaks only with itself. Like him, in a way? He interweaves,
interlaces with the speaking of speech caring little, it seems, about
interweaving, interlacing when speaking with someone, at least someone
who is living and present. He is on the way toward the call of speech, not
toward the call of another subject.38
I1'igaray's frustration is not that Heidegger neglects to attend to the primordial, pre-
reflective site ofthis claim, but that he overlooks how (a) this claim issues from others
whose lives are bound up with ours and how (b) responding to this claim entails concern
for these others, For Irigaray, we never listen to language as such - we listen to the
language of others with whom we are entangled in manifold ways, And to the extent that
we find ourselves concerned to listen well to language, we are demonstrating concern for
those beings who are attempting to communicate to us.
I believe we can see the first point at work in Heidegger's discussion of language
as a primordial condition, even if this way of thinking about things goes in a different
direction than he intended. The connection I have in mind lies with the role interpretation
37 In both "Building Dwelling Thinking" and "Poetically Man Dwells" (both lectures given in 1951),
Heidegger sharply condemns the attitude in which one takes language as an instrument of one's own will.
In both essays, he charges humanity with subverting the order of things. In "Building Dwelling Thinking,"
he writes: "Man acts as though he were the sImper and master of language, while in fact language remains
the master of man. Perhaps it is before all else man's subversion of this relation of dominance that drives
his nature into alienation." - Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking" in Poetry, Language,
Thought, ed. AlbeIt Hofstadter (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), 144. While Heidegger's remark gets at
the point that language can outnm our intentions and thus take on the role of an uncanny companion to the
self, the claim seems to go too far. Heidegger's willingness to see the relation between a hlllllan and
language as one of domination (where language conullands and people obey) seems to leave behind all the
nuances of entanglement that I have presented earlier in the chapter in temlS of thrown facticity.
Furthenllore, it shows the limits of impOlting such remarks into the domain of human-to-human dialogue,
since many problems arise if we try to conceive of these conversations as hierarchical relationships of
dominance, or even if we try to imagine what it would mean to perceive the voice of another person as
one's master.
38 Luce Irigaray, The Way ofLove, trans. Heidi Bostic and Stephen (London: Continuum, 2002), 31.
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plays in the discussion. For example, it must strike one as strange that, on the one hand,
Heidegger insists on drawing a stark separation between Ereignis and what can be
brought to light by discursive description, and that, on the other hand, (l) he had
immediately prior to this spoken about the kinship between human speaking and what
allows itself to be seen, and (2) he put such an emphasis on the need for interpretation in
his earlier lectures on HOlderlin. Why hold onto an ideal of addressing language as
language then, rather than showing that language can only appear through the interpretive
paradigms made available to us by our given social-historical situation? Is it not the case
that, like the pre-reflective situation into which one is perpetually thrown, this is another
instance of a boundary which has always already been transgressed? The fact that
Heidegger's positive descriptions of Ereignis in the lecture could easily be interpreted as
carrying forward paradigms foreign to the region of language itself (language as
language) supports this point. For example, Heidegger attempts to describe this event
(despite the fact that he says "we can only name it") as "the plainest and most gentle of
laws," "the most inconspicuous of inconspicuous phenomena, the simplest of
simplicities, the nearest of the near, and the farthest of the far in which we mortals spend
our lives.,,39 These descriptions appear to bOlTow, for one, from theological paradigms
that have historically been used to interpret the being of being. In using such metaphors,
have we not failed in allowing language to speak for itself?
On the other hand, is it not mistaken to view the presence of such "paradigms" in
terms of an imported, merely subjective interpretive apparatus, since it is - as Heidegger
himself has argued - never the case that things disclose themselves immediately to us
without the need for interpretation? It seems that part of what is suggested by the
lecture's early image oflanguage as a web of relations comes back to entanglement, in
other words, how we find ourselves speaking before we ever encounter our comportment
toward language as a practical question. 4D
39 Heidegger, Martin, "The Way to Language" in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz (San
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1971), 128.
40 This is the henlleneutic situation ofDasein as Heidegger presents it in section 33 ofBeing and Time.
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How does the relationship between Ereignis and interpretation presented here
bear on how we understand the site oflanguage's claim and, in particular, the way we
find ourselves alongside others in this claim? All attempts to listen to language in a spirit
of openness, so as to let language (a text, a voice, etc.) speak for itself, require that we
work within the paths of interpretation available to us. For these paths are not just
arbitrary paradigms or worldviews; they preserve a kinship with whatever is disclosed.
Again, this point should bear on how one relates to the language that one inherits.
To position oneself toward the claim oflanguage needn't entail, on this reading, that one
tum away from the history of language and seek out some point from which language
speaks independently from human speech and the history of the human being's
interpretive efforts. Rather, attending to the claim of language, as I am suggesting that we
hear it, requires that we turn to what is already underway in that history in order to
authentically inhabit that project. This is, as I will explore later in the last chapter, the
way Heidegger describes the task of dwelling in two lectures from 1951, "Building,
Dwelling, Thinking" and "Poetically Man Dwells." There he describes dwelling as the
activity of caring for and cultivating what one finds in the region of one's abode. Such
dwelling, on Heidegger's description, shares with poetic language the feature of making
meaningful connections for us, inhabiting the world symbolically, poetically. In other
words, it is not in Dasein's abandomnent of the discomse it inherits - be it "everyday" or
otherwise - that "language as speaking comes into its own and thus speaks qua
language.,,41 It is through the continual enrichment of how one lmdergoes that
inheritance.
As I've said before, this path can take many forms. In reference to my earlier
example of discovering once inspiring discomse to be the fayade of jargon, one has to
choose how, if at all, to preserve the meaningfulness of the discourse. Does one cut what
is salvageable away and then avoid the rest like the plague in one's philosophical work?
Or, does one stay loyal to it, working to loosen it from the force ofjargon?
4\ Martin Heidegger, "The Way to Language," 124.
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But there is another side to this. For in saying that one cannot abandon the ways
in which we dwell on earth - through, for example, traditions, histories, and habits; we
should not neglect to acknowledge the impOliant role played by social conditions which
may either enable or disenable an individual's ability to work through this task of
inheritance. This isn't to say that one's social context as a whole works either for or
against a person's entanglement. Individual relationships may provide the dialogue one
needs to work through moments of alienation from the discourse of a culture more
broadly construed. Having another who is willing to recognize my voice emerging in the
space between how I find myself and how I attempt to inhabit my throWlmess can be a
precious source of encouragement.
This brings me to another point about the role of meaning shared between
individuals, rather than between an individual and a society as such. It is strange to
consider that even in cases where one experiences a dissonance with something as
general as a cultural system of representation, it is still often the case that individual
opportm1ities for communication prove exceptionally therapeutic. Not that such instances
of communication would ever be sufficient in themselves to effect a complete
reconciliation. Neveliheless, recognition from individuals can playa crucial role, and so
much so that it may make us wonder whether complete reconciliation (where perhaps I
speak as clearly to a stranger as to a friend) is even desirable. For it is in tuning our ear to
the voice of an individual that many of us find ourselves to be our most interpretive,
which means - as I argued in the last section - our most concerned with language.
This brings me to the second dimension of Irigaray' s criticism that I noted above,
the suggestion that what is at issue in our relationship to language goes beyond one's OWl1
authenticity - it expresses a concern for the condition of others. The voice of the
individual other demands that I listen for how it is at odds with the nonnative framework
of recognition. And listening in this case often means intervening on behalf of the
emergence of that other voice. Whether I am reading an anonymous text that has
somehow found its way to me across great time and distance or listening to my sister
speak during a regular visit, I may be struck by the similar precariousness of the process
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in each case. These situations enlighten me to the fact that listening and reading are not
passive experiences. For if I do not allow the voice of my addressor to come into its own,
I cannot possibly listen to that person. Therefore, the need for interpretation is not just a
condition for knowledge - it is also an ethical condition. We must know how to assist
others in giving accOlmts of themselves in order to be responsive to those accOlmts.
This is a different sense of finding myself entangled with others. The debt
presented to me when I find myself already underway in this case is a debt toward others
- others I have listened to, others whose own entanglement involves my use of language,
whether habitual or more mediated. But in this situation, it is impossible to fully separate
the subject of one's own entanglement from the subject of another. This is why
answering the claim is difficult. Take the case of reading a philosophical text. If we value
the freedom of people to speak for themselves, then we will want to facilitate this
freedom for the author of the text. And yet, as we demonstrated with Barthes's writer, the
subject of entanglement is not identical to the biographical subject that we might access
through historicism and psychologism. Therefore, in order to attend to the particular
event of the text, we must intervene as interpreters and, moreover, rely on paths of
interpretation made available to us by others. Thus, though we find ourselves wanting to
release this text to its unique possibility, this goal is complicated by another aspect of our
social entanglement, namely, the fact that our interpretive efforts are never just our own.
They repeat to a large extent the ideas and concems of those who have influenced us.
This is the way that finding myself claimed by another's entanglement brings me once
again to the question of my own entanglement. I call this double claim iyfitbejindlichkeit
- finding myself with and through others.
Unlike the process of inquiry whereby one deduces the fact of a social
inheritance, A1itbejindlichkeit is occasioned by a claim that issues to me from a pa11icular
other. It is occasioned by the experience of another entangled voice. As I suggested
earlier, despite his tendency to see thinkers as thoroughly attached to their historical
culture, it seems that Heidegger was also very much claimed by individual voices at odds
with their historical moment. One can read his dialogue with Nietzsche in What is Called
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Thinking? as an example ofthis.42 The possibility of such an occurrence suggests that the
way people find themselves entangled side-by-side is not constricted by the linear
development of history. Separation works here in history like it works between a cmious
reader and a dense text - it affords a distance to Dasein that Dasein can reach out and
dissolve. So is the natme of the human being's existentiality which Heidegger himself
had described in Being and Time as En(fel'nen. And throughout On the Way to Language,
Heidegger continues to develop this existential structme by theorizing a separating-
binding relation. In "The Way to Language," he writes: "precisely in the solitary [1m
Einsamen] there unfolds essentially the lack of what is in common [del' Fehl des
Gemeinsamen], as the most binding relation to what is in common.,,43 Applying this
statement to the problem of social entanglement, we can say that the occurrence of
Mitbefindlichkeit not only cultivates the kind of communication that is essential to having
a dynamic community, but it does this at the same time as it deepens the lmique
relationship that individuals have to language.
Ifwe can understand A1itbefindlichkeit as a way of finding omselves in common
that is facilitated by - rather than opposed to - om existential condition of Enifel'nen,
then we have answered the question with which we began, namely: How is community
possible for a being whose most proximal ties are simultaneously "environmentally
remote"? What seems apparent now is that it is precisely the individuating quality of
Befindlichkeit, of how I find myself - entangled in and responsible for a life that I inherit
lmderway, that makes the experience of Mitbefindlichkeit such a profolmd one.
By the same token, then, the absence of such an occurrence not only weakens the
fabric of communication but inhibits the development of an individual with his or her
42 Heidegger writes of his engagement with Nietzsche's writing: "People still hold the view that what is
handed down to us by tradition is what in reality lies behind us - while in fact it comes toward us because
we are its captives and destined to it ... That self-deception about history prevents us from hearing the
language of the thinkers. We do not hear it rightly, because we take that language to be mere expression,
setting forth philosophers' views. But the thinkers' language tells what is. To hear it is in no case easy.
Hearing it presupposes that we meet a certain requirement, and we do so only on rare occasions. We must
acknowledge and respect it. To acknowledge and respect consists in letting every thinker's thought come to
us as something in each case unique, never to be repeated, inexhaustible - and being shaken to the depths
by what is lUlthought in his thought." - Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, 76-7.
43 Martin Heidegger, "The Way to Language," 134.
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language. For just as we may facilitate the ability of others to speak authentically, we
may inhibit this possibility when we fail to recognize the plight of individuals to inhabit
their language freely. As Luce Irigaray describes it:
The obligation to speak 'like everyone else' or according to what has been
taught does not awaken, or quench, human consciousness. Ifthe subject
does not have, in himself, the source of his movement, he loses his quality
as subj ect. He is a mechanism staIied up by an energy already fabricated,
not free. He speaks but has, as it were, nothing to say that he could say, or
no longer has anything to say, paralyzed as he is between repetitions and
'1 44Sl ence.
In order for laIlguage to be meaningful, it must allow the individual to speak, something
that is much harder than it sounds. Irigaray's description recalls to us once again the
series of examples that we've explored in which we struggle to find our own voice aI11idst
the conditions of inheritance. With the right support, we may take up this entanglement as
our own possibility and give voice to the silence that we experience; without it, however,
we may go no further than a sense of paralysis, an experience of impossibility within an
inherited symbolic order. Then, the obligation to "speak like everyone else" leaves us
unfree, our lives indistinguishable according to our perception from a mechanism set into
motion from ail unlmown, alien source. Language then loses its usefulness both as a tool
of expression and as a form of disclosure. Thus the paradox: the less a language can
function as giving voice to singular experiences, the less universal it is.
While the suggestion that we ought to deepen our individual relationships to
language might sOlmd antithetical to how we normally understand the foundations of
community (as in the "one nation - one language" concept), we can see that this practice
plays an essential role in our political system today. For without any account of how one
appropriates and authentically comes to emerge in language, it is not possible to have a
political system based on individuals' ability to speak for themselves, for the source of
any utterance - including "I" - is not then a self but merely an anonymous system of
discourse. In this way, liberalism depends on the ability of people to speak for themselves
44 Luce lrigaray, The Way ofLove, trans. Heidi Bostic and Stephen Pluhacek (London: Continuillll, 2002),
62.
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- to speak in their own voices. Indeed, insofar as any healthy human relationship is based
on mutual understanding and most of these arrive at this by way of some kind of
language, the possibility of speaking for oneself seems to be a feature required by most
human relationships if they are to function properly.
This is not to say that it is necessary ever to have complete mastery over one's
speech, that every utterance should be lmderstood as stamped with the guarantee of a
transcendental "1." As many twentieth century philosophers, including Merleau-Ponty
and Derrida, have argued, language is never merely an instrument picked up in response
to some need that exists prior to it. We find olU'selves thrown into language, its roots
reaching far beyond what we have immediate knowledge of.
Because of this entanglement, the relationship between the self and language must
be thought in a different way. In the line of thinking developed through our discussion of
translation, we saw the need for an alternative way of hearing the language of "one's
own," taking this neither as pre-determined essence or pure unfettered self-creation. We
concluded that the goal of arriving at one's own amounts to a return to one's "being-
there," that is, one's original insertion into the world as a being of concern. From this
perspective, it is not in disentangling oneself from one's inheritances that one
accomplishes authenticity, but in tuming toward the claim of those inheritances and
translating them faithfully. But, as we saw in the context ofHeidegger's description of
appropriation, one never does so outside of the lines of interpretation opened up by
others.
It might seem strange that the end of this chapter should focus on the individual.
But it is, nevertheless, through the intervention of an individual or a smaller community
that we are most often brought to our language. And, just as importantly, it is for the sake
of individuals that we often find ourselves concemed to listen and to speak properly. The
goal of reconciling ourselves to language is not just the bettennent of our own condition.
The path that we have developed as the tum to language, notwithstanding one's desire for
authenticity therein, has been all along an activity concemed with enabling others.
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In sum, we have reached two conclusions about the social problem of
entanglement with which we began. First, (l) deep social relations are the a priori
condition of any experience of entanglement. They are, to invert the schema of Entfernen,
what allows distance to be near. In the case of Bmihes's writer, this is to view the very
experience of his alienation, what he calls the "tragic disparity" as presupposing a
structure of communication. For though he has lost faith in the efficacy of the discourse
which aims to reconcile him to its history, his silence (in this case, the stillness of his
pen) was nevertheless memlingful - to him, as a way of understanding himselt~ and - as
far as he suspects - to others too, since he makes the etlort to write about the
entanglement. But it is not just the case that a meaning that automatically inheres in our
social being remains a priori present in entanglement, because (2) there is a creative
meaning-making at work in these moments. From out of these highly individuating (even
solitary) moments of dissonance, a powerful fonn of writing may emerge, one that
discloses the limits of those "all-powerful signs" and thus sets language underway again.
Thus, it is precisely because ofmld not in spite ofits emphases on one's ability to feel
removed from and question nonnative language that Heideggerean philosophy can shed
light on the relationship between language and social life. Not that one can find a
coherent social theory oflanguage in Heidegger. Neveliheless, as I hope this chapter has
demonstrated, following Heidegger's concem about entanglement in its various f0I111S
(Entfernen, GewOl:fenheit, Stilnmung, the henneneutics of translation, etc.) entails that we
address the myriad way that our relations with others are at issue in this entanglement.
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CHAPTER III
TRACES OF ABSORPTION ON THE WAY TO LANGUAGE
A study of the way that Heidegger begins most of his lectures on language in the
1950's, those collected in the volume called On the Way to Language, reveals the
following pattern. The majority of the works collected in this volume begin by invoking
language as a ubiquitous yet indetenninate presence in our lives, something with which
we are in a constant yet indeterminate relation. "Language," for example, begins by
suggesting that we are constantly (stdndig) speaking in a variety of ways, even when it
seems as though we are not, since language does not first originate from a particular
will. I "The Nature of Language" begins by illustrating how, despite its ubiquity in our
lives, we fail to experience (e;:fahren) language, a failure that undermines any scientific
knowledge of it that we might develop. While, in the "The Way to Language," Heidegger
begins by describing the tension between the mystery of language and the belief that we
are "within language and with language before all else," that "a way to language is not
needed.,,2
Each of these essays begins by recognizing a certain absorption of the willing,
thinking, desiring subject in a network of discourse equiprimordial with the world and
thus excessive to each of these ways ofthinking about the unity of the self. Speech, a
pillar of our pre-reflective activity in the world, functions well - perhaps best - when we
pay it no mind. This means that if I dwell primarily with my thought, I am not where my
word is. And thus when Heidegger directs readers to this obscure relationship, the effect
is an unsettling of the subject.
I "Es entspringt nicht erst aus einem besonderem Wollen." - Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache
(Shlttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2007), 11.
2 "So sind wir den allem zuvor in del' Sprache und bei del' Sprache. Ein Weg zu ihr ist unnotig." -- Martin
Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, 241.
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An unsettling of the subject, but maybe also an intensifIcation of the reader. For if
I, the thinker, am not where my word is, then who is it that I encounter only within and at
the same time as the words of the book? An alter-ego (3nother-I), the secret life of the
reader can seem separated from the thinking "I" by an unspoken abyss. This is because,
from the perspective of the thinking "I," our absorption into "the They" of everyday
discourse appears to be an endpoint, an annihilation. It is a void, the kind that Heidegger
describes in the opening passage of "The Word," where he invokes a stanza from
Holderlin's elegy, "Brot und Wein," that asks about silent ancient theatres bereft ofjoyful
dance. Bereft, Heidegger suggests, of the word ("Dem einstigen art des Erscheinens del'
Gaffer ist das Wort verwehrt ....,,3).
Heidegger does not forget in these opening passages that there is a mood proper to
the condition he describes. He names it on occasion in the lectures, though the name
seems to have no more than a cameo role in the texts: melancholy. Why melancholy?
Melancholy has often been described as the inability to properly moum a loss. In
melancholy, loss is all-encompassing - one is unable to do anything with it, since one
lacks a means of reintegrating the event ofloss into one's life. This is pertinent to the
pattem outlined above in that it is precisely the inability to recognize the loss suffered in
our relationship to language that gives this non-experience its peculiar quality. Heidegger
tells us in "The Nature of Language" that we lack the word for the word. One suffers the
absorption in silence. The whole movement is frozen, enveloped by a void.
This brings us to the following question: If the condition Heidegger describes in
these opening passages is indeed a melancholic one, is it possible to understand the path
taken thereafter by the lectures, the path leading toward an encounter with language in its
mystery and othemess, as a therapeutic effort? This question, while seemingly too
psychologically invested for Heidegger, has the benefit of offering us a new perspective
on a couple impOliant interpretive questions that confront readers of Heidegger.
Heidegger's discussion of authenticity, for example, like his emphasis on the
foreigmless of language, has been severely criticized for devaluing our social bonds with
3 Ibid., 219.
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others and even advancing the ideal of a heroic protagonist who negates all social
inheritance as the model of authenticity. Within On the Way to Language, there are
several themes that could support such a reading. In the last chapter, I described these
moments as quasi-transcendental moments in his thought and pointed out the problems
that they present to interpreters of this text. For example, in urging us to think and
experience language outside of the normal ways in which we conceive of it, Heidegger
tells us that the goal of the inquiry is to find language as language. If we take this to
mean, as it often seems we should, that the inquiry seeks language apart from our way of
conceptualizing it, we will soon reach a difficult impasse, since, as readers, we inevitably
read Heidegger's text tlu'ough the working set of concepts that we use for reading all
texts. Another example of the quasi-transcendental role oflanguage in this body of work
is his rejection of the idea that language is, first and foremost, a human activity. In "The
Way to Language," this rejection takes the form of a disagreement with Humboldt, whom
Heidegger takes to be a paradigm of idealism, and an alignment with NovaHs, who
perceives the history of language as asymptotic to the history of self-consciousness.
Looking at these moments altogether, the worry is that language appears to have an
essence separate from how we have used it, interpreted it, and described it throughout our
history. If this is tme, then listening to language itself means precisely blocking out all of
those voices that merely utilize language and do not hearken to its conunand. Heidegger's
approach to poetry would seem to confirm the charge. In his reading of a poem by Trakl
in "Language," Heidegger seems particularly strong-willed about holding apart the
human voice and the voice of language itself. Before turning to the poem, he reminds his
audience: "Who the author is remains unimportant here, as with every other masterful
poem. The mastery consists precisely in this, that the poem can deny (verleugnen kann)
the poet's person and name.,,4
Though Heidegger does not use the teml Eigentlichkeit (authenticity) in these
discussions, a parallel is apparent. In Being and Time, the voice of conscience (Stimme
des Gewissens) - that which breaks us out of our non-thinking absorption and illuminates
4 The important term "verleugnen" here can be translated as deny, disavow, negate, or renounce.
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our fundamental care, solicitude, and concern for the world, is precisely a voice that
appears to belong to no one, or more precisely, that belongs and does not belong to the
one who hears it. In the words of Being and Time, it is a voice that "comes from me and
yet beyond and over me," one that calls the addressee back from "the They" and "into the
reticence of his existent potentiality-for-Being."s This is clearly parallel to the voice of
the poet as Heidegger lmderstands it in the example above. The poem comes from Trakl
and yet also from beyond and over Trakl.
The criticism against Heidegger's depiction of ethics as non-discursive in Being
and Time, which many attribute to the argument's solipsistic focus on anxiety about one's
own death, directly parallels the criticism against Heidegger's vision oflanguage, for
here too the concern is that authentic language requires absolute removal from the
absorption that characterizes everyday discourse. The discussion of die Gerede in Being
and Tirne section 35, Heidegger's deprecating remarks on "idle chatter," already
anticipate the way that Heidegger will treat this type of speech in the later work. The
attitude is still evident in the 1952 essay, "Building Dwelling Thinking," where,
criticizing the gossipy speech that circulates via newspapers and radio shows, Heidegger
declares that "Man acts as though he were the shapeI' and master of language, while in
fact language remains the master of man. Perhaps it is before all else man's subversion
(Verkehrung) of this relation of dominance that drives his nature into alienation.
(Vielleicht ist es Val' allem anderen die vom lvlenschen betriebene Verkehrung dieses
Herrschaftsverhliltnisses, was sein Wesen in das Unheimische treibt.),,6 In suggesting that
our everyday discourse, our concepts, our person, and our nanle must be disavowed in
order to encounter language as language, one wonders where the way to language leads.
But what precisely is it that this path requires us to renounce? Is it our absorption
in "the They"? Is it the way language functions inconspicuously in the presencing of the
world, intennixed with mundane things - a pencil, chair, or street? Is it language's
5 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Jolm Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper
and Row, 1962), 322.
6 Martin Heidegger, "Bauel1 Wolmen Denken" in Gesamtausgabe Band 7: Vortrtige und Aujsatze
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostennaml, 2000), 148.
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worldliness - or more precisely, its thingliness - that must be renounced? The diverse
scope of answers to this question that one gets just from the passages above suggests that
the best answer to this question is not a simple one. The way to language is clearly a path
of renunciation (recall the significant role of renunciation in Heidegger's reading of
Stefan George's poem that we explored in Chapter One), but of what?
I propose that the melancholic mood sUlTounding the begilming of many of
Heidegger's essays on language gives us a clue. As I sketched above, the distinctive
feature of this mooded situation is the unsayability of the loss undergone. Coupling this
with Heidegger's claim that we lack the word for the word, we are brought to consider
how language in the very first instant could be perceived as a kind of loss, one that
Heidegger entreats us to experience, to conti'ont, and to bring to language.
In what follows, then, I will develop an interpretation of the way that our
absorption into language resists thematization by way of a comparison between (a) some
of the key moments in Heidegger's work that describe or enact language entanglement
and (b) the way that absorption and loss are understood by two traditions, namely,
structuralism and psychoanalysis. Finally, I will argue that listening to language as
language need not be heard as a heroic recovery of propriety, but - analogous to the
psychoanalytic process by which one treats melancholy - can be understood as a
transfonnation away from an attachment to the lost origin of one's speaking toward a
more poetic, aesthetic, and historical sense of the unthematizable beginning oflanguage.
The Limits ofl\1astel:Y
In "The Way to Language," Heidegger reminds readers of the debt all speaking
owes to hearing. He tells us that:
Speech, taken on its own, is hearing. It is listening to the language we
speak. Hence speaking is not simultaneously a hearing, but is such in
advance. Such listening to language precedes all other instances of
hearing, albeit in an altogether inconspicuous way. We not only speak
language, we speakfi'om out ofit. We are capable of doing so only
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because in each case we have already listened to language.7
Heidegger's refrain that language is present in our lives prior to our intentional use of it
strongly echoes the focus that some language theorists give to the constitutive role of
address. Like Heidegger, Jacques Lacan sees the fact of address at the origin of our
relationship to language as the source of a gap that from then on characterizes this
relationship. How does this gap arise? For Lacan, one first starts to speak only in
response to the address of others, and this includes all the language which will allow one,
for instance, to make known one's desires or to refer to oneself in speech. This means
that prior to the world of communicative exchanges through which I exercise language as
"mine," I have already been bespoken by the language of others. Another analyst in the
Lacanian tradition, Judith Feher Gurewich, explains it this way:
Even before a child is bom he or she is already assigned a place in the
world of language in the sense that he or she is expected by the parents
and thus already symbolized in their minds. He may already have a name;
she may already be the bearer of many of her parents' expectations. In that
sense the parents' unconscious and conscious signifiers will be projected
onto this imaginary child and will continue to surround the baby after its
birth .... (T)hese signifiers - these words, sentences, affects, attitudes of
the other - will become the hallmarks of the child's existence much before
the time she can impute her own subjective meaning to them. By the time
the child learns how to speak, these signifiers will already have made
inroads in what will become the subject's unconscious. We can understand
at this point Lacan's famous dictum to the effect that the unconscious is
the discourse of the Other, or, as he also puts it, that the Other is the
keeper of the signifiers. 8
In one sense, the point here just repeats in a different way what I have described in
Heideggerean temlinology as our thrownness into language. The signs that shape my
experience - of the world and of myself - and which, in the first instant, I experience as
the spontaneous products of my own thinking and being, have their origin in another and
7 MaIiin Heidegger, "The Way to Language" in Basic Writings - Revised and Expanded Edition, trans.
David Krell (New York: Harper & Collins, 1993),411.
8 Judith Feher Gmewich, "Who's Afraid of Jacques Lacan7" in Lacan and the New Wave in American
PsychoanaZvsis: The Subject and the Self, (New York: Other Press, 1999),9.
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thus are never "mine" alone. But what Gurewich's account adds is that this other is not
just culture or history on a grand scale, which is how we've considered it for the most
part so far, but a more patticularized other - those speaking subjects who have been
charged with bringing one up and teaching one to speak. There are a couple reasons why
this is important. First, paying attention to the particular, finite situation of what compels
me to identify myself in language sheds light on how the power of its claim issues not
only from language's ability to organize experience but from its connection to another
upon whom I am dependent and through whom my own identity must emerge. Second, it
lets us distinguish between two different "others" in which we may find ourselves
linguistically entangled: (a) the voice of a patticular other - more thingly, more bodily-
in whose address I first learn the basic words and grammatical structures of a language,
and (b) the set of norms that are never embodied in this or that individual but are
precisely what allow us to deploy these primitive utterances as rneaningfill. Lacan
describes the series of events that separate these two phases of the subject's relationship
to latlguage castration atld oedipalization.9 Before castration, one exists in a state of
absorption wherein one lacks any sense of "I" beyond the repetition of the word in the
most basic exchanges between the child and the parent. After castration, language
fimctions largely in the service of creating a supplementary and substitute reality for that
which is left behind.
Speaking of the preoedipal is understood to be impossible, because this state of
absorption is considered inaccessible not only to memory but to language as well. The
loss of the origin oflanguage - what we could understand as the "inconspicuous" nature
of our absorption in the address of language for Heidegger- takes place immediately. The
event vanishes from the scenes of memory, because the means by which we build a
memory for the "I" (ego) - narrative, description, dialogue - require language. In this
way, the origin of language is unthematizable. And yet, just as one Catl discem traces of
our absorption within the originary address of language in Heidegger's work (for
9 There is still much debate among psychoanalytic philosophers about how to understand the natme of
these events. Without getting into those debates, I will simply point out that the way I believe them to be
most useful, and the way that I will be using them in this chapter, is as descriptions of what occms III
language entanglement.
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example, in his discussion of legein as an originary showing that enables the indication of
what allows itself to be shown), one can find the traces of the preoedipal within the
psychoanalytic account of language development.
Take, for example, Freud's famous discussion of the "fort" and "da" game in
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, an exploration which exemplifies in many ways the
postoedipal relationship to language. In this account, Freud observes a child's game,
where he thrusts a ball away from him and utters a sound that Freud interprets as "fort,"
German for "gone" or "away." Then, the boy brings the ball back and exclaims a sound
that Freud interprets as "da," "there." Freud sees in this game a way of exerting some
control over the mother's going away, which had recently become distressful to the boy.
Freud observes: "The interpretation of the game then became obvious. It was related to
the child's great cultural achievement - the instinctual renwlciation (that is, the
renunciation of instinctual satisfaction) which he had made in allowing his mother to go
away without protesting." He adds: "He compensated himself for this, as it were, by
himself staging the disappearance and retum of the objects within his reach."IO Language
development is shaped here by the need to retain a part of something even when it leaves,
by the need for object pennanency.
Let us examine the ontological construction of language at work in this game.
While the boy uses language as a tool with which to reorganize his experience, which
would suggest - recalling our previous discussions of tool-being in Heidegger - that this
language belonged already to a world that he finds himself in rather than one he himself
forges, Freud emphasizes in this discussion the way that language plays the role of
substitute for the world, or more specifically, for the part of the world and the self that
must be renoW1ced. Is this just an inconsistency in Freud's theory, suggesting that he has
not given a cohesive description of the phenomenon? Or, could this ambiguity also
belong to the subject matter itself? In order to perfoml the role ofpemlanent-substitute-
for-the-impennanent, language must be absolute, indestructible, even self-referential. In
this new world, names are the essence of things, the most real, because they do not go
10 Sigmund Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" in The Freud Reader, ed. Peter Gay (New York: W.W.
NOlion, 1989),600.
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away - they stay put. On the other hand, the words that he leams are neverjust names
and never wholly attain the position of omnipotence. This is because no one individually
produces these words out of thin air. We come across them and begin to use them before
even having the logos necessary for voluntary action. Thus positioned within language,
the boy's complicated relationship to language can be said to exemplifY a more general
condition of the speaking and hearing subject. Hidden beneath the name that we have
eventually come to perceive as the thing itself is the trace of something heard, silent now
like the light of a star whose presence indicates the death of the origin. Language is at
once that primordial praxis into which we are thrown and, as the means by which we
attain to the invelied world set up by this substitution, the denial of that thrownness.
This dual role of language is one way that we can account for the failure of the
child to win a completely pennanent object out of this strategy. For in taking on language
as a tool for his purposes, little Hans actually takes on something that can never be his.
The words he uses betray his involvement in a primordial disclosure of the world, a
presencing that is not subject to the relation between naming and being that he initiated in
his game of repetition.
We can understand Freud's account of the boy's struggle with language in this
sense through a comparison with the phenomenological concept of being-in-the-world
(In-der-Welt-sein). For the phenomenologist, systematic philosophies that attempt to
describe all presencing as govemed by the principles of reflection and self-consciousness
- figures of mastery - cover over our pre-reflective activity of disclosure. I I Said
otherwise, they obfuscate the absorption of speech - the impossibility of any private
II Heidegger says: "The kinship of Showing with what it shows - a kinship never developed purely in its
own terms and those of its origins -later becomes transformed into a conventional relation between a sign
and its signification." - Martin Heidegger, "On the Way to Language," 115. For Heidegger, it is not
erroneous to say that beings in the world allow themselves to be indicated and expressed by language, but
the way he speaks of this conelation between being and language has been the object of interesting
critiques, like Denida's in "Differance" and Rorty's in "The Contingency of Language." But it is wOlih
noting that he does not describe what is expressed in language as other to language. The discussion is not
presented in the tenus in which it is criticized, namely, as a lUlification of language and nature or the real.
Looking at the quote above, we could say that Heidegger echoes a point that Wittgenstein makes in the
Tractatus. According to Remark 4.12, no propositions "can represent what they must have in common with
reality in order to be able to represent it - logical form [logos]." In the next remark, he elaborates: "What
finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent."
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language. Here is where phenomenology deeply resonates with the leading axiom of
psychoanalysis, namely, that the ego is not master in its own house. For both ways of
approaching language, despite their difIerences, seem to indicate naming's indebtedness
to something prior. Both thus offer insight into what the child attempts to discipline
through his game, what - in the vocabulary of psychoanalysis - we can call the
preoedipal relation to language. Recalling for a moment the line from Stefan George's
poem that Heidegger discusses, "Where word breaks off, no thing may be," the child's
game of repetition subjects the presencing of things to the mantra of his "cultural
achievement": where the word (read: ego) is, there the thing is.
The limit of this mastery is to be found, however, in the significance that the tools
of language passed on by others naturally have, as Gurewich says, "before the time that
(one) can impute (one's) own subjective meaning to them." Because this inheritance does
not altogether disappear, even when the naming game turns into a generalized
comportment toward the world, language becomes the site of a tension. On the one hand,
the word marks the positing of the thing. On the other hand, the word is already a thing,
and thus not the result of such an act of positing. From the perspective of the subject who
expects the world to comply to the subjective meaning that he or she imputes, the traces
of absorption - having always already first listened before one has spoken - can seem
like the very limit of logos.
This dilemma does not disappear in adulthood. It seems to confront us all of the
time when we read and interpret texts. Using the psychoanalytic vocabulary again, the
postoedipal comportment toward a text is manifest in the conviction that, without the
signification imbued by interpretation, the text is an empty, void reality. And yet,
however inconspicuously, the text does not cease to affect those exposed to its address.
The preoedipal relationship to language is manifest in the vulnerability of the reader to
this address, before it is organized as "the text that I read" or "the text that we read."
For, going back to the schema oflanguage development, even when words have a
referential flillction in the preoedipallanguage stage, they do not yet operate as self-
referentially as later speech constmctions will. Creating a noise that sounds like "hungry"
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may be a way of refening to a sensation or giving the signal that is expected to initiate a
desired action (being provided something to eat), but it is not yet the act of one who
understands himself or herself as the subject of speech in its fullest sense. The child does
not yet equate the origin of the speech-act with a reference in the world, saying "I," the
one who speaks and the one you hear, "am hungry." Such connections come later.
Roman Jakobson observed this pattern in language development in his theory of
shifters, noting what a different picture of language development it suggests from that
presumed by most philosophersY According to Jakobson, "shifters" are a category of
words that have a dual role in language. On the one hand, a shifter is an index, a word
that is "in existential relation with the object it represents." It has a vocative function. On
the other hand, a shifter is a symbol in that it "cannot represent its object without being
associated with the latter by a conventional rule." Thus, it also has a nominative flillction.
Personal pronouns are one type of shifter. To say that "I" is an index is to say, in a sense,
that it is immediately what it represents. At the same time, however, every shifter
"possesses its own general meaning. Thus," Jakobson writes, "I means the addressor (and
you, the addressee) of the message to which it belongs.,,13
The significance of these dual function words has, according to Jakobson, been
neglected by philosophers. Citing Edmund Husserl and Belirand Russell, he points to
their mistake when, in conceiving of the personal pronoun merely as an index, they
conclude that it lacks meaning. Russell, for example, calls index words like the personal
pronoun "egocentric particulars" that cannot apply to more than one thing at one time.
But they are "egocentric" from only one vantage point: when we recognize them as also
having a general meaning, this omnipotence vanishes. In our ability to say "I," we have at
once the conditions for the experience of an individuated subjectivity and, at the same
time, the impossibility of complete individuation.
12 While Jakobson's discussion of shifters bOlTOWS from other language theorists like Peirce, Jespersen, and
Beneviste, I will restrict my discussion to Jakobson, because he synthesizes the others and best articulates
the impOit of the theory for philosophy nan'owly construed.
13 Roman Jakobson, "Shifters, Verbal Categories, and the Russian Verb," in Word and Language, Volume 2
ofSelected Writings (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 132.
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Furthennore, Jakobson argues that, in neglecting the dual function of shifters,
these philosophers have mistakenly imagined that these words belong to the simplest
phases oflanguage development, when, in fact, they are among the latest acquisitions in
child language development and, as he elaborates on in another article, among the earliest
losses of aphasia. Sticking with the example of the personal pronouns, Jakobson writes:
... it is quite obvious that the child who has learned to identify himself
with its proper name will not easily become accustomed to such alienable
tenns as the personal pronouns: he may be afraid of speaking of himself in
the first person while being called you by his interlocutors. Sometimes he
attempts to redistribute these appellations. For instance, he tries to
monopolize the first person pronoun: 'Don't dare call yourself!. Only I
am I, and you are only you.' Or he uses indiscriminately either I or you
both for the addressor and the addressee so that this pronoun means any
participant of the given dialogue. Or finally I is so rigorously substituted
by the child for his proper name that he readily names any person of his
surroundings but stubbornly refuses to utter him own name: the name has
for its little bearer only a vocative meaning, opposed to the nominative
function of the 1. 14
While social maturation and adaptation most often meliorate these difficulties, the
ambiguity of personal pronouns and demonstrative adjectives may still cause frustration
in adult language use (e.g., the "vague pronoun reference" that composition textbooks
warn against). And the potential for confusion presents itself also in the fact that many
jokes turn around this an1biguity.
Despite his comments about the way that philosophers have overlooked the
complexity of shifters, Jakobson's analysis of the dual function of shifters -like the
tension that I described between the preoedipal and the postoedipal relationships to
language - finds an early precedent in the critique of sense certainty in Hegel's
Phenomenology ojSpirit. Both demonstrate how the initial experience we may have of
language as a tool for communicating what is to us the most vivid and clear of
phenomena - "this," "now," "1," "here" - can become complicated by the realization that
these words are universals, applicable to an infinite series of "I"s, "this"es, and so on. But
14 Ibid., 132-133.
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an important difference - maybe the most relevant difference between structuralism and
phenomenology on this point - is that Jakobson does not comply with the Phenomen-
ology ojSpirit's chronological organization to these moments. "This," "now," "you,"
and "I," from the perspective of the linguist rather than the Hegelian phenomenologist,
would have to come ({fiel' knowledge of and use of abstract universals in language, since
on account of its dual function, the shifter is more complex, more mediated. I5 Ability to
use proper nouns comes before the ability to effectively use the more meta-linguistic
indices. In light of this, it is more likely that little Hans was saying Fortreise (departure)
or Fortschritt (progress) and Dqfiirhalten (opinion) or Dachshund than he was simply
jort and da (though some of these examples introduce the filliher issue of what level of
language capacity one needs to have in order to effectively use compound words where
index words appear as roots within symbols that no longer fimction as indexes at all, e.g.,
the presence of "f01i" in Fol'treise.)
As previously mentioned, on account of the relatively complex rules governing
their two intertwining functions, it is not uncommon for mature adult language users to
struggle with the processes required for effective use of dual-function words. The clearest
example ofthis occurs in cases of aphasia, the topic of Jakobson's famous article entitled
"Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasiac Disturbances." Though the
concept of the shifter is not central in it, the analysis hinges on a distinction between two
modes of arrangement necessary to language, that of combination or contiguity and that
of selection or substitution, a deficiency in either corresponding to one of two varieties of
aphasia. There are many interesting aspects of each variety; however, I will restrict my
remarks to a few observations on the two, mostly on what Jakobson calls selection or
substitution deficiency insofar as it helps us to better understand the tension between the
two scenes oflanguage outlined above - on the one hand, that of our pre-reflective
15 There is some debate about what the sequencing of the forms of knowledge means in the Phenomenology
a/Spirit. While it would be insufficient to understand the sequence to describe factual individual and
societal development, describing the sequence as rational seems neveliheless to rely on such description.
For an altemative to the two, John McCumber's discussion In the Company a/Words of the role of
nanative constlUction in Hegel's account is helpfi.Jl, for McClilllber distinguishes Hegel's project of
phenomenology from other ways of doing history in that it maintains the contingency of a narrative among
other narratives.
98
absorption within address, and, on the other hand, that wherein language is (re)fashioned
as a world of meanings substituted for a prior, more unpredictable presencing. Both kinds
of aphasia that Jakobson discusses are, on my reading, problems that occur in the process
of trying to deal with the absorption that I have described as an impOliant structure for
both psychoanalysis and Heidegger.
In the case of selection or substitution deficiency, Jakobson observes the
following interrelated phenomena. This deficiency shows up as an inability to let the
meaning of words transcend a given context, an incapacity for naming (the nominative
function), an incapacity for metaphor, and a loss of metalanguage. One's speech
regresses back to a fantasy of remaining within the preoedipal relation, where there is no
need to substitute out the idiom in which one has always already found oneself. One
retains a kind of speaking position but one that appears frozen, locked into the position of
the hearing subject.
Insofar as it is a basic foundational principle of any language use - disappearing
only in extreme cases of aphasia - substitution is a key feature of the everyday
interpretive attitude that I described in the last chapter. And yet, for reasons that Jakobson
does not speculate upon, theorists have often overlooked the implications of
substitution's fundamental role in language. "According to an old but recurrent bias, a
single individual's way of speaking at a given time, labeled idiolect, has been viewed as
the only concrete linguistic reality," Jakobson notes. 16 Is this the philosopher's prejudice
again that says that we start off in language as egoists and then gradually get accustomed
to the idea of shared meaning?17 Jakobson gives the following example to convey just
how often "everyday" speech employs substitution. He writes:
16 Roman Jakobson, "Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasiac Disturbances" in Word and
Language: Volume 2 o.fSelected Writings (The Hague, Mouton, 1971),248.
17 One of the most interesting discussions of idiolect and its opposite is to be fOlUld in the work of Mikhail
Bakhtin, who asserts that we belong to multiple discourse communities, and only in so doing, have a
relative freedom fi'om the ideological condition that we inhabit whenever we think within a single language
(idiolect). It is not clear, however, that in heteroglossia there are multiple languages per se, since - on
Jakobson's account - there must be some equivalence in any situation in order to have meaningful
difference.
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Obviously such operations, labeled metalinguistic by the logicians, are not
their invention: far from being confined to the sphere of science, they
prove to be an integral part of our customary linguistic activities. The
participants in a dialogue often check whether they are using the same
code. 'Do you follow me? Do you see what I mean?' the speaker asks, or
the listener himself breaks in with 'What do you mean?' 18
Here Jakobson describes the common use of metalanguages - of translating beyond a
given idiom - as a necessary tool with which we constantly negotiate the differential
which is the norm in any speech exchanged with one another. We must be able at any
point to put ourselves in the place of another and reevaluate the way we say things, to say
the same but in a different way.19 In this, the practice of substitution entails something
different than the "cultural achievement" that Freud perceived to be at work in the child's
game. Here substitution is not simply a matter of replacing that abS011Jtion from which I
am cast out with a word that remains steady and obedient.] translate away from the
immediate language into l-vhich ] am thrown in order to experience myselffound again by
the other with whom] speak, to find myselfin a scene ofmutual address.
The requirement of "code-switching," as Jakobson sometimes calls it, has far-
reaching philosophical implications that recall the argument in the previous chapter that a
concem for one's own language must, in some respect, imply a concem for others ... in
this case, let us just say for the understanding of others, noting that such efforts to include
others in a discourse may have virtues beyond simply expanding understanding. Like the
theory of shifters, the theory of selection or substitution contests the notion that language
at any point appears as a tool of a single, unified ego. It suggests that to speak is always
to speak (at least potentially) for the sake of another. As Jakobson says:
Everyone, when speaking to another person tries, deliberately or
involuntarily, to hit upon a common vocabulary: either to please or simply
to be understood or, finally, to bring him out, he uses the ten11S ofthis
addressee. There is no such thing as a private property in language:
18 Roman Jakobson, "Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasiac Disturbances," 248.
19 Of course, there must still be some commonality between two interlocutors in order for this to work. "Do
you follow me?" does not help to move a conversation along if the addressee of this phrase call1lot
understand it as an offer to rephrase a point just made for the sake of his or her own understanding.
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everything is socialized. Verbal exchange, like any fonll of intercourse,
requires at least two communicators, and idiolect proves to be a somewhat
perverse fiction ... This statement need, however, one reservation: for an
aphasiac who has lost the capacity for code switching, the 'idiolect' indeed
1 1 1 1· .. l' 20)ecomes t le so e mgUlstlc rea lty.
As obvious as the point seems, one can appreciate its significance if one considers the
frequency with which people today treat different languages as different world-views that
are like isolated islands floating in the void. Perhaps as a consequence of some mixture of
lay relativism and constructivism, it is quite common to oppose a language in itself and a
language as it is used to communicate to others who do not speak that language. But even
within a single language, one must always render the meaning of one thing into the
meaning of another thing to clarify it. When one puzzles over a word, one can go to a
dictionary and find substitutions for that word. If this kind of substitution doesn't work,
another act oftransposition - metaphor or simile - might. "I don't understand your
point," one says. "It's like this ... ," another responds.
Tuming briefly to the other aspect of language and the corresponding variety of
aphasia, we see that substitution alone ceases to function, according to Jakobson, if it is
not complemented by a capacity for combination. In contiguity or combination
deficiency, one has lost the ability to propositionalize or "generally speaking, to combine
simpler linguistic entities into more complex units." In this case, the capacity for
substitution and metaphor is preserved - one can readily say what a given word is like;
but one cannot perfoffil the combinatory functions necessary to build propositions or, to
recall our earlier example of Fortreise, etc., to perceive words as combinations of
different phonemic constituents.21 Again, I will not go through this fonll of aphasia,
except to mark that in this form as well one can detect a regression of one's language
back to an early stage in child development.
20 Roman Jakobson, "Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasiac Distmbances," 248-249.
2l Though Jakobson himself does not analyze the relationship between the two aspects in quite this way, we
could say that, for any functional language, one aspect is the condition for the other. Without the ability to
build propositions out ofbasic nominative lmits and also to unpack the word-groups one learns into its
constitutive parts, one will have a significantly reduced range of sentences, for example, that one is capable
ofuttering.
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In spite of the many examples that we may enlist to make his point, Jakobson's
characterization of substitution disorder as an inability for metalanguages, an inability for
metaphor, and an over-reliance on context might strike some philosophers today as the
bias of a metaphysician over and against, for example, the significance of context in
ordinary language and the situatedness of our speech. But Jakobson argues that the
aphasiac's loss of these capacities distances him or her from ordinary language use. In
order to communicate effectively, .Takobson says, we must be able to substitute one way
of saying something for another. The aphasiac who lacks the ability for selection cannot
substitute a word for its synonyms, let alone, Jakobson says, its heteronyms, "equivalent
expressions in other languages."
But there are theories of language that argue for this impossibility as a general
condition of language. Heidegger seems a likely candidate given the caesura of meaning
dramatized between, say, Greek discourse and our own, his general suspicion toward
many aspects of lVfetasprache,22 and his insistence on the geo-political propriety of the
relationship between one's language and one's home (Heimat). As I argued in the last
chapter, Heidegger presumes a quasi-natural connection between the people who belong
to or identify with a given nation or culture and some particular language. In his work on
Holderlin, for example, he makes liberal use of the category of "the German language,"
which he seems to understand, not as something which every German possesses by
nature, but which nevel1heless has a tmified historical destiny, one that only comes into
being through a dialogue with another Volkssprache, that of the Greeks. To this extent, it
seems that Heidegger is willing to acknowledge that language is most meaningful, even
most defined as a language, when it undergoes translation toward another.
Some commentators have missed this part of Heidegger' s work in an effort to fit
him into the larger trend oflinguistic turn philosophy. Richard R011y, for example, in
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, presents Heidegger as a spokesperson for the view
that we are trapped within a particular historical language that limits our thinking, a
21 Recall that in Chapter I, I discussed Heidegger's condemnation in "The Nature of Language" of
Metasprache, which he took to be synonymous with the scientific project of analytic metalinguistics.
Metasprache, Heidegger says there, is Obersprache.
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condition that ROliy says we should embrace - with irony - rather than seeing any
particular language as connected to any other through the unifying force of reason. ROliy
writes: "For there will be no way to rise above the language, culture, institutions, and
practices one has adopted and view all these as on a par with all the others." After
invoking Donald Davidson as a proponent of this view, Rorty goes on to say that
Heidegger's understanding of language is exactly the same: "Or, to put the point in
Heidegger's way [notice the metadiscursive move], 'language speaks man,' languages
change in the course of history, and so human beings cannot escape their historicity.,,23
But, if the need to translate what is one's own is really an impOliant feature of
Heidegger's discussion oflanguage, the capacity for substitution seems to be operative in
Heidegger's reflections on what it means to have a language. And, if we take Jakobson's
argument against the assumption of egoism in language seriously, then we have reason to
complicate Rorty's argument that we cannot rise above our language, since to have a
language is to be continually able to step away from it and corne to it anew. I say to step
away, not rise above, because such maneuvers needn't entail adopting the view from
nowhere. In fact, it is the particular, concrete situation where another person makes a
demand on me that motivates me to make this step. So, when we make such a step, we
find ourselves more situated in a particular context than usual. We may be engaged in a
face-to-face conversation, or, in writing, we may be trying to anticipate the patiicular
ways that our readers will find our words, refolmulating when we think it may be
necessary for the sake of making our work accessible to a diverse audience.
In this way, Jakobson's analysis of substitution presents a way of hearing
Heidegger's dictum that "language speaks man," not as resignation in the face a
language's or a culture's unthematizable origin, but as a revolution in what it means to
thematize. Recall the passage that I quoted at the beginning of the chapter where
Heidegger writes that we have "lost the word for the word." In light of Jakobson's
criticisms of the egoistic assumptions within the philosophy oflanguage, we may
rephrase the point in the following way: by assuming that a language is entirely self-
23 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, (Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of
Cambridge), 50.
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referential, cOllilectable neither to things in the world nor to other language users beyond
the walls of the particular idiom, we have lost the ability to account for how language
exists in the world, forcing it back into a position of isolated subjectivity. On the other
hand, reading Heidegger through Jakobson in this way gives us even more justification
for the conclusion that we drew in the previous chapter, namely, that it is as much a
dialogue with one's neighbor as it is with an ancient people where we see the important
place of translation for language. And in this way, Heidegger falls short of offering an
exemplary philosophical version of Jakobon's insights.
In general, however, I believe that we can use Jakobson's analyses of shifters and
substitution aphasia in order to describe the need for making one's way beyond a subject-
oriented, ego-bolU1d relationship to Imlguage, not in order to twist free of the address of
others in which we find ourselves, but to rediscover this scene of address elsewhere -
namely, in the event of communication. Heidegger's descriptions oflanguage as beyond
the intentions of an individual or even a group of people needn't suggest an other-worldly
phantasm, the invisible hand of a divine speaker. Instead, we might see language's
withdrawal from any given code as the way that language ex-ists, the way that it is - that
Dasein is - thrown into the world beyond itself. Thus, Jakobson helps us to understmld
the nature of what some have called the metaphysical component of Heidegger' s
description of language.
Jakobson's linguistics shows how, despite the philosophical theories of the day,
ordinary language proves to be adaptive, creative, and almost self-overcoming
(metaphorical, metalinguistic, etc.) But this leaves a lot unsaid. Despite his frequent and
insightful comments about how ways of theorizing lmlguage have historically gone awry,
Jakobson's success in tracing out the philosophical implications of the two poles of
language is, I believe, incomplete. This is because he says little about why the
philosophers he criticizes perceive language the way they do, why these disorders arise,
and what we have to gain by normalizing this understanding of language and the
procedures it describes.
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As for the first two questions, we might ask about how intersubjective social
conditions (i.e., practices and institutions of Sittlichkeit), affect the propensity of an
individual or a group to embrace or reject the type oflanguage practices Jakobson
describes, and how social forces might, in turn, contribute to a rectification of these
"disorders." This may sound like a strange point to question Jakobson on if we
understand aphasia in a purely clinical sense, but, remarkably, Jakobson's work shows
that not only individuals but also whole rhetorical cultures can adopt linguistic styles that
privilege one or the other function. This is especially apparent, for example, in
Jakobson's criticism of trends in the history ofphilosophy that put into effect a
widespread tendency toward one or the other aspect of language, and in his description of
art and media forms that bend toward one or the other in different ways. But he does not
say much about lesser-scale social relations, that is, the linguistic interactions that one has
in one's life with particular friends, lovers, authorities, strangers, etc., nor about how
social relations on either scale might harmonize the two aspects rather than privilege one
over the other.
In terms of the third question, we want to know what is to be gained by rectifying
this imbalance. Jakobson does not give us a positive description of this and instead tends
to describe it only as that which takes place in normal, everyday communication, which,
at the same time, he admits is not a given and may even be rather difficult to achieve.
Thus, it is not easy to say what, after reading Jakobson, we have to hope for other than
the preservation of a normative system that exists already for most - though not all -
people. Would synchronizing the two poles mean that we communicate better with one
another? And would it signify some advance in terms of the individual's entanglement
with language that we have explored in the previous two chapters? I propose to answer
these questions by exploring phenomenologically a couple of ways that each of us may
find ourselves unthematizable from time to time.
But first, let me recap where this section has brought us. In this section, we began
by looking at the complicated situation of the speaking and hearing subject, whose
mastery of words as a speaking subject is limited by the conditions in which she first
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tinds herself in language. We then went on to consider how Jakobson's theory of shifters
echoes the point about non-mastery, bringing it to bear even on the word "I," which
would seem to be the very origin of the mastery that it in fact denies. Despite the role it
plays in everyday language, though, the complicated maneuvers exemplified in shifters
are not regularly taken up as a way for people to understand their relationship to
language. This was suggested by Jakobson's analysis oflanguage structures and his
interpretation of data on language disorders. We explored Jakobson's analysis for the
implications it bears on the relationship between being and language, particularly in
tenns of the ontological significance of language's transcendence of private meanings,
and in tenns of what it means to be bespoken by language for one's being in the world.
What Jakobson's work shows us is that, while language must contain structures of
transcendence, as in the metalanguage that he describes, this does not mean that such
transcendence should be opposed to language's conmmnicative function. Whenever we
speak, we do so by stretching across a spectrum of different speaking positions and
across different languages. It is tlus openness oflanguage that leads Jakobson to call
idiolect a fiction.
To conclude this section, allow me to go back to our earlier example of the way
that we read texts, as it will offer us another perspective tiom which we can appreciate
the way that we are thrown into language. For both Jakobson and Heidegger, to have a
language is to have the possibility of interpreting what is said in that language. Thus, in
encountering a passage from a given text, for example, both authors would say that to
know what the passage says is to know how to venture an interpretation of it, rather than
to see it is as indicating a single memung which would inhere regardless of circumstance.
There is something quite evident about this claim if we think about what the practice of
reading a longer body of writing (a few pages, a chapter, a book) involves. When
engrossed in the practice of reading, we enter into a dialogue with the text. In order to
cmTy this out, we cannot pin every sentence down to a single absolute meaning. On the
other hand, we must certainly take a stab at what each passage plausibly means, but we
do this without abandoning other possible interpretations. We keep these other
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possibilities open along the way. Following this line of thought, we can understand why
Heidegger says that language is not in the rows of letters printed on the page, nor in a set
of universal forms to which the printed words refer, but in the event of transposition by
which they are said together.
Tran.~ference and the Rhetorical Structure ofthe Pel:formative 'T'
Concerning the issue left lU1touched by Jakobson's linguistics, we would like to
know what role others play in affecting how absorption and substitution take place in our
speech, and what might result from the conection of an overly egoistic and idiomatic
relationship to language. Luckily, some philosophers have filled in the blanks left by
Jakobson. In the upcoming sections, I tum to the work of two philosophers who have
drawn from the psychoanalytic tradition to answer this question. First, I look to recent
work from Judith Butler who takes up the transference relation in psychoanalysis as a
way of rethinking the conditions necessary for giving an account of oneself, conditions
Butler wants to distinguish from the problematic criteria of absolute self-transparency
and self-mastery popularly upheld in society today. Second, I turn to Julia Kristeva's
work on language loss in cases of melancholy and depression in order to examine the
quasi-sublimatory processes that Kristeva suggests are crucial for cases where one is
incapable of renouncing the loss that forms as a reaction (a narcissistic substitute) to the
event of castration.
Both of these discussions, Butler's but especially Kristeva's, also make a unique
contribution to the conversation in that they speal( to the affective dimension of the
unthematizable origin of language. Because language - in its association to reason - has
regularly been opposed to feeling or affect throughout history, there are often strong
bodily affects that accompany alienation from discourse. Psychoanalysis, particularly
once transfonned by feminist commentary, is pmiicularly well-suited to describe the
affective features of the ·condition where one becomes unspeakable to oneself, because
psychoanalysis focuses on the persistence of primary bodily drives, which are always in
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negotiation with the demands of the symbolic order. This allowed Freudian
psychoanalysis to perceive types of suffering that were previously ignored or understood
as cognitive disorders (for example, the frequent silent, affectively intensified suffering
of women in the nineteenth century). While Freud and others in the tradition certainly did
define many forms of suffering according to observable behaviors, by theorizing the way
that drives go into hiding, they developed a way oflistening to and interpreting those
silences. Describing the affective dimension of language loss in its various f0n11S "fleshes
out" the structuralist theories of Jakobson, who does not speak about the embodied
dimension of language structures and who, in his descriptions of aphasia, limits the
symptoms he describes to observable behaviors.
Yet Jakobson's analyses do allow us to appreciate the structural dimension which
leads to affective symptoms. One ofthe things that Jakobson's linguistics show is that,
paradoxicaLly, what I may often perceive as the grounding intuition of my ability for
speech, the "I," is a late development. This is a central point for how language can seem
to both encompass everything and maintain a strange, alien character at one and the same
time. Rhetorical theorists have drawn from linguistic analyses of language like
Jakobson's in order to better describe, not just how language systems work, but how
conu11lmication more broadly occurs among speaking subjects. And one ofthe ways that
rhetorical theory has benefited from the concept of dual-function words is the way it has
understood shifters like "I" to hold together a performative or vocative character and a
nominative or symbolic character, that is, its being something that we can refer to in the
world.
Judith Butler has taken up this perspective on interlocution as a challenge to
prevailing ethical norms that hold that each of us should be able to narrate our lives in
such a way that we can be held accountable tor each of our desires, values, and
perceptions. Butler offers this challenge in her recent book, Giving an Account of
Oneself, an exploration of the limits ofnaITative in light of the rhetorical structure of the
"I" of the speech-act. According to Butler, we can never be fully known to ourselves,
because who we are is bound up with the "I" which is as much perfoffilative as it is a
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reference in the world, and, as perfonnative, is not properly something we know (since it
lacks any properties) but something we do or enact. Indeed, for reasons we have already
discussed, to say that the "I" is my own deed or action is even misleading. There is no
self-same subject behind the perfOlmance of this "I" acting as its agent. It emerges as a
response to the expectations, demands, and addresses of others. And to take it on as
"ours," which in many ways we must, is to be thrown into these structuring conditions,
which will always remain external to the "I" emerging as a response to these things, but
which will nevertheless have an enduring presence for the speaking subject as the
lITecoverable origin of its speaking. But prevailing ethicalnol111s demand that we be able
to know ourselves as an object in the world so as to be able to nanate, for example, the
causes of our actions. But, for Butler, this expectation is never fully possible given the
limits of our ability to narrate the full scope of our existence:
The '1' can tell neither the story of its own emergence nor the conditions
of its own possibility without bearing witness to a state of affairs to which
one could not have been present, which are prior to one's own emergence
as a subject who can know, and so constitute a set of orifins that one can
nanate only at the expense of authoritative knowledge.2
Putting this in tenus of Jakobson's categories (which Butler herself does not employ but
seem nevertheless relevant), we may say that the moment of self-discovery described
here is one where a speaker has lost hold of the nominative ftillction of the shifter and is
only capable of the vocative (for Butler, the performative). One has become incapable of
setting the "I" forth as a reference to a thing in the world. On the other hand, Butler's
attention to the social organizational context in which others demand more of one or the
other from us - the performative "I" or the referential "I" - fills in some of what
Jakobson's theory did not touch on. For as we saw, Jakobson does not explain what the
ultimate causes are for why some people - individually or collectively - tend to speak
more one way or the other. By bringing Butler's analysis to bear on Jakobson's
categories, we can begin to see how, for example, the existence of certain ethical nonns
in a society may privilege the capacity for similarity ("I" am one and the same "I" as I
24 Judith Butler, Giving an Account ofOneself, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 37.
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was a year ago) over the capacity for substitution where, depending on the audience, the
nalTative I give might be drastically different. A demand for similarity might manifest
itself as a concern for proper self-referential speech, speech guaranteed by the act's
reference to the speaking subject as an object at hand in the world.
Now the metaphysician might insist that, even though we are thrown into our
language, we must nevertheless be able to take it on as our own and give an account of
ourselves within it. This would be one answer to the problem that I raised in the last
chapter about authenticity and political representation. Given that both our CUlTent
political and legal systems, not to mention less institutionalized ethical systems, require
us to speak for ourselves, it would seem that we need a theory of language that gives the
speaking subject agency rather than one that takes it away.
But Butler is skeptical of this argument, insisting that we camlot dismiss the
actuality of our speaking condition - the estrangement and uncertainty therein - simply
because things must be otherwise. Thus, Butler criticizes a tendency among some
therapists to see the goal of therapy as the shoring up of the ego, as insisting that
everything be brought to language and to consciousness. To put the point in
Heideggerean tenus, Butler rejects the idea that authenticity requires the complete
disavowal of our fallelmess into "the They" or our absorption within a set of discourses
that could never be mine and mine alone. In other words, she does not want to hold up as
a goal the remmciation of the unthematizab1e. One of Butler's most important reasons for
this stance is that she finds it absurd to suggest that, in order to be ethical, we must deny
those primary, pre-reflective relationships that we have with people.
Butler does not conclude from this that we should give up altogether on the goal
of speaking for ourselves. Instead, she suggests that the history of psychoanalysis offers
an altel11ative for how the speaking subject might take shape, such that our being situated
as linguistic points of reference needn't strip us of all possibility of transformation or
demand of us a disavowal of the way language makes us vulnerable. According to Butler,
psychoanalysis has the unique goal, while always incorporating narrative, not simply to
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bring everything into narrative and into what she describes as the egoistic mastery ofthe
unconscious.
Key to this discussion is Butler's argument that address is the interruption of
narration, a claim that resonates strongly with Jakobson's theory oflanguage duality.
Butler describes the way that the performative and the narratival intersect in the analytic
session in this way:
And as I make a sequence and linle one event with another, offering
motivations to illuminate the bridge, making pattems clear, identifying
certain moments or events as pivotal, even marking certain recurring
pattems as fundamental, I do not merely commlU1icate something about
my past, though that is doubtless part of what I do. I also enact the selfI'm
trying to describe; the narrative'!' is reconstituted at every moment it is
invoked in the narrative itself. That invocation is, paradoxically, a
perfom1ative and non-narrative act, even as it functions as the fulcrum of
narrative itself. I am, in other words, doing something with that '1-
elaborating and positioning it in relation to a real or imagined audience-
which is something other than telling a story about it, even though 'telling'
remains part of what I do.25
This description of the exchange between the analysand and the analyst describes well
how the other's receiving my story allows me to continually find myse(f in it. In the face
of the other who listens, I must refommlate the origin out of which "I" arose. Butler's
description echoes the need for substitution that we saw in Jakobson's discussion: to
narrate something to another requires an interpretive attitude that can modify the form of
a tale in order to bring about the best possible understanding for my interlocutor. The
analytic relationship, Butler argues, provides a useful model for how cel1ain forms of
social interaction can enable a recuperation or reconstmction of this origin which exceeds
the reach of narration. And for this reason she considers it a helpful reference in
reframing the relationship between ethics and both narrative and self-knowledge.
As Butler herself points out, it is not only analysis in a limited sense that can offer
the rhetorical conditions for the recovery of what appears lost in entanglement. Other
dialogical situations, where one brings one's thoughts and experiences into language for
another, can have the same effect. What is necessary is only that one enters into a
25 Ibid., 66.
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situation where, by addressing another, one "does something with the 'I' other than
telling a story about it." The dialogical practice of writing, for example, may also work
toward this end. For, according to Butler, that which I position and elaborate the "I" in
relation to may be either a real or imagined audience.
The demand to configure our language and self-relation toward the referential
and not the performative "I" has no doubt contributed to those literary movements and
impulses that celebrate the author as the purely performative and deny any relation
between the "I" of a text and an individual in the world that we might reference as the
author of the text. Perhaps one of the strongest celebrations of this non-referential subject
of the speech-act is to be found in Roland Bmihes's "Death of the Author" essay. In this
essay, in which he explicitly invokes 1.1. Austin's theory ofperfOlmatives he describes
writing as like the performative:
in which the speech-act has no other content (no other statement) than the
act by which it is uttered: something like the 'I declare' of kings or the 'I
sing' of the earliest poets; the modern scriptor, having buried the Author,
can therefore no longer believe, according to the pathos of his
predecessors, that his hand is slower than his passion .... for him, on the
contrary, his hanel, detached from any voice, born by a pure gesture of
inscription (and not of expression), traces a field without origin- or at
least with no origin but lmlgua~e itself, i.e., the very thing that ceaselessly
calls any origin into question?
On the one hand, considered against a culture which - if Butler is right - obscures the
extent to which our relationship to language is an ecstatic one and stunts our capacity for
transfol111ing our speaking position through substitution, there is something liberating
about what Batihes describes here. On the other hand, if we recall the concerns about
Heidegger's claim that the mastery of Trakl's poem is that it denied Trakl his person and
his name, we might have want to hesitate before following Barthes all the way. Does
authentic latlguage require the subjugation of the one who identifies with his name? Does
authentic writing require the murder of the author? Doesn't such writing only work if
26 Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author" in The Rustle afLanguage, trans. Richard Howard
(Berekeley: University of Califomia Press, 1989), 52.
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there is a reader (real or imagined) who recognizes the text produced as a creative origin
unto itself?
These become urgent questions when we are talking about therapy. If the goal is
to help someone speak, meaning to help that person identify as a subject of speech, one
must respond to such writing or other varieties ofthis perfoffi1ativity with precisely this
kind of reading, with an act that recognizes this work of inscription as an effort made by a
subject to speak authentically, to rewrite the origin at which she was never present, not by
subjecting all of language to the dominion of an isolated ego but by replaying the original
scene of address.
Though Butler does not mention her in this book, Julia Kristeva's work on
language and the speaking subject resonates profoundly with Butler's project in Giving
an Account ofOneself. In her Revolution in Poetic Language iI-om 1974, Kristeva
describes how the subject's relation to language decenters the transcendental ego, cutting
through it and opening it up to a dialectic.27 A dialectic, on the one hand, in the sense that
the semiotic drives always require and yet remain irreducible to their articulation by the
symbolic. But a dialectic also in the sense that the other offers me something that I cmIDot
provide myself, and vice versa, such that the speaking subject achieves its fullest fmill
when directed beyond itself for another.
Like Kristeva's description of this dialectic, Butler's project in Giving an Account
ofOneself has historical roots in an ongoing commentary on the subject of recognition in
the philosophy of Hegel.28 According to this tradition, Hegel powerfully articulated how
the self exists in and through acts of recognition offered by others. In this view, while I
may experience myself as the sole author of my story, my goals, etc., others playa
27 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1984),30.
28 Butler has dedicated much of her work to the topic of recognition. The study that is most focused on this
topic - apmi from Giving an Account ofOnese?f- is Su~jects ofDesire (Columbia Press, 1987), which
traces the thread of this theme through the works of Hegel, Kojeve, Hyppolite, Smire, Den'ida, Foucault,
Lacan, and Deleuze. Though Butler is probably most readily associated with her work on the performative
dimension of the self (including the perfOlmative aspect ofthe speaking subject), an equal focus in her
work is 011 the conditions of recognition that structure perfonnance.
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pivotal role in what brings me to myself, in other words, in my identity. The insight is
that om most intense, effective experiences of finding omselves are those where,
paradoxically, we are given to ourselves by or as another. This reading of Hegel fueled
the renaissance of Hegel scholarship centered around the topic of recognition - as in
Kojeve's Introduction to the Reading ofHegel first published in 1947 - which was
seminal for the development of post-Freudian psychoanalysis?9 It offered a way of
thinking about how the address of (an) other(s) is fonnative for the subject, giving it the
split character indicated by Jakobson's theory of the shifters, for example. In effect, it
filled in the gap within Freud's account of the genesis of desire and its relation to
language. The other demands of me that I inhabit language as my own - that I, for
example, can speak for my actions and communicate my will to others; but, my taking on
this role is, from the beginning, something I do for the other.
This process by which I come to speech for another is what Kristeva calls
identification (Identtjizierung). According to Kristeva's account, one's openness toward
the speech of the other - whether that of the child to the parent or the audience to the
orator - requires a dramatic restructming of the drives. For, in order to identify with the
speech of another, I must repress the oral relationship to words, my desire to conswne
them, to take them into me; and in so doing find myself in a place where previously I was
not. In Tales ofLove, Kristeva describes this process in tenns that will recall our earlier
descriptions of the preoedipal and postoedipal relationships to language:
Incorporating and introjecting orality's function is the essential substratum
of what constitutes man's being, namely, language. When the object that I
incorporate is the speech of the other - precisely a nonobject, a pattern, a
model - I bind myself to him in a primary fusion, communion, unification.
An identification. For me to have been capable of such a process, my
libido had to be restrained; my thirst to devom had to be deferred and
displaced to a level one may well call 'psychic,' provided one adds that if
there is repression it is quite primal, and that it lets one hold on to the joys
29 Lacan was in attendance at Kojeves lechlres. along with other upcoming French intellectuals like
Merleau-Ponty and Bataille, when Kojeve outlined his understanding of Hegelian dialectic along the
following lines: "The concrete Real (of which we speak) is both Real revealed by a discourse, and
Discourse revealing a real. And the Hegelian experience is related neither to the Real nor to Discourse
taken separately, but to their indissoluble unity."
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of chewing, swallowing, nourishing oneself ... with words. In being able
to receive the other's words, to assimilate, to repeat, and reproduce them, I
become like him: One. A subject of enunciation. Through psychic
osmosis/identifIcation. Tlu'ough 10ve.3o
The consumer of words recalls the figure of absorption with which we began, for
example, in Heidegger's description of the voice into which we are always already
thrown, and which marks the limits of the ego's mastery over language. In the course of
language development, Kristeva tells us, this absorption must be repressed if we are to
identify ourselves as the "subject of enunciation." Words and phrases must cease to be
things that I find in the world and become nonobjects instead. We saw something like this
earlier when we spoke about the relationship between postoedipallanguage mld
nominalism. For little Hans, the word was not the thing but a world separate from things,
set up where things are negated. Here we can add that the repression of primary
absorption opens up a space of negativity not only in the sense that names may negate
things but in that, I (finite, not-One) become the interchmlgeable subject of enunciation
("I become like him: One. A subj ect of enunciation"). In the movement of this becoming,
a discursive identity is established in the place where there had previously been no
identity - nor difference.
For Kristeva, the psyche comes into being with the repression of the primary
drives and the splitting of the self into the symbolic subject of enunciation and the
reservoir of drives. Such fragmentation, she argues, is necessary, not only within the
context of a bourgeois and heterosexual family structure (that is, not only in a context
where I am forbidden to keep my mother as my love-object) but as a necessary feature of
all meaning and of all language. We can understand this point by recalling the place of
substitution in Jakobson' s theory of language. In ordinary language, according to
Jakobson, one must be able to substitute one way of saying something for another.
Without this ability, one will be significantly limited in his or her ability to communicate.
The splitting of the preoedipal and the postoedipal establishes a similar dialectic whereby
30 Julia Kristeva, Tales q/Love, trans. Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987),26.
115
I retum to myself in the words of another. It opens a space of negativity where words
mayor may not retain their original use, and if they do, where they do so only by finding
new contexts.
This approach to the role of identity in the development of the speaking subject
echoes Heidegger's insistence that a way to language is needed - not because we
contemporary humans have lost the way - but always. (Recall the passage of Heidegger's
that we examined earlier where he argues that there is no such thing as a natural
language, that all language is historicaL) A way bridges together. It discloses one thing
by way of another. Language always involves this kind of way-making.
What then of Butler's concem, namely, that the need to completely identify our
desires and experiences in language is just that - a need - that in no way guarantees that
such an accomplishment is actually possible? Does Kristeva's insistence on the necessity
of the splitting of the speaking subject anlOunt to an agreement with the argument of
linguistic tum theorists that nothing is "outside" of language?
On the contrary, Kristeva suggests that the individual, while structured by the
symbolic, remains - through the preoedipal, semiotic drives - asymptotic to symbolic
language. Because of this basic duality that characterizes the speaking subject, like
Butler, Kristeva wams against the analytic method of bringing everything that is
lU1conscious into symbolic discourse, arguing instead that analysis must attempt a unity
of the preoedipal and the postoedipal, word and flesh, that is not based on sacrifice.
subjugation. or renunciation. The purpose of analysis, for Kristeva, is not to subject the
drives to the organization of language but to unite these two.
According to Kristeva's description in Tales ofLove, the unification of affects and
symbolic language is only possible through what she calls love. She explains how love
compels us to bring to word, into the realm of co-disclosure, our bodily drives. When we
cannot do this, these bodily drives seem ineiIable to us. For example, when we think
about amatory writing (Kristeva often mentions that of the troubadours), we can
recognize the abundance of performative speech-acts like those earlier described by
Barthes and Butler. Recall Barthes's description ofthe "I sing" of the early poets or
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Butler's description of the role of narrative in psychoanalysis: "I do not merely
communicate something about my past, though that is doubtless pali of what I do. I also
enact the self I'm trying to describe." To put the point in an Austinian way, we do not ask
of one's original declaration oflove - written or spoken -- whether it is true or not. Or,
for Kristeva, I do not ask of my own declaration of love whether it is really I who makes
the declaration. The vocative and the nominative are united together in such utterances,
creating the kind of speech-act that Kristeva understands to be sine qua non for a
meaningful life. Thus, Kristeva takes love as a model for the goal of psychoanalytic
therapy.3l
Kristeva argues that aesthetic experience allows this same bridging to occur, and
thus she also retains aesthetic experience as a model for the goals of therapy. Works of
art, for Kristeva, blur the distinction between the symbolic or conceptual and what we
usually take to be the non-signifying material or corporeal. In taking in the canvas's deep
pool of orange, a transubstantiation of a sort takes place, where the semiotic drives
become participants in meaning. The therapeutic power of such experiences lies in the
way it allows a performance and a transferal of the chthonic drives toward the realm of
signs. In this way, like Heidegger, Kristeva sees poetry as encapsulating the basic
function of all of the other ali forms, since the power of art is that it brings into symbolic
language the semiotic drives. The loss created by the movement from the preoedipal to
the postoedipal then ceases to be an all-encompassing loss and becomes thematized, not
in a wholly symbolic way but nevertheless in a meaningful way.
Again, these strategies for dealing with the precarious process of becoming al1d
remaining invested in world of communication and mutual disclosure differ from that
31 While the suggestion that love is a necessary component to the kind of interlocutionary activity that
bonds us to language may seem far-fetched, Kristeva is not alone in making this claim. In The Strugglejor
Recognition, Axel Honneth weaves together a number of SOlU"ces, including Hegelian phenomenology,
Mead's social psychology, and Winnicott's object-relations theory, to show how love is a necessary
condition for other f01111s of reciprocal recognition. For example, Honneth writes oflove that "This
fundamental level of emotional confidence - not only in the experience of needs and feelings, but also in
their expression- which the intersubjective experience of love helps to bring about, constitutes the
psychological precondition for the development of all fmther attitudes of self-respect." - Axel Honneth,
The Struggle/or Recognition: The Moral Granunar o/Social COJ?flicts, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1995), 107.
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therapeutic strategy that Butler warned against. It is not a sacrifice and disavowal ofthose
parts of our experience that estrange us from the symbolic but a way of recognizing these
parts as participating in meaning, despite their apparent exclusion. Kelly Oliver explains
the uniqueness of Kristeva' s strategy in this regard through the way it takes up the
relationship between the body and language:
Traditional theories which postulate that language represents bodily
experience fall into an impossible situation by presupposing that the body
and language are distinct, even opposites. Some traditional theories
purport that language is an instmment that captures, mirrors, or copies,
bodily experience. The problem, then, becomes how to explain the
cOlmection between these two distinct realms of language, on the one
hand, and material, on the other.
Instead of lamenting what is lost absent, or impossible in
language, Kristeva marvels at this other realm that makes its way into
language. The force of language is living drive force transfened into
language. The tones and rhytlmls of language, the materiality of language,
are bodily. Signification is like a transfusion of the living body into
language. This is why psychoanalysis can be effective; the analyst can
diagnose the active drive force as it is manifest in the analysand's
language.... (T)he psychoanalytic session inscribes flesh in words.
Language is not cut off from the body. And, while, for Kristeva, bodily
drives involve a type of violence, negation, or force, this process does not
merely necessitate sacrifice and loss. The drives are not sacrificed to
signification; rather bodily drives are an essential semiotic element of
signification.32
Without experiences which bring the two together, one is not only estranged from
language but also from one's body, the significance of which is doubly lost, since even its
silence does not corne to expression. In this sense, Oliver's observation about the failure
of philosophy to theorize the connection between language and materiality echoes
Heidegger's own claim in the Zollikon seminars, for example, that psychology has to
think about the unity of the psyche and the soma in their difference.33 In this regard,
Kristeva's project responds precisely to the problem that Heidegger thought it crucial for
32 Kelly Oliver, "The Crisis of Meaning" in The Kristeva Critical Reader, ed. John Lechte and Mary
Zomnazi (Edinburgh: Edinbmgh Press, 2003), 38-39.
33 Martin Heidegger and Franz Mayr, Zollikon Seminars: Conversations - Protocols - Letters (Evanston:
NOlihwestem Press, 2001), 77-79.
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psychologists to address. Rather than presuming these two regions as essentially
different, Kristeva interprets the way that the semiotic (bodily but already linguistic)
shows up within the symbolic as the other to which it is lovingly united.
As a theory oflanguage or meaning then, Kristeva's project must be understood
as a therapeutic one. Her texts indeed often draw attention to and affect the reader's
physical sense of himself or herself, as though refusing to allow materiality to disappear
from the text and the act of reading to devolve into an entirely scientific hermeneutic. For
example, she makes frequent use of "I," "we," and "you" in vocative, perfonnative
gestures that reform the space traditionally observed between author and audience. On
the other hand, her disruption of the conventions of scientific discourse does not go as tar
as others - Nietzsche, for example, or, perhaps more relevantly given the comparisons,
Luce I1·igaray. Her goal is not to do away with scientific discourse but to inflect it with
the semiotic, to draw attention to the traces of absorption. The target of this therapeutic
intervention is a discourse estranged from those conditions upon which it relies and yet
which remain unthematizable within the symbolic economy set up.
A Phenomenology ofA1elancholy
Kristeva"s diagnosis of the crisis of meaning in her culture (Europe since the
Second World War) bOlTOWS from and infOlms her interpretation of individuals that she
has treated who suffer from an analogous estrangement. Just as in culture, where the
mechanisms of meaning can become detached from the agents of that meaning, the
individual can become alienated from the source oflanguage's vitality. It is the
possibility of becoming unspeakable to oneself and thus incommunicable to others that
brings Kristeva to examine melancholy and depression in her 1987 book Black Sun. 34
Responding to the apparent indifference of the depressed to language, Kristeva notes that,
despite appearances, we should not perceive depression to involve a complete detachment
from language. Instead, she argues that the depressed remain intensely attached, not to an
34 The terms "melancholy" and "depression" are used interchangeably in Kristeva's book. While there is a
very different history to the two terms, I will follow Kristeva's choice to treat the two as one.
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object of identification, but to what Kristeva calls sometimes the archaic preobject. 35 In
focusing on the attachment hidden beneath the detachment, Kristeva takes her lead from
Freud's 1917 work on melancholy. She begins with the assumption that melancholy
comes about when one is unable to moum a loss. For Kristeva, like Freud, this loss may
refer to the death of a person, the loss caused by having been abandoned, or the loss of
some ideal (Freud includes political examples like the loss of one's fatherland or the ideal
of liberty). In the event of such losses, one may come to suffer a grief so profolmd that, in
the words of Freud, it "leaves nothing over for other purposes or other interests.,,36 The
difference between melancholy and the mouming of a loss, however, according to Freud,
lies in the fact that melancholy involves an "unconscious loss of a love-object, in
contradistinction to mourning, in which there is nothing unconscious about the 10ss.,,37
Kristeva follows Freud up to this point; however, rather than following Freud in
saying that the unconscious character of the suffering comes from an aggression toward
that object that has existed alongside and in spite of one's love, Kristeva argues that what
has been lost is no object in the usual sense. Or, more specifically, the object that has
been lost has become ineffable - unnameable. Thus, the withdrawal from ordinary speech
that seems regularly to have characterized the condition of melancholia in the modem
age. Emil Kraepelin, a contemporary of Freud's, for example, observes of the
melancholic that "His sOlTowful features show no play of emotion; the scanty linguistic
utterances are laboured, low, monotonous and monosyllabic, and even the addition of a
simple greeting on a postcard is not attainable or only after much urging. ,,38 As Kristeva
35 Kristeva uses a few different terms with which she names the object ofthe melancholic's attachment:
notably, "the (archaic) preobject," "the lost Thing," and "the real.'· For the sake of clarity, I will stick
primarily to the fIrst term. That said, I believe that I understand her desire to use a rotating set of terms to
describe this fIgure. While one could read her use of various terms as a lack of clarity on her part, it makes
sense, given the therapeutic dimension of her project, to view these names as a series of substitutes tor
something that (properly speaking?) has no proper name.
36 Sigmund Freud, "MolUl1ing and Melancholy" in The Nature ofMelancholy, ed. Jennifer Radden
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 284.
37 Ibid., 285.
38 Emil Kraepelin, '''ManiC-depressive Insanity,' in Textbook of Psychiatry, 8th edition, 1909-1915" in The
Nature ofMelancholcv, ed. Jennifer Radden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 263.
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puts it: "... (T)he depressed person has the impression of having been deprived of an
unnameable, supreme good, of something unrepresentable, that perhaps only devouring
could represent, or an invocation could point out, no word could signify.,,39
This unnameable character of the loss contributes to the sense of void. The loss of
language, Kristeva points out, is always also a loss of a meaningful life. This is because,
for the speaking being, life is invariably meaningful life. When meaning shatters, one's
life loses the quality of a life.4o
Some may find this point too general. Surely there is much to a life that, try as we
might, we could never put into words. Yes, but what is it exactly in a life that seems to
recede from aliiculation? Paliicular things in the world, referential objects? Or, must we
look to the structure of how the world appears? If so, then it is only in connection with a
world of things that can be indicated by lallguage that one Call experience the void
beneath such a world. Or, said otherwise, it is only after having already found oneself
thrown into a world that one can ask these kinds of questions, questions that may be
understood in tenns of a coneem for authenticity. In other words, to go back to Butler's
way of posing the problem, to wonder about how to deal with the non-narratival origin of
one's ability to speak, is already to be thoroughly involved in the expression of a
meaningful world. Kristeva is making a phenomenological point here. Just as Heidegger
describes the way that the appearance of things depends on Dasein's being-there, its
disclosure of beings, the argument here is that life takes shape through the disclosive
power of language. This shape, as we know, tmfolds over time. In a life, we experience
things coming into words - including ourselves - and we experience these and other
things recede again. So, Kristeva's point that, for a speaking being, life is invariably a
meaningful life, should not be taken to mean that things are without significance until
they are named. That life's meaningfulness depends on our ability to speak about it does
not meall that all things must be subjugated to words. Rather, it means that things must be
able both to enter and withdraw from our speech, and that each movement enriches the
39 Julia Kristeva, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1989), 13.
40 Ibid., 6.
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other.41 Said differently, language allows there to be a world of presence and absence,
unconcealment and concealment. This is the meaningful, expressible life that melancholy
denies.
And yet perhaps Kristeva' s boldest leap beyond the Freudian paradigm of
melancholy is her claim that fomls of meaningful disclosure are nevertheless taking place
in the world of the depressed, which - however closed in and cut off - remains at least
the shadow of a world. Kristeva bases this claim on her observation that, while the
depressed lack interest in the nomlal sentential signification, they often retain interest in
some oflanguage's other features. The rhythm and intonation of sentences may remain
very meaningful. The materiality of written words may be of interest.42 This requires
Kristeva to listen in a different way to her patients. She must listen for ways that they
manage to express themselves apmi from descriptive speech-acts. Kristeva offers an
episode with one of her patients as an exmnple.
"I speak," she would often say, "as if at the edge of my skin, but the
bottom of my son-ow remains unreachable." I may have interpreted those
words as a hysterical refusal of the castrating exchange with me. That
interpretation, however, did not seem sufficient, considering the intensity
of the depressive complaint and the extent of the silence that either settled
in or broke up her speech in "poetic" fashion, making it, at times,
undecipherable. I said, "At the edge of words, but at the heart of the voice,
41 This is why Kristeva sees mood as pivotal for artistic and literary creation - exemplary of the way life
appears as meaningful. In the first chapter ofBlack Sun, she writes: "On the frontier between animality and
symbol fonnation, moods -- and particularly sadness -- are the ultimate reactions to our traumas; they are
our basic homeostatic recourses. For if it is true that those who are slaves to their moods, beings drowned in
their sorrows, reveal a number of psychic or cognitive frailties, it is equally true that a diversification of
moods, variety in sadness, refinement in sorrow or mourning are the imprint of a humankind that is surely
not triumphant but subtle, ready to fight, and creative ... Litermy creation is that adventure of the body and
signs that bears witness to the affect -- to sadness as the imprint of separation and beginning of the
symbol's sway; to joy as imprint of the triumph that settles me in the universe of artifice and symbol, which
I tty to harmonize in the best possible way with my experience of reality." ~ Julia Kristeva, Black Sun, 23.
42 At one point in Emil Kraepelin's description. he adds an interesting observation to his description of
melancholic behavior: "They do not give infOlmation on their own initiative, are innnediately silent again,
but, at the same time, occasionally display in their writings a fluent and skilful diction. Speech is mostly
low. monotonous, hesitating and even stuttering. Calligraphy is often indistinct and sprawling." While there
seems to be some disagreement about the affective quality of the voice, Kraepelin's description concurs
with Kristeva's in that both see an activity ofmeaning-discloslll'e at work beneath the fayade of muteness. -
Emil Kraepelin, '''ManiC-depressive Insanity,' in Textbook of Psychiatry, 8th edition, 1909-1915" in The
Nature ofMelancholy, ed. Jennifer Radden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 270.
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for your voice is uneasy when you talk about that inconullunicable
sadness.,,43
Reflecting later on this scene, Kristeva adds:
I believe the analyst can and must, through interpretation, reach that vocal
level of discourse without fearing to be intrusive. By giving a meaning to
affects that were kept secret on account of the mastery over the archaic
preobject, interpretation recognizes that affect as well as the secret
language the depressive patient endows it with (in this instance, vocal
modulation), thus opening up a channel for it at the level of words and
secondary processes. The latter - hence language - considered empty up
to this point because cut off from affective and vocal inscriptions, are
revitalized and may become a space of desire, that is, of meaning for the
subiect.44
For the most pmi, in cases of depression, the person's attachment to the lost preobject,
their return to a preoedipal relationship to lm1guage, becomes all-consuming, impeding
any possibility for a bonding identification elsewhere. And yet, given her theory that both
the preoedipal and postoedipal, both the semiotic and the symbolic, are necessary
elements for language, Kristeva sees in the secret affective language of the patient an
opportunity to revitalize the analysand's relationship with words.
Moreover, Kristeva sees the need for such revitalization, not just in cases of
depression, but in general throughout culture. Black Sun - like her more explicitly
political texts - takes the individual's alienation as indicative of the alienation of the
culture as a whole. This is both a historical and meta-historical claim. For example,
Kristeva targets contemporary society's obsession with conveyability as contributing to
the flattening out of the dynaI11ic processes whereby we come to name ourselves and
disclose things in the world. She also attends to the way that particular individuals
undergo these precarious processes differently, depending on their embodied and political
situation. Most of all, she attends to the many details that distinguish the way that females
nonnally undergo the process differently than males. This is something that I touched on
43 Julia Kristeva, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, 56.
44 Ibid., 57.
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in the previous chapter in briet1y describing how our thrownness into language takes on
different f0I111S depending on different social-political conditions. Again, the point here is
not that there are some linguistic beings who are not thrown into their language, but that,
for example, what it means to speak in one's own voice will be different depending on to
what extent one fits the cultural stereotype of the subj ect of enunciation. Thus, it is
important to keep in mind the political context for Kristeva's goal of revitalizing
language for those who experience themselves, like the woman above, as speaking "at the
edge of their skin."
In regards to the question posed to Jakobson above, namely, how social
conditions can affect one's recourse to substitution, Kristeva can be said to offer two
responses. First, she offers an ontogenetic developmental accolmt explaining the
emergence of one's attachment to an ineffable sensoriality in the absence of conditions
which enable one to properly mourn, going so far as to trace out how, for example, males
and females tend to deal with this loss differently. Secondly, she develops a strategy for
helping people identify as a subject of speech for another. Borrowing from and expanding
upon the linguistic models of lakobson, Beneviste, and others, she re-envisions the
structuralist argument that language exceeds any subject's intention as a practical
guideline for analysis. Refening to the distance between two bodies- be it two people
(e.g., analysts and analysand) or the carrying over of the drive into poetic word - that
allows one to identifY oneselfin 5peech within the place ofmutual co-disclosure, Kristeva
writes:
Would the fate of the speaking being consist in ceaselessly transposing, always
further beyond or more to the side, such a transposition of series or sentences
testifying to our ability to work out a fundamental mourning and successive
mournings? Our gift of speech, of situating ourselves in time for an other, could
exist nowhere except beyond an abyss. Speaking beings, from their ability to
endure in time up to their enthusiastic, leamed, or simply amusing constructions,
demand a break, a renunciation, an unease at their foundations. The negation of
that fundamental loss opens up the realm of signs for us, but the mourning is often
incomplete.45
45 Ibid., 42.
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To rephrase the point in tenns of intersubj ective recognition, the space of mutual
disclosure is a space where one is given to oneself in a new or modified form through the
address and reception of another whose structural position as other is pivotal. In this
space, all identification involves a degree ofloss. In the fragmentation of the self that
occurs in this space, one's absorption within a particular idiom is necessarily broken up
and redistributed. When this loss occurs in connection with the act of identification, on
Kristeva's reading, one has succeeded in working out a fundamentalmouming necessary
for any meaning. So, then, to retum again to Barthes, if the death of the author coincides
with the birth of a reader who can provide the space out of which the writer too can
emerge, then this is an example of productive mouming, provided that the "renunciation"
of authorship does not tum into a denial of the very conditions which allowed this space
of mutual disclosure to occur to begin with.
The idea that the speaking being enduring through time requires an unease at its
foundation brings us back to Heidegger, who, like Kristeva, argues that we miss the very
being of language if we attempt to ground it in something else. This is not because speech
comes from above and does not originate in human activity. It is not because it is a
system unto its own independent of the world and experience. But because language is
that activity by which we disclose the world. For this reason, this primordial act of
disclosure itself resists thematization, not pennanently in one and the same way, but
differently through time.
I tum now to one of the few places that Heidegger names "melancholy"
specifically in On the Way to Language, nanlely, in the lecture entitled "Words." In this
particular passage, Heidegger has tumed to an untitled poem of Stefan George's in order
to shed light on the nature of renunciation as it appears in the poem discussed early in
Chapter One, George's "Das Wmi." The line from "Das Wort" that leads Heidegger to
wonder about the character of renunciation invoked within it reads: "So I renounced and
sadly see: II Where word breaks offno thing may be." In tuming to the untitled poem,
125
Heidegger aims to show that the renunciation referred to in "Das Wort" is not a loss but a
thanks.46 The poem reads:
What bold-easy step
Walks through the innermost realm
Of grandame's fairytale garden?
What rousing call does the bugler's
Silver horn cast in the tangle
Of the Saying's deep slumber?
What secret breath
Of melancholy just fled
Nestles into the soul?
Welch ein kuhn-leichter schritt
Wandert durchs eigenste reich
Des marchengartens der ahnin?
Welch einen weckr~!liagt
Blaser mit silbernem horn
Ins schlurnmernde dickicht der Sage?
Welch ein heimlicher hauch
Schrniegt in die seele sich ein
Derfilngst-vergangenen schwermut?
Heidegger then comments:
Step (that is, way) and call and breath hover around the rule of the word
(schwingen um das Walten des Wortes). Its mystery has not only disturbed
the soul that formerly was secure. It has also taken away the soul's
melancholy (Schwermut) which threatened to drag it down. Thus, sadness
has vanished fl:om the poet's relation to the word. This sadness concerned
only his learning of renunciation. All this would be true if sadness were
the mere opposite to joy, if melancholy and'sadness were identical.
But the more joyful the joy, the more pure the sadness slumbering
within it. The deeper the sadness, the more summoning the joy resting
within it. Sadness and joy play into each other. The play itself which
46 "Renunciation owes thanks - it is a thanking. It is not mere refusal, still less a loss." - Martin Heidegger,
"Words" in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 152.
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attlmes the two by letting the remote be near and the near be remote is
pain. This is why both, highest joy and deepest sadness, are painful each in
its way. But pain so touches the spirit of mortals that the spirit receives its
gravity from pain. That gravity keeps mortals with all their wavering at
rest in their being. The spirit which answers to pain, the spirit attuned by
pain and to pain, is melancholy.47
In this passage Heidegger describes renunciation, the poet's relationship to the word, as
simultaneously both joyful and sad. The mood of melancholy holds the two together. Or,
more precisely, melancholy, Heidegger says, is the spirit attuned to pain, pain being that
which attunes both joy and sadness to one another. This takes us back to the relationship
between the affects and language. Pain, we can say, is always at the limits of discourse,
indeed, at the limits of understanding. It is truly a disclosure - of our finitude, of our
bodies - but precisely because it is so intimate in this way, it resists thematization. If
Kristeva's normative claim is right, then, and life is always given shape through
meaningful linguistic disclosures, pain seems to playa pivotal role in the play of
concealment and unconcealment that shape a life. Melancholy accesses this same
dynamic without necessarily being accompanied by pain, since its connection to pain
remains one of attunement with.
How does this discussion show us that the remmciation of the thing beyond
language is not a loss? While Heidegger turns to this poem as a way of explaining this,
the interpretation that he offers seems to tell a more complicated story. Because of the
ambiguous character ofthe poet's mood, the way he finds himself with language, it
would appear that he must, in fact, tlu'ough his attunement, experience both gain and loss.
There is gain in that, as Heidegger says in "The Nature of Language": "The poet could
never go through the experience he undergoes with the word if the experience were not
attuned to sadness, to the mood of releasement into the nearness of what is withdrawn but
at the sanle time held in reserve for an originary advent.,,48 Pain, the secret language of
47 Martin Heidegger, "Words," 153.
48 Martin Heidegger, "The Nature of Language" in On the W({y to Language, trans. Peter Hertz (New York:
Harper Collins, 1971),66.
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the body, lies at the heart of concealment and unconcealment. It belongs essentially to the
mood (Stimmung) of disclosure. And yet, there is also loss, for pain itself resists the kind
of expression that it grants to life. As a source of disclosure, it remains strange.
How then do we read Heidegger's insistence that the renunciation of the thing
beyond the word is not a loss? One possible answer is that it is a lingering relllilant of
metaphysical thinking. If we think about the relationship between the poet and language
as a dialectical encounter, then, from this perspective, Heidegger's insistence on
renunciation as thanks is an attempt to construe the encounter as a one-sided sublation:
the poet's desire for things in themselves gives way to his new nominalist commitment,
loss gets redescribed as gain. One then reads Heidegger as offering an idealist
metaphysics.
But if we approach Heidegger's treatment of melancholy above from the
psychoanalytic perspective that Kristeva offers, we get a different story - a story not of
sacrifice but of working through (Freud's Durcharbeitung). What Kristeva attempts to
show in her work is how the dialectical encoill1ter between the bodily drives and the
symbolic need not take the f01111 of a sacrifice of the fonner without remainder. Indeed,
when we insist on such a split - and it seems like the linguistic tum in its attempt to
renounce everything outside of language does just this - we become deafto those pre-
symbolic languages that are necessary for having a productive relationship to language's
transcendence. For Kristeva, the insistence on conveyability and the denial of preoedipal
significance contributes greatly to how people come to develop an attachment to the
ineffable lost preobject. Each dimension that is not carried over by the symbolic sublation
- in particular, bodily affects - then become a void, an empty place, as Kristeva says, "an
inexpressible container." But this condition, Kristeva demonstrates, can be meliorated by
the intervention of another who recognizes - and indeed - co-authors the meaning hidden
beneath the withdrawal from the symbolic. Just as Butler develop a way of grounding
Jakobson's theory of substitution in an activity of mutual disclosure, Kristeva also wants
to transfonn her patients' sense of language as other into ground for an act of disclosure,
--_._-------- --------
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since, as we have discussed both structurally and phenomenologically, an act of
disclosure requires some concealment.
If these parallels between Heidegger and the psychoanalytic project indicated by
Butler and Kristeva do indeed describe an important similarity between the two, then we
can understand Heidegger's redescription ofthe poet's relationship to language as one of
a disclosive melancholy rather than a purely privative loss as a therapeutic task.
This alternative reading of Heidegger's treatment of melancholy as therapeutic
has the advantage of clarifying a number of other dimensions of his project concerning
language. First, it speaks to the imp0l1ant emphasis put on experience (Erfahrung) in the
text. As he mIDounces in the opening lines of "The Nature of Language," Heidegger's
aim is not primarily to change the way we think about language but the way that we
experience it. Heidegger is therefore asking his readers to attune themselves differently,
to undergo the claim oflanguage in a new way. More specifically, he wants to attune us
to the unspoken dimension of language - to listen to silence - and to acknowledge its
place in what allows there to be spoken language. While Kristeva does a much better job
elaborating the political stakes of such listening, the act of listening to what remains
concealed in ordinary speaking remains pivotal to Heidegger's project.
Second, the therapeutic reading gives us a better way of understanding the
interplay of inauthenticity and authenticity. For Heidegger, absorption seems to
characterize both. One might say that authenticity and absorption go together for
Heidegger, that one is authentic when one gives up the idea that, as consciousness, ego,
or human, one is the master of language. Authenticity then consists in returning to the
primordial listening, that is, the absorption in the original addresses of lmlguage. But
absorption seems to characterize inauthenticity too, since absorption in everyday
discourse is a fundamental feature of inauthentic being. The therapeutic reading offers us
a way to resolve this tension, by suggesting that, for Heidegger, we must overcome
absorption in one way - for example, recognizing natural language as historical language
- in order to open up the space in which, through mutual disclosure - we may be
translated back into ourselves. But this requires not that we give up absorption but that
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we revise the way it works. We must bring it to word, communicate it to another. This is
the therapeutic aspect of Heidegger's project.
In the upcoming chapter, we shall leave behind the paradigms employed in this
chapter - structuralism and psychoanalysis - which have helped us to flesh out the social
and communicative features ofHeidegger's philosophical exploration oflanguage. And
with this context in the background, I will tum to the philosophical and poetic work of
one of Heidegger' s contemporaries, Paul Celan, who for many reasons - not least of all,
his close engagement with Heidegger's writings on language - offers an interesting way
oftranslating Heidegger's therapeutic project into a reflection on the poetic work as a
place ofmutual disclosure.
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CHAPTER IV
OPENING THE WORD: BETWEEN HEIDEGGER
AND CELAN'S POETICS
At the beginning ofthis chapter, I would like to take a moment to reflect on where
the previous discussions have brought us. This project began by looking at the difficulties
that arise whenever philosophers try to demarcate language as the endpoint of critical
reflection and thus renOl.mce the part of human cognition that historicizes, politicizes, and
otherwise challenges language. As Heideggerean phenomenology demonstrates, language
is never simply a natural "given." The more that one relates to it as a familiar tool, the
more it will appear strange when the tool breaks down or when one brings it to light. This
is not to deny that language appears reliable and ready-to-hand a lot of the time.
Proximally and for the most part, Heidegger says, we do not consider our relationship to
language, and instead aSSlmle that it will function normally independent of our concem
for it. And yet the breakdown and defamiliarization of language brings to light the need
for such concem. When the way we aIiiculate something no longer works, we encolmter
a practical impasse. Moreover, if the lU1settled part of language belongs to the
fOlmdational structure of self and world upon which we rely, the impasse will also tum to
light what is directly underfoot - my basic sense of who I am, what the world is, and how
to negotiate between the two. What is needed then is not a theory of language that cuts
off the possibility of critical reflection intervening on behalf of laIlguage, which would
deny the validity of such an experience of language estrangement aIlyway, but an account
that addresses the transfonnative possibilities that belong to such moments of breakdown.
After tracing out how we come to discover our language as tied to a particular
history - one with political and epistemic characteristics that we usually overlook, a
discovery that estranges us from the pre-reflective praxis of our language use, we then
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proceeded to ask how this estrangement affects and is affected by the facticity of social
life. The second chapter answered this question, first, by outlining the general
relationship between facticity and Dasein's tln'own possibility; second, by describing
through examples how we find the words of others deeply woven into our own most
basic thoughts and experiences; and, third, by describing how even the experience of
entanglement in which we seem thrust out of social relations actually depends on
formative encounters with other speak:ing subjects.
In chapter three, we discussed how these fonnative encounters actually comprise
the basic interlocutionary structures within which we leall1 how to communicate with
others and to develop our own voice for communicating. Through Jakobson's linguistics,
we considered the way that ordinary language usage requires ongoing substitution and
metalanguage. The latter came to mean, not an ideal system of language into which every
other language can be rendered without remainder or with which one's meaning is always
immediately evident, but something that most of us use all of the time to interpret what
we read or hear and, in turn, to help others interpret us. The need arises, not out of a
desire to transcend the worldly situation of language practices, but from concrete
communicative situations in which our thinking is imbedded. So, for example, when one
is not getting one's point across, it is natural to substitute one fOll11Ulation for another.
And, in doing so, one may need to step back from the particular idiom that they're using
and clarify - for example, with "What I mean to say is ..." or "To put the point another
way ...." And if we are listening to another, we might ask them to step back from the
particular idiom that they are using in order to substitute alternatives. Thus, the distance
that opens up when we undergo an experience of entanglement, while certainly bringing
the limits of ready-to-hand language into relief, can actually work in the service of
communication. But this is never a solo achievement. As Butler and Kristeva show, the
existence or non-existence of enabling intersubjective conditions can significantly affect
whether one relates to the need for substitution as a lost or gained possibility. Thus, both
Butler and Kristeva describe the activity of mutual interpretation in the psychoanalytic
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exchange, for example, as a way that one can discover new (performative or semiotic)
possibilities within the discourses in which one is absorbed.
This is, in effect, the way that we naturally gain some ground apart from the
entanglement in language that this project began with. We are always already entangled
in discourses that we pre-reflectively use before we ever think about it. But, as we
develop and the demands upon us as speaking beings become more complex, we have the
opportunity to radically reorient ourselves vis-a.-vis this entanglement. We develop the
ability to see the absorption into discourse as occasionally problematic. Not because we
float free from our social relationships but because we are claimed by a number of them,
and a single, unchanging language will not enable us to tend to these myriad relations.
Thus, what we first looked at as an existential need, the need to question our language,
has now also come to appear as a social need.
But this conclusion comes to us by way of Freud, Jakobson, Butler, and Kristeva
- not strictly Heidegger. Only through these interlocutors in the last chapter were we able
to assemble a reading of Heidegger' s project as therapeutic. And, yet, truth be told, it was
the first chapter that initially introduced us to the idea of an activity whereby one's
absorption into language is transfonned into a creative possibility. Recall our earlier
discussion of Heidegger' s reading of Stefan George's "Das Wort." While it was unclear
at that time by what processes the poet manages to renounce his melancholic disposition
toward language entanglement, it was clear that the language ofthe poem differed from
the word eternally bound to the thing.
Let us return, then, to the topic of poetry and to the role it plays in Heidegger's
broader understanding oflanguage, approaching it this time from the point of view
developed in the previous chapters. For, much more than his discussion of translation, it
is in Heidegger's poetics that we most clearly see a cOlmection between (a) the need for
interpreting language and (b) the social and historical context in which such need arises.
For Heidegger, the poem is a site similar to what we developed earlier as the scene of
psychoanalytic transference - it opens up the interpretive possibilities within ordinary
language that regularly go unnoticed and uncultivated. The poem does the interpretive,
reconstructive work that the analyst does. And this activity is fundamental to the way that
ordinary language functions. For, according to Heidegger, insofar as the world in which
we collectively dwell is a discursive world, it gains its sense from poems.
In what follows, then, I want to turn to Heidegger's discussion of poetic works,
focusing particularly on the poem as a communicative act that attempts to transfo1111 our
relationship to language's readiness-to-hand. As we shall see, for Heidegger, the poetic is
an indispensable wellspring for language. It is, in fact, the origin of ordinary language,
for Heidegger. And yet, on the basis of what I have argued throughout this project, I
would like to suggest that such a pure origin could never exist and that poetry makes this
point very clearly.
In the latter half of the chapter, I will expand upon Heidegger's reflections via the
poetics of Paul Celano For Celan's work (both his prose and his poetry), demonstrates
well why it is impossible to describe the poem as the origin of the world that it opens up.
I will focus on two main reasons for this claim. First, just as we saw in the last chapter
how a language is most itself when it stretches beyond itself, poems for Celan are also
ecstatic in this way - their communicative power is nothing other than their desire to
communicate. This inadequacy of the poem is what many have identified as the place of
loss or nothingness in Celan's poetry. But, parallel to our earlier discussion of the
semiotic and perfonnative possibilities hidden within melancholy, I would like to read
the emptiness that characterizes Celan's work in ten11S of its positive dimension, that is,
as a powerful act of communication that stretches language beyond its n01111S. This means
that the poems withhold not just, as Heidegger argues, in order to let things be, but also in
order to solicit readers to interpret the poem and thus to bring it even more beyond its
origin. Second, even though the poem gains a fresh approach to the discourse in which it
is entangled, it does not manage ever, in Celan's poetry, to decisively separate itself from
the everyday language that it attempts to open up. Thus, ordinary language, for Celan,
cannot originate in the poem, because much of the latter is, like stones and grass, already
poetic. Thus, the words that appear in the poem are as much dialogical partners as they
are the brute material of the poetic work.
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Before moving into Celan's poetics, though, let us look more closely at
Heidegger's discussion of poetry in order to see in what way Heidegger takes the poem to
found ordinary language. In this section, I will draw mostly from the earliest and
arguably the most well-known of Heidegger's lectures that deal with poetry, the 1935-
1936 "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" or "The Origin of the Work of Art."
Poetic Founding in "The Origin ofthe Work ofArt"
In "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger famously argues that the poem
opens a world. It creates an opening where things first come to appear as they are. In this
regard, the poem is like all works of ali, for Heidegger. It opens up a world in the same
way as the temple, which "in its standing there, first gives to things their look and to men
their outlook on themselves"l ("in seinem Dastehen den Dingen erst ihr Gesicht und den
Menschen erst die Aussicht aufsich selbst,,).2
Everything hinges on the word "first" in this statement. For Heidegger situates his
claim relative to the prevalent belief that poems - as works of art - are derivative,
parasitic on a more basic, originary presencing elsewhere.3 Within this popular opinion,
poems are often viewed as a failed attempt at clear descriptive speech, either of some
ilmer or outer reality, one that is difficult enough to put into words that the author
attempts to do so elliptically. Thus, one believes that in order to understand poems - one
needs to straighten out what they are trying to say, rendering it into the kind of
propositional speech that we are already familiar with. Heidegger rejects this view. For,
as we saw in chapter one in the context of the George poem, Heidegger sees the attempt
1 Mmiin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Ali" in Poetl:V, Language, Thought, trans. Albert
Hofstadter (New York: Hmper and Row, 2001), 42.
2 Mmiin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe Band 5: Holzwege (Frm1kfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977),
29.
3 In this way, Heidegger is entering into a conversation about art with Plato and Aristotle, the ''''orks ofboth
which contain discussions of ali - in paIiiculm', poeuy - as imitation (mimesis). In Books II, III, aIld X of
The Republic, for example, Socrates mId his interlocutors in the dialogue detennine that poetic craft tends
to make bad imitations. For Heidegger, the artwork is not mimetic.
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to render poems into propositional speech as misguided. In the context of this earlier
discussion, we looked at Heidegger's attempt to respect the polyvalence of the poem. In
light of the above claim from "The Origin of the Work of Ali," it is also clear that
Heidegger wants to think about the activity of the poem completely apaIi from
descriptive speech, apart from the assumption of an inner or outer reality separate from
what the work opens up. Like the Greek temple whose "fiml towering makes visible the
invisible space of the air" and whose "repose brings out the raging of the sea,,,4 the poem
is what first opens the world.
This is to say that the space of the air and the raging of the sea do not come to
appear independently of the cultural works that put them into relief. They are at work
only in the work. In this way, Heidegger extends upon the basic phenomenological
exercise of describing the relational context in which things that are come to appear, or in
which beings are preserved. Just as Husserl argued that the world never appears
independently of consciousness, Heidegger points to the primacy of artworks for
structuring the world in which we dwell.
In this way, Heidegger' s argument in "The Origin of the Work of Art" is not
unlike theories of poetry that suggest that the work of the poem is the creation of a world
rather than description of a world. The two perspectives overlap in that both conceive of
the aliwork as the source of its own intelligibility. Because it first sets fmih the relations
between beings, the being of ally aliwork cannot be understood in temlS of relations with
things that pre-exist its activity. It is, in an important way, its own source, its own
Ursprung. Thus, Heidegger says that the work is at home in the world that it sets up and
nowhere else.
But there are some important points on which these two theories differ, since for
Heidegger, it is not quite right to say the poem creates the world. That is, first of all, why
he chooses middle-voice constructions like "allows beings to appear" and "allows beings
to be" (lassen sein), suggesting a reciprocal rather than a unilateral action. Secondly, on
this view, the world opened up by the work comes into conflict with what he calls the
4 Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work ofArt," 41.
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self-seclusion and the impenetrability of the Erde, the ealih. This marks the basic
difference, on Heidegger's view, between the tool al1d the artwork. Whereas the material
of the tool is meant to disappear completely in its use, material in the aliwork is not. As
Heidegger puts it:
In fabricating equipment - e.g., an ax - stone is used, al1d used up (gebraucht und
verbraucht). It disappears into usefulness. The material is all the better and more
suitable the less it resists perishing in the equipmental being of the equipment. By
contrast the temple-work, in setting up a world, does not cause the material to
disappear, but rather causes it to come f01ih for the very first time (allererst
hervorkommen) and to come into the Open of the work's world. The rock comes
to bear and rest and so first becomes rock; metals come to glitter and shine, colors
to glow, tones to sing, the word to speak.5
The work of ali is, on this view, whatever "causes (materials) to come forth for the very
first time." Rock, metal, color, tone and the word are obstinate in the work. They stand
out as more thal1just the medium for its message. The work lets them be6• In this way,
the work accomplishes what our everyday habitual interactions with the world may
occasionally chance upon, namely, that dimensions of our experience resist analysis. The
stone denies analysis, for eXal11ple, Heidegger argues, because its heaviness is instantly
withdrawn as soon as we try to break it open to reach the inwardness of its being. We try
to break down what causes it to be heavy, but as soon as we put it on a scale, we lose the
heaviness in attempting to render it as a quantitative weight. Likewise, "Color shines and
wants only to shine. When we analyze it in rational tenllS by measuring its wavelengths,
it is gone. It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus
shatters every attempt to penetrate it.,,7
In this way, Heidegger says, the work is "set back into the earth." This is what
distinguishes it from a theory that tmderstands the poem as world-creation and reality-
5 Mmtin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Alt," 44-45.
6 "What seems easier than to let a being be just the being that it is? Or does this hUll out to be the most
difficult of tasks, paIticularly if such an intention - to let a being be as it is - represents the opposite of the
indifference that simply tlUllS its back upon the being itself in favor of an unexamined concept of being?" -
Mmtin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Alt," 31.
7 Martin Heidegger, "The Origin ofthe Work of Art," 45.
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creation. For while the account given in The Origin ofthe Work ofArt concurs in saying
that the work is an originating source through which things come to be what they are,
Heidegger does not argue that such works make being but that they let beings be. In this
way, poetry serves the goal of phenomenology, namely, fidelity to die Sache selbst, the
things themselves. The case of poetry makes the difference clear. For Richard Rorty, for
example, the most compelling accounts are not those that hook into some universal and
im1ate truths about human nature but those ofthe "strong poets" who invent their own
vocabulary, incongruous to discourses ofthe past. 8 Rorty sees the work of the poet in this
sense as indistinguishable from the development of scientific paradigms. Since, for the
linguistic turn theorist, reality in all cases is a discursive reality, the scientist is no
different from the poet - neither the strong poem nor the strong scientific paradigm is
strong because it moves us closer to the reality "out there," which stays the same, but
because their descriptions are more powerful- on their own terms - than previous
descriptions. But, although Rorty solicits select lines from Heidegger as evidence that he
approaches language similarly, as we can see from the passage quoted above, there is a
significant difference. For words, for Heidegger, are like rocks, metals, colors, and tones.
The poem's opening activity involves, not the coining of words, but letting words be,
letting customary language that habit keeps hidden come to stand in the open.
Thus, the poet's language is not extra-ordinary. It is the same language as occurs
in ordinary, habitual usage, but with a difference. "To be sure," Heidegger writes, "the
poets also uses the word- not, however, like ordinary speakers and writers who have to
use them up, but rather in such a way that the word only now becomes and remains truly
a word.,,9 The poem lets the word be. Words thus are in the position of "the things
themselves," that originary presencing that both phenomenology and poetry attempt to
bring forth.
One finds a similar understanding of poetic language in Kierkegaard' s description
of "transfelTed language." Kierkegaard writes:
8 See Richard Rorty's Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press,
1989).
9 Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work ofArt," 46.
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.. (E)ven though man is spirit from the moment of birth, he first becomes
conscious as spirit later, and therefore prior to this he has lived for a certain time
within sensuous-psychic categories. The first portion of life shall not, however, be
cast aside when the spirit awakens. .. . The first portion is taken over by the
spirit, and, thus used, thus laid at the base, it becomes transferred. Therefore the
spiritual man and the sensuous-psychic man say the same thing in a sense, and yet
there remains an infinite difference between what they say, since the latter does
not suspect the secret of transferred language, even though he uses the same
words, but not metaphorically.... Transferred language is, then, not a brand new
language; it is rather the language already at hand. Just as spirit is invisible, so
also is its language as secret, and the secret rests precisely in this that it uses the
same language as the simple man and the child but uses it as transferred. 10
Kierkegaard's description of transferal prefigures Heidegger' s concept of the clearing
activity in that both are ways re-approaching what has already claimed us in a way. This
is, for Kierkegaard, "the first portion of life" which is not "cast aside" when the spirit
awakens but is "laid at the base." Ordinary language, basic words, thus retain their
primacy and density. But the poet relates and calls us to relate to this base in a new,
"transferred" way. Taking the opening activity of the work as an intensification of
Dasein's disclosive activity, we can appreciate the way that the poetic work is thrown
into and entffi1gled within "the first pOltion of (speaking) life." One can never leave
behind the firstness of language, and yet one Cffi1110t remain there either.
Of course, as I have been developing throughout this proj ect, this transferal is not
always a pleasure to the individual speaking subject undergoing it simply by virtue of its
aesthetic character. Recall, for example, the way that Barthes's writer struggled with the
historical facti city of his language, which he perceived as an obstacle to his writing and to
his own self-knowledge. But there is a difference between the entanglement ofthe
individual and that of the artwork in this respect. While a person may perceive the
movement tluough such a transformation as a disturbing estrangement from what was
once most fmniliar, as Heidegger suggests, it is actually part ofthe goal or telos of the
10 Smen Kierkegaard, Works a/Love, trans. Howard and Edna Hong (New York: Harper and Row
Publishers, 1962), 199-200.
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work to get entangled like this. For only through such entanglement can the work let
metals shine and words speak.
The work of ali, therefore, helps us to better see the condition of entanglement.
Kierkegaard's description of transferal, after all, like Heidegger's motif of way-making,
makes clear just how easy it is to overlook need within our relationship to ordinary
lallguage. The poem helps us see that, because we are always within language, a way to
language is needed. Recall, for exanlple, how in the first chapter, we explored the
difference between Wittgenstein's "Whereof one Calmot speak, thereof one must be
silent" and Stefan George's "Where word breaks off, no thing may be." On the face of
things, these two statements appear to meall the same thing. However, when we take the
latter, the poetic statement, in terms of the poet's care toward the bond between word and
thing, we realize that the statement hardly describes a self-evident, unquestionable,
immediate kind of impression. Nor, despite the lead-in "so," does it assert this as a
conclusion reached via logical processes. Rather, it attempts to let be the impenetrability
of the word. Or, to take a less complicated example, since the line from "Das Wort" is
language about language, consider another poem that Heidegger references, "A Winter
Evening" by Georg Trakl. Heidegger explains: "The poem's content is comprehensible.
There is not a single word which, taken by itself, would be unfamiliar or unclear."jj The
first stanza in the first version of the poem reads:
Window with falling snow is arrayed,
Long tolls the vesper bell,
The house is provided well,
The table is for many laid.
Wenn del' Schnee am Fenster lalit,
Lang die Abendglocke lautet,
Vielen ist del' Tisch bereitet
Und das Haus ist ·wohlbestelit.
II Martin Heidegger "Language" in Poetr:v. Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York:
Harper and Row, 2001), 193.
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While the syntax might be a little different than how we usually talk, Heidegger does not
seem too amiss in saying that the content of the poem is comprehensible, familiar, and
clear. We might have occasion to repOli that a table is set for many or that the vesper bell
is tolling long. Ordinary language seems, for the most part, intact. But many things
evidence both the care that the poet took in bringing these words and utterances into the
poem and the care that we as readers bring in attlming our ear to the verse. As mentioned
above, the syntax differs slightly from the fonn of ordinary descriptive statements.
Moreover, each line seems intentionally simple, due to the repetition of the very basic
structure of the lines: "window ... is anayed," "house is ... provided," "table is ...
laid." And, as Heidegger points out, the verses of the poem "manifest a paIiicular beauty
of imagery" that "heightens the chaIm of the poem and strengthens its aesthetic
perfection as an artistic structure,,12 ("erhoht den Reiz des Gedichtes und bekraftigt die
asthetische Vollendung des Klmstgebildes,,).13 But this is not to say that it is solely the
formal elements of the poem that compel us to listen with more care than usual. Knowing
that it is a verse from a poem, we search its shape and contents differently than we would
an instruction manual. We anticipate coming across images in the poem, images that will
relate to one another in ways that we cannot predict straight away. We read with more
patience. But the point is that this poetic activity, in which a world is opened up where
ready-to-hand things - window, house, table - appear aIleW, does not require the
circumvention of ordinary, ready-to-hand language. Rather, any poetic devices simply
serve to bring this language forward.
The poem, thus, does the work of the phenomenologist, leading us "back to the
things themselves." And yet, it is worth noting, that the "things themselves" as
approached by the poem do not comprise some brute reality that we have strayed from.
The firstness that the poem tries to get at is never reducible to an independent and
primary presence in this way. This is what Heidegger describes as the uncanniness of
what the poem opens up, a description that recalls Kierkegaard's depiction of "transfelTed
12 Martin Heidegger, "Language," 194.
13 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe Band 12: Unterwegs zur Sprache (Frankurt am Main: Vittorio
K1ostennal1l1, 1985), 16.
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language" as both "the language already at hand" and, at the same time, as something that
retains the character of a "secret." The poem is at home in ordinary language but its
relationship to the ordinary is a unique one, not itself ordinary. For, on the one hand,
poems aim to establish - again, not to obscure - our immediate, familiar relation to the
world. They bring the everyday closer into view. But, on the other hand, they do not
simply establish the realm of the ordinary once and for all. Rather, they catch a glimpse
of the way the ordinary comes to pass as the ordinary. This is why, according to
Heidegger, the work of art is uncanny - it presents the familiar as the unfamiliar. "At
bottom, the ordinary is not ordinary," Heidegger says, "it is extra-ordinary, uncanny,,14
("Das Geheure ist im Grunde nicht geheuer; es ist un-geheuer,,).lS Trakl's poem presents
a very everyday scene in a way that, like Heidegger says, appears not unclear or
unfamiliar. And yet in letting be what is opened up in the world of the poem, we find
ourselves as readers present to the scene in an unfamiliar way. Likewise, the temple
brings forth the raging of the sea only then to return it to hiddenness. The painting ofthe
peasant shoes offers a picture of a tool-being that is intimately connected to the context
which gives it purpose that the painting illuminates and which simultaneously keeps it
hidden.
This is why, for Heidegger, the work of ali as well as the poem are not things like
other things. They are, rather, the kind of things that first organize the dynamics of
concealment and lillconcealment, the disclosure of which characterizes our way of
belonging to or dwelling in our environment. The work of art is a sacred space, aldn to
the space of rituals that bring forth nature as nature, the divine as the divine. But it is
important to bear in mind here that it is precisely the degree to which the work distances
itself fr0 111 the world that it discloses the world. Its separateness serves only to gather and
let occur the elements comprising our everyday environment. The work is at home, it has
its place, in that which it opens up, and not elsewhere.
14 Martin Heidegger, "The Origin ofthe Work ofArt," 53.
15 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe Band 5: Holzwege, 41.
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This motif of being at home in the activity of clearing or disclosure is echoed in
two lectures from 1951, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" and "Poetically Man Dwells.,,16
In "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," Heidegger tells us that to dwell is "to save the emih,
to set it free into its own presencing.,,17 This dwelling can be manifest in the habitual
attitude of people, according to Heidegger, who "leave to the sun and moon their own
joumey.,,18 Again, while this may seem like a passive stance, Heidegger's aim is
precisely to emphasize the 1i'ork of this letting. As he explains, any dwelling is also a
building. Not that dwelling requires building as a preliminary step, but that "to build is in
itself already to dwell.,,19 The essence of building, bauen, Heidegger suggests, is the
work of the fmmer, del' Bauer, who cares for the emih and whose activity is one of
cultivation rather than construction. To build is to cultivate. It is in the work of
cultivation that beings come to appear and to recede. Van Gogh's painting of shoes, then,
does not just reflect the appearance of shoes as we find them independently of the work.
Likewise, the poem neither reflects nor distorts words that we access independently of
poems. It builds and cultivates the way that things first come to appearance, first become
what they are.
Let us look directly at the relationship that Heidegger sets up between this activity
of cultivation and our social-political life. Following up on what I presented conceming
social entanglement in my previous two chapters, I suggest that this opening activity
should be lmderstood in tenns of its inter-subjective, communicative character. For
Heidegger, the work opens up a shared world, and- again - what is important here is that
it is not a shared world that exists independently of this communicative act, but one that
first comes to appearance in such acts. Thus, Dichtung is an important part of how we as
human beings share sources of meaning in common. For Heidegger, building and
16 Heidegger borrows from material used in "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" tor "Poetically Man Dwells."
Thus, there is a lot of overlap in the two texts. I will be focusing on the fOInIer.
17 Mmiin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," in Poetry, Language. Thought, translated by Albeli
Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 2001), 148.
18 Ibid., 148.
19 Ibid., 144.
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dwelling constitute a political praxis. The work of art opens beings and allows truth to
happen, and according to Heidegger, so does the founding of a political state. These
things can disclose beings in a way, Heidegger says, science cannot. Science must work
in the wake of poetic-political truth. It gains its measure fi'om such truth and not vice
versa. Heidegger sees that the pre-reflective world in which we pursue our life goals day
by day hinges on appeals made by individuals through the setting up of an aesthetic work.
In his description of truth as what is cultivated through political and aesthetic works, one
finds civic humanist tendencies in Heidegger's thinking that at other times he seems to
deny. If our political life depends on the construction of works that allow us to share a
world, then the kind of rhetorical study emphasized by thinkers like Aristotle, Vico, and
Cicero do not seem too far off from Heidegger's line of thinking.20 Furthenllore,
Heidegger's phenomenological approach seems to make an interesting contribution to
this area of political philosophy. In developing how we are in need of a way to language,
Heidegger indicates a tmiversal motivation for seeking ourselves and our world in the
words of another. By describing how this need for finding language belongs to our
existential character, Heidegger provides reasons for why the search is an ongoing one,
unfinished as long as we continue to experience ourselves thrown into and entangled
within a social world. For example, Heidegger writes: "World is never an object that
stands before us and can be seen. World is the ever-nonobjective to which we are subject
as long as the paths of birth and death, blessing and curse keep us transported into
Being,,21 ("Welt ist das immer Ungegenstandliche, dem wir unterstehen, solange die
Bahnen von Geburt und Tod, Segen und Fluch uns in das Sein entriickt halten,,).22
To be clear, Heidegger's view is not that nothing would really be what it is
without poems and paintings in a narrow sense. This is why he tries to gather these
20 An Italian student ofHeidegger's, Ernesto Grassi, has produced interesting studies ofHeidegger's
relationship to the tradition of civic humanism and rhetoric. While Grassi argues that Heidegger largely
overlooked the rhetorical tradition, others argue that there were some deep connections between the two.
See, for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer's interview "Heidegger as Rhetor" in Heidegger and Rhetoric, ed.
Daniel M. Gross and Ansgar Kemmanll (SUNY Press, 2005).
21 Maltin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art" 43.
22 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe Band 5: Holzwege, 30.
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different kinds of work under the wnbrella teml, Dichtung. At root, building and dwelling
belong to the habitual, everyday experience of the human being. "Building as dwelling,
that is, as being on the earth, however, remains for man's everyday experience that which
is from the outset 'habitual' - we inhabit it, as our language says so beautifully: it is
Gewohnte.,,23 But precisely because of its habitual character, it falls into oblivion. Thus,
poetic and artistic works can awaken us to what habit pushes into the backgrolmd: the
clearing activity that allows things to be what they are, that brings forth our world as
meaningful.
The idea that dwelling (in language) requires building echoes something that we
explored last chapter, namely, Kristeva's phenomenological understanding of the
relationship of language and life. A meamngfullife, Kristeva argues, is a life explored
and expressed through language. Thus, when life loses meaning, as in the case of
depression and melancholy, one's ability to speak tends to collapse. One may retain the
capacity for many basic language skills but one ceases to identify as a speaking subject
and thus to wlite one's experience with one's language. One loses the ability to build onto
what they have absorbed, taking it on as one's own, and reforming it. Heidegger's call for
building is in this way similar to Kristeva's insistence on the role of art and poetry in
sustaining language. And yet these f01111s of (semiotic) signification, according to both
thinkers, cannot function autonomously apart from the ongoing process of sedimentation.
In other words, neither believes that poetry will ever cure us ofthe need for more poetry.
Language will always be too close to bring it entirely within the opening of the poem.
The tension between the two is what calls for us to re-found ordinary language through
the work of the poem.
And yet, based on what we have seen in the previous two chapters, it appears
difficult to draw a clear line between poetry and ordinary language. For, as we have seen,
everyday communication constantly demands the need to rethink language's claim upon
our lives. At one point, I described this as our everyday interpretive mood manifest, for
example, in the way that we tend to take caution when we listen to an individual or read a
23 Heidegger, Matiin, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," 145.
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text. Rather than assuming the speaker's or writer's meaning at the first clue, the prudent
listener or reader keeps open multiple plausible interpretations, and continually bears in
mind that he or she may need to revise the interpretation as the account unfolds.
Similarly, the poem allows things to appear as they come to pass, not as they are from
every angle at every moment, but in a particular manner. For example, the table in
Trakl's poem comes to pass in a particular context. The ordinariness of the scene, which
Heidegger comments on, contributes to the fleeting nature of the appearance: because the
poem brings forth one context included in the stream of ordinary experience, the reader
cannot and does not presume that a table appears this way and just this way - well-laid at
evening time. Likewise, the word in the poem is brought forth in the particular context of
the rest of the poem. It appears bound to the line of interpretation that one can develop
out of the associations and usages that that single context invites. Thus, the way that we
approach both kinds of language seem to require the same open comportment that allows
a thing to come to appearance as a possibility. While we certainly bring different
expectations to the two situations, and the two take on distinct cultural forms and values,
there is, in fact, no fiml principle or objective quality that distinguishes poetic language
from ordinary language in this way. Revolution, reformulation - these are axiomatic to
both everyday speech and poetry.
Granted, as chapter three argued, this description of ordinary language - while
intuitive at a certain level for many of us - is not the way that many of us regularly
perceive and experience ordinary language. For, the habits we develop in constantly
using language (speaking and listening) have a way of working against the poetic
dimension of ordinary language. But this habitual usage can break down on occasion,
revealing the way that our lives become shaped around language habits. The poem offers
this kind of experience, and as such, must both separate itself from and belong to
ordinary language.
Heidegger insists on the need for this separation, calling it variably a "strife," a
"rift," and a "thrust." It is this strife whereby art lets truth originate. In "The Origin of the
Work of Art," he writes:
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The more solitarily the work, fixed in the figure, stands on its own and the
more cleanly its seems to cut all ties to human beings, the more simply
does the thrust come into the Open that such a work is, and the more
essentially is the extraordinary thrust to the smface and the long-familiar
thrust down. But this lllultiple thrusting is nothing violent, for the more
purely the work is itself transported into the openness of beings - an
openness opened by itself - the more simply does it transport us into this
openness and thus at the same time transport us out of the realm of the
ordinary. To submit to this displacement means: to transfonll om
accustomed ties to world and to earth and henceforth to restrain all usual
doing and prizing, knowing and looking, in order to stay within the truth
I . h .. I k 14t lat IS appelllng 11l t Ie wor .-
Je einsamer das Werk, festgestellt in die Gestalt. in sich steht, je reiner es
alle Bezuge zu den Menschen zu losen scheint, um so ein/acher tritt del'
StofJ, dafJ solches Werk ist, ins Offene, um so wesentlicher ist das
Ungeheure aufgestofJen und das bislang geheuer Scheinende umgestofJen.
Abel' dieses vielfaltige StofJen hat nichts Gewaltsames: dennje l'einer das
Wel'k selbst in die dul'ch es selbst el'offnete OfJenheit des Seienden
entl'iickt ist, um so ein/achel' l'iickt es uns in diese Offenheit ein und so
zugleich aus dem Gewohnlichen hal'aus. Diesel' Vel'riickungfolgen, heifJt:
die gevl'ohnten Bezilge 2U1' Welt und zur Erde verwandeln undfortan rnit
allem gelaufigen Tun und Schatzen, Kennen und Blicken ansichhalten, um
in de rim Werk geschehenden Wahrheit zu verweilen.25
It is in the strife of the poetic work or in the thrust of political decision that Heidegger
says a true origin opens up. The apparent violence toward and displacement of us
affected by the work, the restraint of all usual doing and prizing, knowing and looking, is
in actuality, Heidegger says, the only genuine kind of beginning. Otherwise, om way of
dwelling in the world is not properly founded.
But given the poetic character of ordinary language as we have described it, we
may wonder: is poetry ever really in the position to found om dwelling with language? Is
it necessary or even possible to leave behind ordinary language in order to open it up
poetically? Heidegger seems at odds with himself on this point. On the one hand, the true
poem is one that does not abandon everyday language but exploits the familiarity of the
24 Maliin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Ali," 64.
25 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe Band 5: Hol:z:wege, 54.
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most familiar moves of our language. Trakl's poem, for example, speaks ordinarily. It
does not try to flee the original hel111eneutic condition in which Dasein finds itself
entangled, as in - for example - the attempt to create a logically perfect language, one
that requires no interpretation. On the other hand, everything depends for Heidegger on
this transformation, and its accomplishment is irreversible and decisive.
The political stakes of this an1biguity in Heidegger are worth commenting on. For
as much as we might benefit from uniting Heidegger's phenomenology of language with
a humanist politics oflanguage, Heidegger's work regularly resists the prospect of this
collaboration. Heidegger never backed away from his suspicion toward the linguistic
forms of public debate (often tied to mass media like newspapers, radio, etc.). Nor did he
acknowledge any poetic possibility within these conversations, and instead considered
these to be the kind of "idle chatter" from out of which we yearn to be poetically
disentangled?6 Thus, Heidegger develops art's status as a genuine foundation for our
historical lives at the expense of the kind of daily conversations that we tend to see as
essential to democratic society. For Heidegger, "Whenever art happens - that is,
whenever there is a beginning - a thrust enters history, history either begins or starts over
again.,,27 Idle talk is not capable of such radical transfonnation. But the separation of
poetic language from ordinary language takes on an even more problematic political
form. For Heidegger sharpens the line between poetic language and ordinary language-
authentic and inauthentic political being - by describing the movement from the latter to
the forn1er in terms, not only of truth and political foundation, but in tern1S of "decision"
(Entscheidung) and even "the essential sacrifice" (das wesentliche Opfer). Heidegger
writes, for example, directly after his description of world as "the ever-nonobjective to
which we are subject" (quoted above) that "Wherever those decisions of our history that
relate to our very being are made, are taken up and abandoned by us, go unrecognized
and are rediscovered by new inquiry, there the world worlds" (my emphasis). And to
preserve these decisions means that one "submits to the decision of an historical
26 See, for example, in "Poetically Man Dwells," where on page 213 Heidegger writes: "As expression,
language can decay into a mere medium for the printed word."
27 Martin Heidegger, "The Origin ofthe Work ofArt," 74.
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humanity the question of victory and defeat, blessing (md curse, mastery and slavery."
Among these decisions of a historical humanity, Heidegger includes "the essential
sacrifice." This has grave consequences. By prioritizing the aesthetic over the discursive
in politics, and detaching the aesthetic from the discursive and intersubjective processes
that support it, Heidegger turns away from the possibility of a liberal, civic htilllanistic
poetics and toward the fascist interest in epochal discontinuity.28
But are there not politically meaningful relations in place, relations that claim us
very profoundly, prior to the poem's opening up of a world? Is it only once we have set
these relations forth and given ourselves distance from them that we can properly belong
to them as genuinely political beings? Or do we stay within the discourses available to us,
within the worlds opened up with them, as we undergo the work's transformative
opening? The sea opened up by the temple is, after all, also the sea opened up by the POlt
and the ship. The well-laid table in Trakl's poem may appear as ~ffor the first time, but it
is likely that this "original" event comes borrowed from others. So, although Heidegger's
poetics is indeed promising in the way that it argues for the importance of poetic works
for bringing forth shared worlds of meaning, there is clearly more to say about the
relational character of the poem than that the poem founds and originates its relations.
There is, after all, a kind of being-there that is prior to the origin established by the poem.
Now, one could go about demonstrating tIns by appealing to worlds of meaning that are
so deeply rooted for us that poetic reflection cannot dig beneath them. Our earlier
analyses of primordial absorption would support tIns point. But there is another way of
demonstrating this point as well, and that is by showing how the work's opening up of a
world necessarily takes place in a world that is already set forth. In other words, we
would have to show that the work only makes sense within a context of references that
are already in place, references themselves that are not exactly un-poetic, but are lasting
28 The work of Carl Schmitt demonstrates well the connection between the thesis of epochal discontinuity,
decisionisl11, and the fascist conception of political life. Schmitt famously claims that sovereignty means
possession of the decision conceming the exception, and that such sovereignty can never be possessed by a
general people. His criticisms of liberalism overlap in important ways with some ofHeidegger's
explorations of aesthetic and political truth. See Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of
Sovereign~v(Chicago: University of Chicago, 2005).
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impressions from other works (again, works here means practices of Dichtung). This
means that the work does not bring things out fi'om utter hiddenness but draws fi'om the
culture in which it is situated. The image of the temple and the sea may be misleading if
it leads us to believe that sea, air, and stone have not already originated in a way when
they are put into relief by the temple. This indicates that there is a relational character to
the work, because it is in dialogue with how other works have presented a shared world
of experiences. Besides borrowing from other works, this means also that the work
relates itself negatively to other works. For example, the painting of the shoes brings
f01ih the peasant's shoes in a particular way: (a) positively, by way of referencing other
works and (b) also negatively, by indicating a region in which the shoes do not come to
appear as they are. In sum, because the poem is also an act of communication with worlds
already opened up, it is never a purely fOlmdational act. It opens a world within a world
that is already underway.
To say that the work opens a world within a world that is already underway is to
insist on reading the poem as an instance of communication, that its origination is tied to
the co-existence of multiple worlds. And in this way, rather than simply inverting the
hierarchy that Heidegger sets up between poetic language and ordinary language, we
press the point of their commonality fmiher. It is not just the fact that they share similar
features that unites the two, but that poetic language remains bound up with the
relationality that constitutes our entanglement with others. With such a reading, we
admittedly lead Heidegger away from some of his own tendencies. For the poem is then
not that which grounds ordinary language anymore than ordinary language is that which
grom1ds the poem. Accordingly, nothing actually originates in the poem outside of a
commU11icative act, one which must reference things out in the world that are available to
other independent subj ects.
To be clear, Heidegger's thought moves very close to this insight at two points.
First, he is very interested in how the work stays bound to what it carmot open up. The
opening activity of the work is specifically the opening up of what withholds itself from
complete disclosure. The strife between concealment and unconcealment opened up in
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the temple is retained by the stone, the earthiness and thingliness ofthe work. Similarly,
the word retains its opacity. The stone, the paper, the ink - all remain among the things of
the world that the work of art attempts to disclose. The artwork and the tmth event which
is established thereby are retumed to the earth, Heidegger tells us. In this way, the work
contests itself. It remains but a partial clearing, because it cmmot obtain the distance that
it needs to take from the world in order to disclose it.
On the other hand, despite how Heidegger conceives of the poem as bound to
what it cannot open, his poetics falls short of explaining how the poem is subject to social
entmlglement. For by grouping together the word with rock, color, etc., as the self-
secluding "emth," we lose sight of how the limit ofthe poem's opening pertains to its
c0111l11unicative dimension, that is, its proximity to ordinary language. The work of mt
cmmot ultimately be its own unique source, because like the ordinary speaker who must
always open language when encounters with another demand it, it is never complete lmto
itself. It is, rather, impossible for the poem to independently decide on its relation to the
world. Discursive relations in the world are what open the poem up.
From this perspective, what Heidegger calls the earth can be better understood as
the poem's own self-othering, its openness to what lies outside of it. This outside appears
within the poem as the tension among the multiple sources out of which it arises. For
within the world opened up by the poem, there are traces of other worlds. Other worlds
which cross paths with the poem but never come under the sway of its decision. Worlds
with their own histories, their own tmths. A plurality of worlds that converge in a poem
that requires a plurality of interpretations. The earthly quality of the poem, the scene of
its conflict, is just as much about the plurality of worlds as the withdrawal of materiality
from the language of the poem. Heidegger aclmowledges the dependence of the poem on
what he calls preservers. This is the second way in which the work is seen as held in
relations that it does not set up itself. "(W)hat is created," he writes, "cmmot itself come
into being without those who preserve it.,,29 But the activity of preservation, for
Heidegger, is again one of submission to the work itself, understood once again as the
29 Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 64.
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denial of multiplicity of works, worlds, and interpretations. Preserving, he says, "is a
sober standing-in within the extraordinary awesomeness of the truth that is happening in
the work .... (it) does not reduce people to their private experience, but brings them into
affiliation with the truth happening in the work."
I offer these criticisms in light of one particular body of poetic work where I
believe the traces of an encolmter with Heidegger can be found. This is the work of Paul
Celano In what follows, I will present Celan's poetics in light of how it resonates with and
responds to Heidegger's discourse on the poem as origin.
The Originlessness ofLanguage in Paul Celan 's Poetics
The words of Heidegger -like biblical, historical, and literary allusions - are a
recurring material out of which Celan weaves his poems. At the same time, the place of
Heideggerean discourse within Celan's poems goes beyond the place of material- the
poems seem to be in dialogue with Heidegger's work. There have been many
interpretations of this dialogue reconstructed through the poem "Todnauberg," the name
of the village where Celan spent a day with Heidegger in 1967 a few weeks after he was
released from the psychiatric hospital. But this poem, which has been the focus of nearly
all of the comparative studies, does not seem to seek a dialogue with Heidegger's poetics
per se. As most commentators have suggested, the poem seems, rather, to be engaged
with Heidegger as a human being and an ethical agent. But there is another dialogue with
Heidegger in which Celan is engaged, namely, a dialogue that was first and foremost
about language. And it was indeed Heidegger's philosophical writings on language that
first drew Celan to his work. 3D This dialogue is to be found most clearly in Celan's 1961
"Meridian" address.
The speech bears the name of the figure illustrated in one of the last passages, a
tigure whose meaning is not immediately clear, despite its proximity to many
30 This is not to say that there is not a significant relationship between Heidegger's poetics and his practical
and ethical life decisions. But since all evidence suggests that Celan sought out Heidegger because he was
genuinely interested in his philosophical explorations of language, it seems appropriate to me to try to
reconstruct that dialogue as much as possible on its own terms.
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philosophical ideas. Celan speaks about having found something, there in the presence of
his audience, that "binds and that leads to an encounter, like a poem (das Verbindende
und wie das Gedicht zur Begegnung Fahrende)," and which is "like language-
immaterial yet earthly, terrestrial, something circular, retuming upon itself by way of
both poles and thereby - happily - even crossing the tropics (and tropes) - the
meridian.,,3l ("Ichfinde etwas - wie die Sprache - Immaterielles, aber Irdisches,
Terrestrisches, etvvas Kreisjormiges, iiber die beiden Pole in sich selbst Zuriickkehrendes
and dabei - heitererweise - sagar die Tropen Durchkreuzendes --: ichfinde ... einen
A1eridian. ,,)32 What he finds gives us an understanding of what Celan believes his poems
seeks, his poetic goals.
Appearing at the end of the speech, Celan likens the figme of the meridian to the
poem and to language. In so doing, he indirectly speaks to these things through this
figme. The poem, Celan says, is something binding. There is a way in which language of
any sort is binding though, as we have discussed, and Celan addresses one aspect of this
in his pOlirayal oflanguage as "immaterial yet earthly." Language binds together earthly
things, perhaps the flow of perceptions that make up the bulk of human experience, and
the pali of our experience that intercepts this flow. It binds people together in
communication. In this way, all language - but particularly poetic language - seems
impOliallt for the connective work that makes om life experiences meaningful. But why
then should the meridian - this language-like figme - appear at the end of the address and
why does Celan say that the meridian, like language, is etwas Kreisjormig. What kind of
loss, void, or wandering creates a need for such a binding?
Celan frequently expresses or otherwise tries to bring forth the experience of loss.
MallY of his poems address the loss of his parents, particularly his mother, who were
depOlied dming the Holocaust and died in Nazi camps. A number of others address the
loss of close friends. Another, the loss of his firstborn son. And beyond these personal
31 Paul Celan, "The Meridian" in Selected Poems and Prose ofPaul Celan, trans. John Felstiner (New
York: NOlion, 2001), 413.
32 Paul Celan, Paul Celan, Del' Meridian: Endfassung, Entwiirfe, Materialien, ed. Bernhard Boschenstein
and Heino SclUllUll (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1999), 12.
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losses, there is good reason to read many of Celan' s poems as mouming the loss of all the
victims of the Shoah, of extinguished cultures, of hope for humanity in light of fascism as
well as post-fascist Europe. And yet, despite the fact that many would assume that the list
of these losses should include the loss of language, Celan's writings often suggest that he
considers language in a different, almost opposite light. For example, in the "Speech on
the Occasion of Receiving the Literature Prize of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen,"
Celan writes:
Reachable, near and not lost, there remained in the midst of the losses this
one thing: language.
It, the language, remained, not lost, yes in spite of everything. But it had to
pass through its own answerlessness, pass through frightful muting, pass
through the thousand darknesses of deathbringing speech. It passed
through and gave back no words for that which happened; yet it passed
through this happening. Passed through and could come to light again,
"enriched" by all this. 33
Here language is not what is lost but what remains despite all other losses. It remains not
by staying itself, and not by simply giving a word for "that which happened;' but by
undergoing a radical transformation. It must pass through its own limits - the limits of
what it can answer. And when it has, only thus enriched, can it remain.
The passage from the Bremen address provides us with some insight into one of
the mysterious tensions surrounding the figure of the meridian, namely, that it seems both
present, if only on the horizon, throughout the speech, and, on the other hand, seems only
to emerge at the end of the speech. It is continually sought but never absent. Heidegger's
philosophy of language, as we have explored it, may shed light here.
In Heidegger's work, we have traced out how human beings often find it
necessary to reapproach the discursive contexts within which we find ourselves thrown.
These contexts make up our social facticity and our historical reality, but our relationship
to them often appears inauthentic or otherwise problematic, often in response to a
33 Paul Celan, "Speech on the Occasion of Receiving the Literatme Prize of the Free Hanseatic City of
Bremen" in Selected Poems and Prose ofPaul Celan, trans. John Felstiner (New York: Norton, 2001),
395.
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demand from another that requires us to leave behind familiar fonTIs of speech in order to
communicate. Heidegger saw this clearly at issue in the activity of translation. But it also
has an important role in his understanding of poetry, insofar as he sees the distance taken
by the poetic work away from ordinary language to perform the same kind of disclosive
work as Dasein in general. The poetic work, like the creative writer, finds itself entangled
in ordinary, everyday words such that the distance it musters out for itself enables these
words to appear as iffor the first time. Likewise, the meridian appears at the end of the
speech as if for the first time, though - insofar as it is "like" language and poetry - it is
also taken up throughout the speech in Celan's description of poetry.
Like poetry as Celan describes it tluoughout the speech, tlle speech itself searches.
But the search aims in two directions. On the one hand, in writing a poem, one is, Celan
says, on a path toward oneself. He writes:
Then does one, in thinking of poems, does one walk such paths with
poems? Are these paths only by-paths, bypaths from thou to thou? Yet at
the same time, among how many other paths, they're also paths on which
language gets a voice, they are encounters, paths of a voice to a perceiving
Thou, creaturely paths, sketches of an existence perhaps, a sending of
oneselfahead toward oneself, in search ofoneself. .. A kind of
homecoming (my emphasis).34
Geht man also, wenn rnan an Gedichte denkt, geht man mit Gedichten
solche Wege? Sind diese Wege nur Um-Wege, Umwege von dir zu dir?
Aber es sindja zugleich auch, unter wie vielen anderen Wegen, Wege, mif
denen die Sprache stimmhajt wire!, es sind Begegnungen, Wege einer
Stimme zu einem wahrnehmenden Du, kreaturliche Wege,
DaseinsenM'iirfe vielleicht~ ein Sichvorausschicken zu sich selbst, mifder
Suche nach sich selbst . .. eine Art Heimkehr. 35
One can hear echoes of Heidegger here. Celan speaks of paths where language gets a
voice and which also grant a homecoming. Likewise, Heidegger speaks of ways to
language, whereby language may come to speak, and whereby we speakers can come to
truly belong to what already claims us. Thus poetry's role as founding. Such parallels
34 Paul Celan, "The Meridian," 412.
35 Paul Celan, Paul Celan, Der Meridian: Endfassung, Entwiilfe, Materialien, 11.
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would be apparent to any reader, though there is little agreement in general about how to
take references like these in tel111S of whether they suggest that Celan is thinking along
with or somehow against Heidegger's poetics. But the italicized segment of the passage
above is of special interest to our discussion. Celan calls the paths of poetry "sketches" or
projections of an existence (Daseinsentwurje). Why should the path whereby language
gets a voice require a projective sketch of an existence? We can make sense of this if we
recall our earlier discussion of substitution, translation, and metalanguage from the last
chapter. Previously we saw how the possession of a language required being able to
constantly extend beyond that language in response to the demands that arise from the
alterity within any communication relationship. The poem requires that one bring one's
speech beyond its limits in order to be enriched through an encounter with another. Celan
thus says that the path is "a sending of oneself ahead toward oneself, in search of
oneself." Or, as he says at another point: "Poetry hurries ahead." In the last section, we
saw how, for Heidegger, language originates in and through the poem. Words, Heidegger
says, come to be what they are in the world opened up by the poetic work. Likewise, the
projective nature of the poem, for Celan, strives after a return to an origin, a
homecoming. But this is only possible when the poem projects beyond itself. This brings
us to the second direction that Celan tells us the paths poems take. "The poem wants to
reach an Other," Celan says, "it needs this Other, it needs an Over-against (ein
Gegenuber). It seeks it out, speaks toward it.',36
This is also famously where Celan says that there is no absolute poem. "The
absolute poem (das absolute Gedicht) - no, that certainly does not exist, that can't
exist!,,37 What is this absolute poem that Celan denies? Many commentators hear this as a
reference to Symbolist poetics, exemplified by Stephan Mallanlle. And while Celan did
come very much to see his poetry as opposed to the Symbolist tendency, I think that we
can hear this point more broadly as a resistance to the idea that a poem wins the truth of
its begilming and sublates its original condition, that is, the condition of being thrown
36 Paul Celan, "The Meridian," 409.
37 Ibid., 410.
156
into this or that point of origin outside of itself. This means that we must understand the
meridian, the destination of Ce1an' s address which is "something circular, retuming upon
itself' otherwise than a reflection on language which attempts to secure its origin in the
poem.
For Celan, the retum of the meridian neither authenticates nor fmmds language. It
is as much characterized by incompleteness as it is by rootedness and belonging. So too
with Celan's poems. Many commentators have examined how the void, emptiness, and
rootlessness appear to be the goal of Celan's poetry. In what follows, I will consider how
some of these commentaries explain this goal and come back in the end to the description
of the meridian in Celan' s poetics.
Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, for example, has argued compellingly for the need to
hear Celan's work as aIiiculating the limits of the kind of experience that seems rooted in
subjectivity. Experience nanles, for Lacoue-Labarthe, precisely what our subjectivity
cannot stand as absolute witness to. Poetry, he says, attempts to recall experience, but
also ends up reaching a limit to what it can recall for the subject, since - as we described
in the last chapter - one's memory never has access to the origin of one's words. As
Lacoue-Labarthes writes: "to speak, to let oneself be caught up and swept away by
speech, to trust language, or even, perhaps, to be content to bon-ow it or submit to it, is to
'forget oneself.",38 Language is always rootless in this way. Even when we use it to
identify ourselves as precisely as we can, as with the pronoun "I," we still use a
bon-owed, general word. The poem seeks to recall the mood of perpetual thrownness into
language, our having missed the origin. It recalls this limit but in so doing reaches
another limit. Take, for eXaIllple, "Tiibingen, Janner" - a poem that Lacoue-Labarthe
takes up to describe the limits of subjective memory and experience in Celan's work. The
poem reads:
Eyes talked in-
to blindness.
Their - "a
38Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, Poetl}' as Experience, trans. Andrea Tal110wski (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1999),48.
riddle, what is pure-
ly arisen" - , their
memory of
floating HOlderlintowers, gull-
enswirled.
Visits of drowned joiners to
these
plunging words:
Carne, if there
carne a man,
came a man to the world, today, with
the patriarchs'
light-beard: he could,
ifhe spoke of this
time, he
could
only babble and babble,
ever- ever-
moremore.
("Pallaksch. Pallaksch.")
Zur Blindheit uber-
redete Augen.
Ihre - "ein / ReUsel ist Rein-
entsprungenes" -, ihre / Erinnerung an
schwimmende Holderlintiirme, mOlven-
umschwirrt.
Besuche ertrunkener Schreiner bei
diesen
tauchenden Worterl:
Kame,
kame einMensch,
kame ein Mensch zur Welt, heute mit
dem Lichtbart: er diirfie,
spl'ach el' von diesel'
Zeit, el'
dul'fle
nul' lallen und lallen,
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immer-, immer-
zuzu.
("Pallaksch. Pallaksch.',) 39
Lacoue-Labarthe takes the poem to mimic Holderlin's own search for the source - his
own obsession with homecoming (cf. e.g., "Heimkunft"). But in this attempt to recall
Holderlin, whose shadow Celan always felt that he labored in, he becomes disoriented.
He cannot find the origin that Holderlin pursued, HOlderlin who Heidegger always held
up as the most authentic, the most genuine of poets. Of the dizziness the poem encounters
in trying to recollect Holderlin' s Tilbingen, Lacoue-Labarthe writes:
Dizziness is an experience of nothingness, of what is, as Heidegger says,
'properly' non-OCCUlTence, nothingness. Nothing in it is 'lived,' as in all
experience, because all experience is the experience of nothingness: the
experience of dizziness here, as much as the anquish Heidegger describes,
or as much as laughter in Bataille. Or the lightning recognition of love. As
much as all the infinitely paradoxical, 'impossible' experiences of death,
of disappearance in the present. 40
On this view, the poem strives for an experience of nothingness, because it is in this void
that the poem truly speaks. For Lacoue-Labarthe, the poem in this way taps into the
nothingness at the heart of all experiences, by virtue of the subject's limited penetration
of them. In this way, the dizziness here could be called phenomenological vertigo-
dizziness before the things themselves whose way of appearing resists the kind of
analysis whereby we subsmne things lmder general categories. The limits of what one can
know, what one can see, and what one can say: these mark not just what is beyond one's
disclosive ability, but make up the very fabric of disclosure. The poem attempts to get to
the asubjectivity out of which all experience, language, and memory originates. In the
breakdown of vision ("eyes talked into blindness"), balance and orientation ("drowned,"
39 Paul Celan, "TUbingen, Jal111er" in Selected Poems and Prose ofPaul Celan, trans. John Felstiner (New
York: Norton, 2001), 158-9.
40 Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, Poetry as Experience, 19.
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"plunging") and language ("he could only babble and babble"), the poem tries to recall
what Lacoue-Labarthe describes as this nothingness from which we are thrown.
Peter Szondi explains the way that originlessness characterizes Celan's poetry in a
similar but slightly different way, emphasizing how the experience at issue for Celan's
poems is often one of being forcibly moved or uprooted. In his reading of "Engflihnmg;'
for example, he looks at the text's fornlal elements as they bear on the response of the
reader. The poem's first two stanzas are:
Taken off into
the telTain
with the Wllilistakeable trace:
Grass, written asunder. The stones, white
with grassblades' shadows:
Read no more - look!
Look no more - go!
Verbracht ins
Gelande
mit der untriiglichen Spur:
Gras, auseinandergeschrieben. Die Steine, ·weiss,
mit den Schatten der Halme:
Lies nich mehr - schau!
Schau nicht mahr - geh!41
It is a long poem. The spacing of the print slides from the left margin clear across the
pages at points. In the end, and after many sudden shifts and jarring depmiures, it returns
to the image it began with: "Taken off into I the telTain I with the unmistakeable trace: II
Grass, I Grass, I written asunder." One might say that the mention of being "taken off' is
a metaphor for or an expression of the depOliation of Celan's pm'ents, Celan's own
emigration around Europe and the loss of German culture as an intellectual home, or
Jewish diaspora. Szondi insists that we fill in too many blanks when we offer such
41 Paul Celan, "Ellgfillrrung" in Selected Poems and Prose ofPaul Celan, trans. Jolm Felstiller (New York:
Norton, 2001), 118-119.
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explanations though. This is not because these literal and historical uprootings do no bear
on the poem at all, but because, according to Szondi, the poem leaves all these different
sources open and decides ultimately on none of them. In this way, if the poem does try to
remember in the way that Lacoue-Labarthe describes, Szondi concurs that the poem fails
at such memorializing, because what first set the poem into movement, the me,ming
beneath the language so to say, is not given. The language of the poem, rather, feels
rootless. In the imagery of "Engflihrung," the language leaves only a "trace" and a
"shadow." It affords only a glance ("Read no more -look! ! Look no more - go!")
Szondi explains:
This is why we should stop wondering for the moment what is meant by
the 'unmistakeable trace' and instead note that these first three lines do not
tell us what it is .... The opening of 'Engflihrung,, then, is characterized
less by the (potential) meaning of the expressions used in it than by the
fact that the reader finds himself being at the same time drawn into a
context he does not recognize and treated as though it were familiar to
him; or, to be more precise, he is being treated like someone who has no
right to know. From the very begilU1ing, the reader has been deported -
verbracht, 'forcibly brought' - to a terrain that is both foreign and strange
.... Here, too, then, we should stop asking ourselves to whom the phrase
'Deported to the! terrain! with the unmistakable trace' refers and instead
note that the infoffi1ation is being withheld ....42
While, because of its focus on philosophical history, Lacoue-Labarthe's reading requires
that we presume that certain philosophical intentions guide Celan's work, Szondi reads
the poem for how it engages with what he presumes are the reader's expectations. Szondi
explains that the poem pushes the reader out of that position in which everything in the
poem makes sense as an expression of the poet's feelings and experiences. Suddenly it is
the one who is reading, interpreting, and critiquing who has no ground to stand on. This
is what is set to work in the poem. Szondi's reading also contains a positive description
of what the poem does. Its language is not representative. Szondi writes, "The text itself
is refusing to serve reality, to go on playing the role that has been assigned to it since
42 Peter Szondi, Celan Studies (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 28.
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Aristotle. Poetry is ceasing to be mimesis, representation; it is becoming reality.,,43 In this
way, the language in Celan's poems get closer than we are accustomed to. It violates the
distance between reality and language that we customarily reserve while reading.
In its attention to the hermeneutics of readership, Szondi' s reading illmninates the
limits of the tmderstanding of readers and listeners - those who seek to know whence the
poem springs. Furthermore, because we cannot isolate whence the poem issues, Szondi
suggest that it is its own reality. What Szondi does not elaborate on, though, is the way
that the emptiness or negativity of the poem is structured from the very start by the
presence of others. This is a connection that perhaps only becomes apparent when we
read poems like "TUbingen, Janner" or "EngfUhrung" alongside Celan's theoretical
remarks on poetics where he speaks to the intention of his poems. In this way, Celan
dramatizes the dynamics that we have been exploring over the last few chapters and
which Celan indicates when in the "Meridian" he tells us that poetry "runs ahead of
itself." As we have seen, in both the "Meridian" and the "Bremen" addresses, Celan
speaks about the poem making its way toward another. Language in the poem stretches to
its limit not solely on account of the way that the poet experiences originlessness on his
own. The language of his poems can only bring this emptiness to word in the presence of
a reader who will receive it.
This social exchange, the writing of the poem for another and the reading of the
poem for another, is a version of the therapeutic activity that we examined in the last
chapter, where we looked at the psychoanalytic transference relationship and the role of
interpretation therein. There we saw how Kristeva locates love and identification as
playing pivotal roles in language development, citing the way that amatory language
reconfigures the relationship between the speaker and the tool, the meaning and the
expression, and in so doing opposes the skepticism that otherwise often accompanies our
speech (the speech act "I love you" is both descriptive and perfom1ative). We looked at
an example from Roland Bmihes, where he describes modem literature as depmiing from
the kind of writing that expresses an author's ideas. For Bmihes, modem literature is a
43 Ibid., 31.
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speech act which "has no other content (no other statement) than the act by which it is
uttered: something like the 'I declare' of kings or the 'I sing' of the earliest poets,"
explaining that the modem writer "can therefore no longer believe, according to the
pathos of his predecessors, that his hand is slower than his passion .... for him, on the
contrary, his hand, detached from any voice, bom by a pure gesture of inscription (and
not of expression), traces a field without origin.,,44 I described this in temlS of the
amatory character of writing, where in the presence of the other's demand, or Kristeva
would say - through love, one finds oneselfat the swface ofone's words.45 In describing
how poems simultaneously seek both a self-recovery and a cancellation of identity in
anticipation of their addressee, Celan's poetics suggest that we can read his poems as
motivated by an experience of an ever-renewing demand.
Lacoue-Labarthe offers a different version of this insight. For in addition to
identity, what comes into being through the poetic speech-act, for Lacoue-Labarthe, is
memory and history. As previously discussed, the poems try to recall that to which the
author could not be present. Echoing Heidegger's description of the poem as opening up
a site of meaning that was not previously there, Lacoue-Labarthe describes the poem as
the place where memory and history actually originate. The stream of perceptions into
which we are proximally and for the most part thrown are only first ordered and put
together when poetized. Prior to that, all experience, Lacoue-Labarthe argues, is singular.
As singular, it is non-discursive and overwhelming. But through the poetic work, one can
gain a new look. This does not mean that the poem manages to subsume this excess to the
order of memory and history completely, for as we saw earlier, Lacoue-Labarthe argues
that the recollective ability of the poem is also limited. But there are strong resonances
between the way that Heidegger and Lacoue-Labarthe conceive of poetry. Heidegger
44 RolaJld BaJthes, "The Death of the Author" in The Rustle a/Language, trans. Richard Howmd
(Berekeley: University of Califol11ia Press, 1989), 52.
45 Denida's commentary on Celan, which I will tWll to later in the pages ahead, is relevant to this point.
Den'ida aJ'gues the reCWTence of dates in "The MeridiaJl" marks the way that the author's experience
becomes doubled and transfOlmed through each act of reading. Veronique Foti explains: "Precisely insofar
as the poem is inscription, writing, or text (rather than laJlguage speaking, in the HeideggereaJl sense), it
remains indissociable from the date." - Veronique Foti, Heidegger and the Poets (Atlantic Highlands, NI:
Humanities Press Intel11ational, 1992), 104.
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argues that Dichtung is the mode of proper political dwelling, because it is only through
Dichtung that worlds of shared significance are brought into appearance. Without poetic
activity, we would not share a world in which we could pursue conmlOn goals and
deliberate over common problems. Likewise, for Lacoue-Labatihe, there would be no
historical being nor individual - let alone collective - memory if it weren't for poetic
works.
But the difference between the two readings is stark at points. While Heidegger
emphasizes the de-cisive difference between the poem and what it brings forth, Lacoue-
Labarthe emphasizes precisely the difficulty of making such a distinction. The poem
dramatizes our tlu'owllness into language, the originlessness of what we have called
entanglement, but these characterize our everyday condition of being-ahead-of-ourselves
atlyway. In fact, if it is the artwork in some way that de-cisively transforms life, it is
poetry that interrupts this movement, or so Lacoue-Labatihe argues in his essay
"Catastrophe.,,46 Furthemlore, the poem does not succeed in refOlmding or authenticating
this initial condition. And yet, the two do not seem too far apart if the point of origin for
Heidegger atld the point of asubjective originlessness for Lacoue-Labarthe look very
much alike. In both accounts, poetry allows us to experience beings coming forth in their
own way, not coming forth as caused by this or that other thing - but as the nothingness
of Being.
Some commentators have taken Celan's interest in the ungroundedness of poetic
language as an attempt to think about truth as resisting systematicity. This is what
Adorno describes as a negative truth, the function of which is the lillconcealment of the
untruth from which it arises. In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno writes: "Celan's poems want to
speak of the most extreme horror through silence. Their truth content itself becomes
46 Reading Celan in "The Meridian" as reenacting the ancient abandonment of mimesis, Lacoue-Labarthe
differentiates what he sees as poetly's intenuption of ali's catastl'ophe from ali's catastrophic imitation of
reality. In one sense, the difference is about nature. From the perspective of ali, nature is something that
can really only be presented through representation. In poetly, though, something retu111s which resists this.
"Ali wants to expand itself; it clamors to be expanded. It wants its difference from the things and beings of
nature effaced. Ali is, if the word can be risked, generalized, never-ending 'estrangement' -- the Medusa's
head, the robots, the speeches -- without end." In this, the tendency of art is also the tendency oflanguage.
Poetry is an intenuption ofboth, as what contests art/language's desire to make everything its analogue.
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negative.,,47 The idea of a negative truth makes sense of Celan's comparison in the
"Meridian" of poetry to the "counter-word" (Gegenwort). The concept comes from the
story of Danton's Death by Georg BUchner. In BUchner's story, Danton and his
comrades, Lucille and Camille, are disenchanted with the culture of Revolutionary
France and are horrified by the perversity that has overtaken the revolution. The old
heroes of the revolution now face the guillotine as the purge of counter-revolutionaries
takes on a life of its own. The play shows the way that the Reign of Terror is fueled by a
popular obsession with the progress of humanity including its advancement in the arts
and the ethical substance, the Sittlichkeit, of France. As Camille and Danton head toward
the guillotine, about to be executed by Robespierre, Camille says something that Celan
explains sticks with him. He cries out: "Ach, die Kunst!" - Alas, art! Celan calls this a
"counter-word" (Gegenwort), a "word that snaps the 'wire,' that no longer bows to
'history's loiterers and parade-horses,' ... an act of freedom. It is a step.,,48 On this view,
the poem is like the counter-word. It is only as powerful as the loss of memory or the loss
of truth that it sets forth. 49
But, like Heidegger (and unlike Adorno), Lacoue-Labarthe does not elaborate on
the intersubjective character of history or memory; he only shows that they must be
constructed and deconstructed poetically. This may be due to the fact that Lacoue-
Labmihe also focuses on the singularity of experience, its non-discursive, extra-historical,
and extra-conceptual character. After all, if the basic form of experience defies
description by way of general concepts, it is easy to see why we have a hard time
communicating our experience. And yet, it is important to see that Lacoue-Labarthe does
in fact claim to recognize Celan's experience, however singular. This is more through his
deed than his word. For, first, Lacoue-Labarthe cmIDot help but generalize from the
47 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robelt Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota,
1997),322.
48 Paul Celan, "The Meridian," 403.
49 According to James Lyon's research in Celan's personallibrmy (detailed in Paul Celan and Martin
Heidegger: An Unresolved Conversation, 2006), Celan had read Heidegger's "Wozu Dichter?" carefully
and enthusiastically, and had marked the line that speaks ofthe poet's task as being to "attend, singing, to
the trace of the fugitive gods (singend aufdie Sput der entflohenden GaUer achten)."
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singular experiences he sees at issue in the poems in order to make broader claims about
the nature of experience, memory, and history in general. This seems to indicate that
Celan's descriptions resonated with him or at least that he could identify Celan's
experience as like others that he'd observed. Second, he stands in as interpreter of
Celan's poems and speeches, which requires inhabiting them in such a way that they
become windows to his own world to some extent. We have said as much already of
Heidegger's interpretations of Holderlin when we suggested back in the second chapter
that the interpretations demonstrate what I described there as Mitbejindlichkeit. Because
it strongly solicits the reader to step in and participate in the construction of the event, a
poem is one way that we find ourselves entangled with another through language.
One might raise a couple objections to the claim that Celan's poems can be and
seek to be shared like this. For one, one might hesitate to embrace a theory of experience
in poetry which generalizes from the specific historical life of Celano If all experience is a
sublime experience of nothingness, what weight does the specific historical situation that
Celan lived through have? We do not survive an experience of "the lightning recognition
of love" or being cast into a foreign language the same way someone survives deportation
and genocide. Related to this, a second possible objection - one raised by Dominick
LaCapra at a conference I attended a few years ago ~ concerns the need to distinguish
between primary and secondary fOlTI1S of witness and experience. Such a need arises, for
example, in the procedures of law, where firsthand experience of crimes, no matter how
unspealcable, need to be legally recognized.
Derrida's essay "Poetics and Politics of Witnessing" offers further insight on this
point, in that it explains how, in the very structure of bearing witness for the witness, one
must believe the other's experience, not have experienced or lived it. Speaking of the
lines "Nobody! bears witness for the! witness" ("Niemand/ zeugt far den/ Zeugen") from
the poem "Aschenglorie hinter," Derrida writes:
The judge, the arbiter, or the addressee of the testimony is thus not a
witness: he cannot and must not be. And yet, in the final analysis, the
judge, arbiter, and the addressee also have to be witnesses; they have to be
able to bear witness, in their tum, before their consciences or before
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others, to what they have attended, to what they have been present at, to
what they have been in the presence of: the testimony of the witness at the
witness stand. Only on the basis of this testimony will they be able to
justify, in just this way, their judgment. The judge, the arbiter, the
historian also remains a witness, a witness of a witness, when he receives,
evaluates, criticizes, interprets the testimony of a survivor, for instance, a
smvivor of Auschwitz. Whether he accepts or contests this testimony, he
remains a witness of the witness. 50
Derrida's argument holds the reader's experience of the poem and the experience that the
poem originally testifies to together in their difference, disallowing, for the
aforementioned legal reason among others, a conflation between the two. The power of
Den'ida's argument lies not only in its broad-minded sensitivity to the metaphysical
requirements of the legal system but in its powerful phenomenological description of
what it is to engage with and respond to a poem. His description of the need for the judge,
the arbiter, and the historian to receive, evaluate, criticize, and interpret testimony re-
envisions what Heidegger in "The Origin of the Work of Art" called the task of
preservation. Whereas Heidegger sees that the work needs others outside of it to step in
and preserve the happening of truth in the work, he specifically avoids suggesting that the
preserver has an independent ground separate from the work. For Den'ida, by contrast,
the opening up of a testimonial work requires that one must bear witness "before one's
conscience" (which, as we know from Heidegger himself, nobody can do for us.) It
requires an evaluative, critical, and interpretive attitude that engages discursively with the
work and insists on thinking it through in terms of relations that it did not itself set up.
Of course, the legal system operates as much as possible by precedent, by
arranging testimonial procedmes and arriving at decisions through precedent. Though the
singularity of experience, memory, and interpretation comes into play, a legal system-
qua system - cannot rewrite itself with each case. Poetry, on the other hand, is a system
that is constantly transforming. We approach poems with a concem for letting its voice
expand beyond precedent. The poet cannot know who his or her audience will be. Celan
writes: "A poem, as a manifestation of language and thus essentially dialogue, can be a
50 Jacques Derrida, "Poetics and Politics of Witnessing" in Sovereignties in Question: The Poeties ofPauI
Celan, trans. by Outi Pasanen (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005),89-90.
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message in a bottle, sent out in the - not always greatly hopeful- belief that somewhere
and sometime it could wash up on land, on healiland perhaps. Poems too are underway:
they are making towal'd something."sl Why is the poem written "in the - not always
greatly hopeful- belief' that someone will be there to receive it? As Celan reminds us,
the intemallimits of a poem correspond directly to its extemal possibilities opened up
through its readership. A poem attempts to communicate at the limits of the intelligible.
Only in this way can the other that it seeks be found. But this means that there is then an
intrinsic singularity al1d limitation to its address, A poem must always be unfinished,
underway.
Let me review where this engagement with Celan has brought us with respect to
the question of poetry's relationship to origins developed earlier in our reading of
Heidegger's poetics. We began this section by asking about the figure of the meridian at
the end ofCelan's address, that which Celan announces that he has fOlmd in the presence
of his audience and which is like a poem. We saw that Celan describes this as something
circular, retuming upon itself. And this resonated strongly with Heidegger's description
of poetry as founding for the first time those conditions (history, language, political life)
into which we are thrown. But from Celan's descriptions of poetry tlu'oughout the
address, we know that this is only one way of describing its destination. Celan adds that
the path of the poem, in addition to leading back toward oneself, also leads toward (a) a
void i111d (b) another, an unknown addressee. Having explored in previous chapters
language's ecstatic identity (being beyond itself) and the conmmnicative contexts that
condition language this way, we were in a good position to develop how these two
directions belong together. The figure of the meridian, like ordinary language and like the
poem, is both a circle that maintains a single, cohesive identity and a circle that
drastically changes as it revolves.
As such, the poem's opening up of a world is never complete unto itself. Its
opening depends on the existence of others who co-open it. This is why the distance that
the poem takes from worldly relations is never that of the "absolute poem" (das absolute
51 Paul Celan, "Speech 011 Occasion of Receiving the Literature Prize of the Free Hanseatic City of
Bremen," 396.
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Gedicht). The poem, I would like to say, rather, finds itself placeless, rootless - "pointing
into the open and void and free" only in response to the presence or the demand of
another. Only from this angle is the ecstatic character of the poem (what Lacoue-
Labarthe describes in terms of its asubjectivity) a path of homecoming. "Here too, in your
presence, I've taken this path. It was a circle,,52 CIch bin, auch hier, in Ihrer Gegenwart,
diesen Weg gegangen. Es war ein Kreis,,).53 This is, in the sense developed in the last
chapter, a therapeutic path - one where communication is enriched precisely through the
limits of speech. Here the basic act of conmmnicative exchange is the poetic appeal, one
that is not divorced from discursive n01111S, but an act that neveliheless insists on
redefining the criteria for communication at every instance of communication.
In the following respect, Heidegger's and Celan's poetics resonate with one
another. For both, the distance that the poem takes from experience and the ready-to-hand
world is different from the skepticism toward communication that often accompanies
many experiences of language estrangement. The mood of the poet is neither one of
skepticism nor of certainty. It is simultaneously one of hope and despair. Celan calls this,
as we saw earlier, a projection of existence. Poetry runs ahead of what it can be celiain
of. Thus, the poet finds himself or herself projecting the path upon which he or she hopes
to communicate, not anxious before the unceliainty of the protocol for the desired
communication. Likewise, as we saw in the last chapter, Heidegger chooses to describe
the poetic mood as one of a pain that is attuned to both joy and sadness. Thus, when
Heidegger says that the poet "could never go through the experience he undergoes with
the word if the experience were not attuned to sadness, to the mood of reIeasement into
the nea111ess of what is withdrawn but at the same time held in reserve for an originary
advent,,,54 he is near to the spirit of Celan's poetics. Throughout Celan's poems, the
withdrawal of the origin is near. One could see this in "Engflihrung," the poem we looked
52 Paul Celan, "The Meridian," 411.
53 Paul Celan, Paul Celano Der Meridian: Endfassung, Entwiilfe, Materialien, 11.
54 Martin Heidegger, "The Nature of Language" in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz (New York:
Harper Collins, 1971), 66.
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at earlier tlu'ough Szondi's analysis. There the ground quickly disappears and the poem
gives the reader the sense of continual displacement. But an even stronger example of a
poem that resonates with Heidegger's insight is "Tenebrae." The first three stanzas of the
poem read as follows:
Near are we, Lord,
near and graspable.
Grasped already, Lord,
clawed into each other, as if
each of our bodies were
your body, Lord.
Pray, Lord,
pray to us,
we are near.
Nah sind vvir, Herr
nahe und gre ifbar
GegrijJen schon, Herr,
ineinander verkrallt, als war
del' Leib einesjeden von uns
dein Leib, Herr.
Bete, Herr,
bete zu uns,
wir sind nah. 55
As Gadamer's reading of the poem points out, the confrontation in the poem oversteps
the boundary generally set up between the human and the divine.56 It speaks "into the
neamess of what is withdrawn." What precisely has withdrawn has no simple answer, I
believe. Gadamer and others look to the title of the poem for a clue. "Tenebrae" refers to
the extinguishing of Christ's breath during the crucifixion as well as a special service
55 Paul Celan, "Tenebrae" in Selected Poems and Prose o.fPaul Celan, trans. Jolm Felstiner (New York:
W.W. Norton, 2001), 102-103.
56 See "Meaning and Concealment of Meaning," a reading focused entirely on "Tenebrae" in the book
Gadamer on Celan: "Who am I and Who are You?" and Other Essays (SUNY, 1997).
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during Catholic Holy Week commemorating the crucifixion. Gadamer thus uses the title
in order to pinpoint Christ's death as the withdrawing at issue in the poem. Other
accounts of what has withdrawn point to the losses described earlier: the loss of a culture,
the home of a religious tradition, faith in humanity, etc. But again, as Szondi points out,
when the poem leaves all of these meanings and motivations in play, it does not just
decide on one. The one thing that we can say for sure is that the theme of a withdrawing
ground is prevalent throughout Celan's work, and - as we have said - the poems' power
of articulation is tied to this void. Thus, both authors speak to the poetic mood as a
volatile one. In "The Meridian," for example, Celan writes: "The poem is lonely. It is
lonely and underway" ("Das Gedicht ist einsam. Es ist einsarn und unterwegs"). The
poem always occurs in conjunction with a withdrawal of something in the world. But, for
Celan, as we have said, it nevertheless remains always tied to worlds outside of its own as
well. The multiplicity of possible interpretations, each of which connect the poem to
different contexts, confirms this continuing relationality.
In conclusion, I believe that it is, in the end, possible to argue that through the
participation of different interpretations which open up the work, a kind of originality
occurs. For it is in the encounter with each addressee that the poem reaches an origin.
But such interpretation must always involve tying the work back to relations which co-
exist alongside it and do not emanate directly from it. Moreover, the poem itself is no
longer the place where this origination occurs. Rather, it is in the encounter between the
poem, in its attempt to speak at the limit of what can be said, and the listener, who runs
ahead to meet it, that an original event takes place.
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CHAPTER V
EPILOGUE: THE CLAIM OF LANGUAGE
In different ways, each of the chapters within this project has turned around the
following tension. Language's claim upon our lives is, on the one hand, relentless and all-
encompassing. Our thoughts and our experiences are structured by discursive elements
that we inherit from others, and we absorb them as we absorb culture and history.
Language is thus one of our most basic forms of knowledge. To a significant extent, it is
through it that we develop ways of tUlderstanding our world, ourselves, and others. Thus,
it makes sense that philosophical science has turned its sights to language systems in
order to better tUlderstand the rules internal to them. For if language mediates between
our lmowledge and all objects of knowledge, it makes sense to look to the mediw11 in
order to set down the grounds and the limits for thought. On the other hand, when out of
our desire to know the medium, we inch our way closer toward language, the system up-
close is full of holes. The net oflanguage that seemed at tlrst relentless and all-
encompassing appears held up at its most fow1dational points by experiences of language
as placeless, lost, or lacking.
The first chapter demonstrated how philosophical and poetic processes of
discourse - both which question or otherwise unsettle our familiar use of words - are
pivotal to certain accow1ts which otherwise seem to announce the permanence and
stability of words in ordinary language, namely, in the Tractatus and Philosophical
Investigations of Ludwig Wittgenstein and in a poem, "Das Wort," by Stefan George.
From a celiain perspective, these works strongly denounce philosophical and poetic
discourse on accOlUlt of the way they tUlsettle and try to transform the relentless net of
language. But what George's poem plainly reveals and what Wittgenstein's work
obliquely admits through its confession of absurdity is that the process by which one
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finds oneself detenllined by inherited discourses is also a path upon which language
appears contingent on what it receives from the outside. History itself makes this point
when we consider that philosophy's tum toward the task of grounding language betrays
its own purpose, since a language that needs grounding from the outside can only ever
have something extemal as its ground, something that in a way also ungrounds it.
Martin Heidegger's work on language, especially the essays and lectures from the
1950's collected in On the Way to Language, provided us from the very beginning with
ways of describing the complex dynamics of language's being. While most philosophy of
language at that time, like much of it later, focused on the immediate way in which
language detemlines our existence, appealing often to the notion of a common sense
about words that language users share whether they know it or not, Heidegger resisted
such appeals. Heidegger acknowledges that we are entangled in language usage prior to
any attempt to thematize what this entanglement means. As such, our relationship to
language is, he tells us, "vague, obscure, almost speechless."l But this does not mean, for
him, that we should not attempt to thematize it. Everything depends, for Heidegger, on
bringing our relationship to language to word. What this will require, however, is not
approaching language scientifically and explaining it in tenllS of concepts bOlTowed from
the topos of, say, human activity or spirit. Rather, throughout On the Way to Language,
Heidegger urges us to come face-to-face with the experience oflanguage and, in so
doing, to let it appear on its own telms. His approach is therefore a phenomenological
one, and based on what we have explored in the fourth chapter, also a poetic one. It draws
our attention to the groundlessness of our relationship to language, to its independence
from any subjective ground from which we might suspect it derives.
The second chapter looks more closely at how our entanglement within language,
the way it always exceeds the individual subject's use and intention, pertains to our
entanglement in factical social life more generally. The chapter asked whether the
argument that we must find a way to language and therefore that we do not tmly dwell
with it in our n01111al usage entailed some kind of skepticism toward our social being. By
I Martin Heidegger, "The Nature of Language" in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz (New York:
Harper and Row, 1971),58.
--------------- . -_._----
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looking back at a few sections fimn Being and Time, we saw how Heidegger understands
our throwm1ess into language and the social relations that go along with it in tem1S of
Dasein's general condition. The enviromnental remoteness of what is most near, those
tools, habits, and contexts that we use and live through everyday are, Heidegger says, the
most hidden and obscure for thought. As for the issue of skepticism, our joumey into
Being and Time led us to see that being perpetually thrown - through moods and other
ways of finding ourselves (Befindlichkeit), Dasein no more immediately dwells with its
own thoughts or experiences than it does with the world "extemal" to it. Heidegger
makes this point most clearly in his discussion of translation in his lectures on Holderlin's
"Der Ister." There Heidegger writes that we must translate what is our own in order to
dwell with it.
It was at this point in the project that my own attempt to bring our obscure
relationship to language to word first diverged from Heidegger's path. For while
Heidegger's discussion of translation definitely carried forward the concept of perpetual
thrownness from Being and Time, applying it to the practice of cross-cultural translation,
it also underemphasized the need for translation between those speakers who speak "the
same" language. The difference at issue in translation was construed again and again by
Heidegger as the encounter between national peoples - specifically those of Ancient
Greece and modem Germany. Did not our everyday conversations with people in our
own communities require an interpretive mood as well? Moreover, was it not this sort of
encounter that conditioned us most of all to experience language entanglement in the first
place?
The third chapter pressed on along this path, parallel but separate from
Heidegger's own. In order to work out how exactly nom1al, everyday encounters require
an interpretive attitude toward and a critical distance from our own language, this chapter
ch'ew from structuralist linguisitics and psychoanalysis, two discourses often kept
separate from phenomenology. Echoing Heidegger's idea that we find ourselves always
already using language prior to our reflections on it, psychoanalysis claims that our
entrance into language is from the beginning always in response to others to whom we
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remain deeply entangled as we mature and otherwise develop as individuals. It is for this
reason that language is never our own, nor is it - psychoanalysis says - under the
dominion of the ego. Language is, instead, other to the ego. This may often take the form
of an antithetical relationship between one's sense of oneself and the world oflanguage,
the world out there accessible to all. Such a condition, according to Julia Kristeva, is
characteristic of melancholy.
But through his research in language development and linguistic categories,
Roman Jakobson argues that this tension is actually fundamental to all language systems.
For all languages depend on what he calls shifters, words which have both a singular and
general meaning. Shifters are thus complex linguistic categories, and it is no slU-prise that
in cases of aphasia, where one's speech capacities regress, one loses the ability to hold
both functions together at once. This capacity for dual-function speech, for Jakobson, is
also tied to the capacity for substitution. Ordinary commlmication requires that we be
able to switch from one code to another and, in order to do this, we must be able to let go
of a given idiom, our absorption into a single language, and translate for another.
We only do this, though, in response to another. In other words, we switch codes
when communication requires it. There are, therefore, intersubjective conditions which
enable us to engage in translation or substitution, which are, again, basic to any language.
Thus, some theorists have pointed to the impOliance of dialogical rhetorical conditions in
helping individuals estranged from language to invest again in communication. Through
the kind of dialogue that is exemplified, for example, in psychoanalytic transference,
others can help us work through the tension between feeling absorbed in single, idiomatic
speech situations and feeling at a distance from our words. The therapeutic process
outlined by Judith Butler and Julia Kristeva takes advantage of the difference between the
descriptive and perfonnative aspects (Butler) and the semiotic and symbolic aspects
(Kristeva) oflanguage. Since one's estrangement from language often entails an inability
to locate oneself in the symbolic order or in the n0D11ative descriptions available, both
thinkers see tremendous therapeutic possibilities in those aspects of language that are
structurally other to the symbolic and the descriptive. Both Butler and Kristeva thus
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develop how disclosing one's life through language involves the caring recognition of
others.
This is not something that one finds thoroughly developed in Heidegger's work;
however, I argued in this chapter that there are nevel1heless strong parallels between
Kristeva and Heidegger that justify the hypothesis that Heidegger's proj ect, insofar as it
is a desire to recognize the fundamental tension in the speaking subject, is also a kind of
therapeutic project. Heidegger's claim that poetic work requires an attunement to both
joy and sadness in any case strongly echoes Kristeva's argument in Black Sun that there
is only meaning when there is also melancholy.
Chapter four returns to Heidegger again, this time focusing on his discussion of
poetry. While the previous chapter had used the example of psychoanalytic transference
to describe how individuals can work through language entanglement, the fOUl1h chapter
describes how poetry can accomplish this task. Because of the extensive focus on social
conditions in the previous chapter, the important question here is to what extent social
interaction is involved in the way that poetry brings forth language. Heidegger's poetics
powerfully articulates how shared worlds of meaning or nonns of communication emerge
through poetic works. In this way, he demonstrates again ordinary language's need to be
grounded by what will always remains outside of that system. Going back to the language
of Being and Time, we can say that Heidegger's poetics shows that ordinary language is
always thrown outside of itself into the always-external, always-marginal space of poetry.
It is this kind of perpetual thrownness that Heidegger calls the poem's founding activity.
But while Heidegger insists that Dichtung has a vitally important role to play in
establishing discourse communities, he does not fully consider how the poem maintains
ties to worldly relations that it itself does not open up. The last chapter, therefore, tumed
to the poetics of Paul Celan, a poetics that is very much in dialogue with Heidegger's
writings on language and poetry. For Celan, we saw, the distance that the poem takes
fl.-om worldly relations, from ordinary language, is aimed not at the establishment of a
decisive tmth event discontinuous from others but at soliciting the pm1icipation of its
readers. As such, it does not attempt to achieve the status of an original ontological event.
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It remains within the world opened up by others - other interpreters and other works.
Celan's poetics therefore offers an altemative path from Heidegger's way to language.
For he insists more strongly than Heidegger that poetic language maintains a deep
kinship with ordinary language, a hypothesis that the second and third chapters explored
in some depth. Moreover, CelaJ.1 offers us a different measure for coming to terms with
the human relationship to language, in that the figure that he offers is not quite a circle
that retums back to its origin. For on its path toward language, it transforms each time it
encounters the possibility of a new communication.
The path of my own project has taken a similaJ.' route. In trying to give a
phenomenological description of how we find ourselves in language, I have encountered
voices aJ.1d inherited concems that have made my own route back to this conclusion an
imperfect circle. But what has originated through this project, I believe, is a rich
description of why human beings find it necessary for various reasons to enrich the way
that they initially relate to language. Whether we describe this as an existential necessity
or a political necessity arising from our deliberations with others, it falls upon philosophy
to open up a space for individuals to find their own paths into language.
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